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SUMMARY
This dissertation presents innovative demand management techniques for ser-
vice systems with limited resources. The first study analyzes demand management
policies of animal shelters with limited Kennel space as a set of interacting stochastic
queueing systems. In practice, there are two main policies being used, which we call
“Kill” and “No-Kill” policies. In a “Kill” system, animals may be euthanized if a
shelter is full. Many shelters have moved to a “No-Kill” policy, where they avoid
killing for space and adopt other approaches to reduce supply and demand mismatch.
Our goal is to provide insights on how No-Kill policies, such as coordination, adop-
tion and neutering campaigns, help reduce the animals’ killing rate so that the shelter
management can choose the way to effectively solve their problems.
In the second part, we consider a topic of demand management for the Sports
and Entertainment (S&E) industry, called “Scaling the house”, i.e., how to divide
seats into zones for different prices to maximize revenue across the venue. From the
data obtained from several performance venues in the U.S., we find ticket demand
is impacted by locations of seats as well as by price. We characterize closed-form
solutions for the optimal two-dimensional zoning decision (with row and column cuts)
and the one-dimensional decision (with row cuts), and explore when each model
should be applied. The third study considers pricing as a tool to manage demand for
the S&E tickets. We develop dynamic pricing with demand learning models where
demand is also affected by time left until the show dates. Since the show’s popularity is
usually uncertain to the seller, we propose a method to learn the overall popularity via
Bayesian updates. We perform computational experiments to understand properties




Many organizations traditionally emphasized the supply side of the profit equation
such as making cost reduction a strategic priority. However, rapidly growing technol-
ogy results in expanding market opportunities and this shift causes many companies
to realize that focusing on supply alone is not enough. Demand management has been
spotlighted and considered to be an effective tool to generate competitive advantages
in the present economic environment. In this thesis, we consider a variety of inno-
vative demand management policies, including partial coordination, segmentations
based on behaviors, and learning when demand also changes over time, with the goal
of improving a system’s performance, capacity utilization and customers service.
In this work we focus on the service industry, which is one of the major sectors in
the US. Approximately 55% of the economic activity in the United States occurs in
service industries as classified by the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) [109]. The key characteristic of the service sector is that unlike most goods,
in which firms can decide to sell before or after their manufacturing, service can only
be sold prior to its production, not after [111]. This causes demand management
of service systems to be complicated due to perishability issues. In addition, many
service facilities may not have flexibility in changing the number of their resources
in the short run. It is, therefore, important to manage demand so that they can
effectively utilize their limited capacities.
In the first part of the dissertation (Chapter 2), we consider the problem of demand
management in a public service system, namely, an animal shelter. City animal
control organizations and individuals often bring stray animals to animal shelters (the
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city pound or individually operated entities). Individuals may also bring animals to
the shelter for which they are unable to care. Approximately 5 million cats and dogs
were euthanized in the shelter systems last year in the United States, which resulted
in part due to the inadequate space in animal shelters [103]. For example, some
shelters or city pounds kill animals after a short period of time when more animals
arrive than the space available (denoted here as a Kill policy or a K system). Some
shelters have moved to a No-Kill policy (called an NK system) where animals, waiting
for adoptions, are not killed for space reasons, but as a result incoming animals may
be turned away (e.g., left on the streets or sent to an alternate shelter) when there is
insufficient space. The main goal of the No-Kill policy is to reduce killing rates with
policies other than killing, e.g., encouraging coordination among shelters, promoting
adoptions and emphasizing neutering practices.
We study such systems as a set of shelters as queues with diversion of animals
when full. In the first part of Chapter 2, we consider the effects of the coordination
policy and primarily focus on the rejecting (or killing) rate of animals, which is a key
measurement of how well the shelter serves the overall community of strays and how
many lives are lost due to limited capacity. We start with the basic model where a
system consists of identical shelters that divert animals to another shelter when the
first is full (i.e., partial coordination). We find that when each shelter has the same
adoption rate distribution, the arrival rate of No-Kill system is identical to that of
the M/M/mC/mC queueing system. However, when the adoption rate of each shelter
in the system is different, we show that the killing rates of the coordinating No-Kill
shelters and the M/M/mC/mC are not the same. For large systems, our results show
that adding more coordinated shelters helps reduce the overall killing probability but
the marginal improvement is decreasing. We also provide several insights on how to
design different kinds of coordinating systems to achieve the highest improvement,
including coordinating with neighbors or between particular pairs of shelters, as well
2
as using one-way animals diversion when necessary.
In addition to shelter coordination, No-Kill shelters may encourage people to adopt
animals by using adoption campaigns, e.g., using temporary storefronts, mobile units,
or partnerships with retail operations. We identify how to obtain the optimal number
of adoption campaigns to achieve the shelter’s overall minimum cost when adoptions
are concave and increasing with the number of the campaigns. Also, No-Kill shelters
may attempt to reduce their demand (or the animals’ incoming rate) by promoting
a neutering policy in the community. When animals increase according to a type of
growth function, we show that the shelter’s total cost is first concave and then convex
with the number of animals neutered. We give insights on which situation that each
of the No-Kill policies can be most beneficial. For instance, our results suggest that
an adoption campaign can be more attractive for a low campaign budget, while a
neutering policy is more effective for a higher budget. Although our work in Chapter
2 is motivated by the animal shelters’ policies, the context can be applied to other
industries with limited servers, e.g., hospital operations, ambulances and internet
servers.
In the second part of the thesis (Chapter 3), we study a demand management
problem in the entertainment ticket industry that arose from discussions with deci-
sion makers in the performing arts organizations. Selling fixed perishable products,
the entertainment ticket industry can potentially benefit from the revenue manage-
ment idea but still has not received as much attention in the literature [41]. A key
question for many venues is how to segment the venue by location and price (i.e.,
“Scaling the house”). We empirically explore transactional level data from 318 shows
to observe how seating locations drive ticket demand within the venue. In addition
to price, we find that distance from the stage and distance from a row’s center also
affect demand. We develop a two-dimensional zoning model for the optimal ”Scaling
the house” decisions. In addition, we present an alternative one-dimensional zoning
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model for the case where demand is not significantly sensitive to distance from the
center. We show that the optimal seating row (to be priced at a higher price before
switching to the next lower price) is the row whose expected revenue when charging
a high price is equal to the expected revenue when charging a low price. We provide
key comparative statics on how model parameters impact the optimal decisions. In
robustness analysis, our results show that a risk-averse venue manager who tends to
overestimate the sensitivities of demand may achieve higher revenue than a risk-taker
manager who underestimates them. We also discuss important managerial insights
on when it is most worthwhile to section seats into two-dimensional zones and how
to match different types of shows (or different shapes of venues) to optimal seating
segmentation.
While “Scaling the house” is extremely important, it is generally performed no
more than once a year and organizations are now turning towards dynamic pricing
as a tool to balance supply and demand dynamically as the season progresses. In
the third part of the dissertation (Chapter 4), we consider a demand management
problem via dynamic pricing for the Sports and Entertainment (S&E) industry. We
develop dynamic pricing models for stochastic S&E demand in a discrete finite time
setting, where demand depends not only on ticket prices but also on time left until
the show dates. In our analysis of three venues with over 300 shows, demand of
performances/arts tickets generally increases sharply in weeks before the show.
We assume the overall show popularity is uncertain to the seller, but this infor-
mation can be learned via Bayesian updates as early sales are revealed. We consider
two situations: (1) the seller can adjust ticket prices every period, or (2) the seller
dynamically determines the optimal timing for one price change in the selling horizon
and how much to change price. We perform computational experiments to under-
stand properties of the model solutions and performances under different scenarios.
Our results show that demand learning is most beneficial when the initial estimates
4
are incorrect. In addition, it can be useful to consider demand pace when making
price change decisions. Our results show that it is less necessary for the seller to vary
price every period if a large amount of demand arrives close to the show dates. Our
results also show that having flexibility to adjust price every period becomes more
beneficial with the existence of demand learning.
Overall, in this thesis we consider innovative policies to manage demand in service
systems, which are key components in our societies. We study a variety of decision
levels from planning to real-time and consider policies including partial coordination,
segmentation, and decision making incorporating demand learning. Although our
work is motivated by problems specific to a particular type of organizations, we also
contribute new results across organizations and sectors.
In each chapter of the thesis, we describe the contribution of our research in
the literature review and present the main results as well as the key computational
experiments. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
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CHAPTER II
ANALYSIS OF LIMITED CAPACITY SERVICE
SYSTEMS BASED ON OPERATIONAL POLICIES OF
ANIMAL SHELTERS
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we study the operational policies (namely coordination, adoption
and neutering policies) of animal shelters as a set of stochastic queueing systems.
Although the specific problem we study is motivated by policies used to operate No-
Kill animal shelters, similar systems can also be found in other systems of servers.
We focus on the killing rate, which is defined as the rate of animals rejected from the
capacitated system, and the total cost of shelters as the main measurements of this
study.
“Approximately 5 million dogs and cats were killed last year in U.S. shelters. That
is 13,800 every day or 575 dogs and cats killed every hour, 24 hours a day, seven days
a week” [103]. The majority of these killings are due to space restrictions rather than
diseases. Yet, this is happening in a society where a major league athlete who was
involved in dog fights and deaths of a small number of animals was received with
outrage and jail time. City animal control organizations and individuals often bring
stray animals to animal shelters (the city pound or individually operated shelters).
Individuals may also turn in animals for which they are unable to care. The vast
majority of the deaths in these shelters are due to the limited capacity of animal
shelters compared to the population of animals [81]. As a result of limited capacity,
many shelters such as city pounds are operated with policies where they will kill
animals after a period of time to gain more space for incoming animals.
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Many people, especially those connected with shelters, find the killing rate unac-
ceptable. In 1989, Ed Duvin wrote an article about humane societies and shelters,
noting that the foundation of the system “Is the dark secret that it is, in part, lit-
tle more than a vast killing machine?” [10]. As a result of the distaste for killing,
many shelters have moved to a “No-Kill” policy. In this policy, the shelter does not
euthanize any animals for space but only for reasons such as disease. When there is
insufficient space, incoming animals may be turned away (e.g., left on the streets).
To reduce the killing rate, shelters management attempts to reduce the killing rate
by several methods such as 1) coordinating with each other, 2) increasing adoptions
and 3) promoting animal neutering.
The current rate of about 5 million animals euthanized per year in shelters, though
still unacceptable, is significantly reduced from about 17.8 million euthanized in 1985
[81]. The prevalence of No-Kill shelters may be one contributing factor to this reduc-
tion. The No-Kill policy offers much comfort to those who love animals, yet it has also
generated controversy. For instance, one woman wrote to the Best Friends Animal
Society “No-Kill shelters sound great. But where do all the other animals go?” [10].
Though the No-Kill movement has generated much discussion and controversy, little
has been done to analyze its effects on the system. In this chapter, we analyze the
main policies currently implemented in most No-Kill shelters: namely, coordination,
adoption and neutering policies.
Basically, each shelter can be described with stochastic arrivals (of animals) into
a limited capacity shelter with stochastic service or adoption rate environment. An
animal is either accepted to wait for adoption or is turned away; thus there is no
queueing within a shelter. When a coordination policy is implemented in the No-Kill
system, incoming animals who arrive at a full shelter can be transferred to another
shelter in the system if space is available. The adoption rates of the shelters may differ,
depending on factors such as: location, physical conditions, management policies, etc.
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If all shelters are full, we assume the incoming animals are rejected from the system.
We refer to a set of: 1) coordinating No-Kill shelters as an NK system, and 2)
uncoordinated shelters as a K system. In contrast to an NK system, if an incoming
animal arrives to a full shelter in a K system, it is rejected without being diverted
to a second shelter. We quantify the behavior of the system as measured by the
killing (or rejection) rate of arriving animals. Of course, while animal deaths are
important problems, the context of coordinated queueing systems translates across
many industries with customers and servers, for example, hospitals, ambulances and
internet servers.
For the issue of coordination among shelters, we first consider a basic model
where a system consists of identical shelters. We show that when each shelter has
the same mean adoption rate, the NK system gives the same rejecting rate as an
M/M/mC/mC system, even though the NK shelters only partially coordinate when
a shelter is full. We find the killing rate of the NK system is less than that of the K
system which has no coordination, but the rate of the reduced killing rate decreases
as more shelters are included in the coordinating NK system. We find the killing
rates of the NK and the M/M/mC/mC system are not equal when the adoption
rate of each shelter in the system is different. Intuitively, this is due to the ability
to choose among shelters with different adoption rates when animals are diverted to
another shelter in the NK system. For example, the time spent in the shelter before
adoption (or inter-adoption time) can be reduced if an animal is diverted to a shelter
with a better location (higher adoption rate). Otherwise, the time can be increased.
Also, we consider a more general case when the mean adoption rate of each shelter
is nonlinear, specifically an increasing concave function of the number of animals in
the shelter. In this case, an NK system’ killing rate is not necessary the same as
an M/M/mC/mC’s rate. Yet, our numerical analysis shows that coordination still
reduces the killing rate, although its benefit is small when the adoption rate is less
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sensitive to the number of animals in the shelter.
In practice, there may be different types of sheltered animals (e.g., puppies and
older dogs), whose expected times in the shelter are not necessarily equal. We also
take into account that animals arriving to the shelter can be divided into two different
types: 1) those with shorter inter-adoption times (i.e., “good”), and 2) those with
longer times (“bad”). We explore the impact of adoption and arrival rates of each type
on the shelters’ killing rate. When the shelter’s mean adoption rates are different,
we use computational experiments to explore a number of policy combinations (e.g.,
between a fast and a slow shelter versus between a pair of fast shelters or a pair of
slow shelters). In some cases, it may be impractical to coordinate among all NK
shelter, we examine the impact of coordinating only with shelters in neighborhoods
and provide recommendations for effective policy selections.
In addition to stressing coordination, shelters with No-Kill policy attempt to re-
duce animal deaths by implementing adoption and neutering policies. The first policy
can help reducing number of animals in the shelter, while the second can decrease the
arrival rates. In typical service systems like call centers, reducing the arrival rates is
not common since it means fewer customers (and usually less revenue). However, for
non-profit organizations like animal shelters, having too many arrivals (e.g., animals)
can cause a higher number of euthanized animals, so having fewer arrivals can ben-
efit the system. In this chapter, we also explore the impacts of both adoption and
neutering policies and consider which one is more effective than the other under dif-
ferent scenarios. When animals increase according to a type of growth function, and
when a shelter promotes neutering, we show the shelter’s total cost is first concave
and then convex with the number of animals neutered. For the adoption policy, if
adoptions are concave and increasing with the number of the campaigns, we find the
shelter’s total cost is convex in the number of campaigns used and there is an optimal
number of campaigns for the minimum cost. We explore computational experiments
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to evaluate the total cost to compare adoption and neutering policies. We find that
one policy can be more preferable than the other when campaign budgets are taken
into consideration.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section we review the
most pertinent literature. In Section 3 we describe the model and the assumptions
for the coordination policy. We present the results when the shelters have equal mean
adoption rates and when they have different adoption rates in Sections 3.1 and 3.2,
respectively, and the insights from numerical experiments of this policy can be found
in Section 3.3. Adoption and neutering campaigns are analyzed in Section 4. We
conclude by summarizing our results and discussing the managerial insights derived
from our analysis in Section 5. The proofs of all results are included in the Appendix.
2.2 Literature Review
This chapter draws on two main streams of literature; studies related to animal
shelters’ operations and queueing literature. Some papers have found the time to
adoption can be different for animals with different characteristics (e.g., size and
age). Posage et al. [118] point out that animals with gold or white coat colors, small
size, and a history of an indoor environment spend less time in the shelters compared
to others (those types of animals can be comparable to the “good” type in our study
while others can be grouped as the “bad” type). Normando et al. [113] consider
methods to increase successful adoption rates. The authors found that although a
young age is the most important factor for a quick adoption, programs that include
increased human interaction and special training for dogs with behavioral problems
could aid in the successful adoptions. In addition, Diesel et al. [40] study how animal
features (such as purebred status, size, sex, etc.) affect time to adoption. Their
results show that the significant factors were breed, size, sex, neuter status on arrival
at a shelter, color and age. Neither of all studies above consider operational policies
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of shelters; instead they primarily focus on the adoption effects of either the shelters’
environment or animal characteristics. In contrast, our study focuses on how the
performance of shelters can be improved by using different kinds of policies. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to quantitatively analyze operational policies
of animal shelters or study them as a stochastic system.
The second stream of work relevant to our study is the queueing literature. One
area closely related to this chapter is the study of the Erlang loss formula. The
Erlang loss formula (the blocking probability of the M/G/C/C system) was first
developed by A. K. Erlang and his colleagues (see [46]). Since then it has been
widely studied and extensively applied by telecommunication researchers (see [136]).
Important properties of the Erlang loss formula have been proved in several papers.
Messerli [105] shows the rejecting probability of the M/G/C/C system is a convex
function of capacity C. Harel [64] proves that the Erlang loss formula is strictly
decreasing and strictly convex in the service rate when the arrival rate and capacity
C are fixed. In addition, the Erlang loss formula is shown to be independent of the
service time distribution beyond its mean. In other words, the rejecting probability
of the M/G/C/C model is equal to that of the the M/M/C/C system (see [124]).
Other key properties of the Erlang loss formula can be found in [68] and [146]. While
the papers above focus on the properties of the loss formula, we study various kinds
of operational policies and consider impacts of different types of arrivals to the shelter
queueing systems.
The type of queueing system closely related to our work is a parallel-server system,
which is the most common model to support resource management of call centers (See
[6], [53], [54], [59], [66], [71], [79], [114], [130], and [143]). In this chapter, we study
animal shelters as systems with parallel servers with no waiting space. First, we focus
on how the performance of No-Kill shelters can be improved by coordination among
11
systems. Our study is, therefore, closely related to the capacity pooling and parti-
tioning literatures. Smith and Whitt [131] mathematically prove that the probability
of the M/M/mC/mC system being full is strictly decreasing in m. They also show
that combining the M/M/C/C systems can lead to disadvantages when the service
time distributions are different. While [131] study full coordination of resources, our
work considers partial coordination, which only happens when one of the shelters is
full. We prove that partial coordination gives the same rejection rate as full coordi-
nation when the service distribution is identical. Unlike the earlier study in [131], we
assume the service (or adoption) time of each animal is based on the shelter to which
the animal is transferred. We also show partial coordination of shelters in the NK
system is not the same as the M/M/mC/mC system when the service distribution
of each shelter is different.
In other studies related to capacity pooling (e.g., [8]), the author presents perfor-
mance bounds for the effectiveness of pooling situations and shows some trade-offs
between capacity and utilization of the pooled versus the independent systems. Buza-
cott [23] studies the pooling of N servers in series when each server is dedicated to one
task, versus N parallel servers when each server completes all the tasks. The author
points out that the pooling system performs better when there is higher variability in
the tasks. Sheikhzadeh et al. [129] consider machine sharing in manufacturing sys-
tems focusing on total flexibility and chaining. Benjaafar [9] study inventory pooling
in systems with symmetric costs where supply lead times are created by the pro-
duction system with finite capacity. In this chapter we include the exploration of
performance improvement due to partial coordination among systems with different
service distributions. We also computationally examine how to combine such systems
to effectively reduce the rejection rate with a pooling policy.
Our study is also related to the problem of optimal control in queueing systems.
Much of the literature in this area studies capacity planning; e.g., Kochel [78] considers
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how to optimally determine the number of servers and the waiting spaces for the
M/M/C/K system. Borst et al. [20] focus on the M/M/C queues with the objective
of minimizing both waiting and staffing costs where the waiting cost depends on the
waiting time of customers. While those papers looked at capacity decisions, we focus
on how shelters can improve their performance by using a variety of policies instead
of changing their current capacities.
A number of studies consider the problem of deciding the optimal price for a queue-
ing system. For instance, Mendelson [104] studies the problem of finding the optimal
price for the computer service facilities in which the delay cost linearly increases with
the waiting time. Dewan and Mendelson [39] consider the similar problem but allow a
general delay cost function. Palaka et al. [115] study the M/M/1 system and decide
optimal price and quoted lead time, where arrivals are assumed to be linear with
price and lead time quoted. So and Song [133] extend the problem when demand is
log-linear in price. Other papers on pricing decisions in queueing models can be found
in [24], [63], [121] and [150]. In contrast to the literature where arrival rate is usually
assumed to depend on prices, in our work we assume animal arrivals (or shelter de-
mand) can be adjusted via neutering campaigns. We also focus on the overall cost,
which is the killing cost plus campaign cost, rather than the system’s profitability.
We build our work, first, on the assumption of identical customer (or animal)
service (or adoption) time distribution. Then, to better represent animal shelter
characteristics, we consider more than one type of animal. In our work, although the
service time distribution is initially attached to each type of animal, it can be adjusted
based on the shelter to which the animal is transferred. When shelters are located in
different locations, each may have different traffic for people visiting for adoptions,
or different animal preferences (e.g., big/small dogs in rural/urban settings). We
provide an analysis of an adjusted model in which the adoption rate is a non-linear
function of the number of animals in the shelters (which is not equivalent to the
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M/M/C/C system in this case). Moreover, we include the study on neutering and
adoption campaigns to evaluate their impacts on shelters’ performance. These ideas
and assumptions distinguish the animal shelter systems from the previous studies of
queueing systems, although our results hold across a range of problems.
2.3 Coordination Policy
We start our analysis of animal shelters with a coordination policy, namely, the NK
policy where shelters coordinate with each other only when one of them is full. The
first case we consider is when each shelter in the system has approximately the same
mean adoption rate (Section 2.3.1) and the second case is when each shelter has a
different mean adoption rate (Section 2.3.2). Computational experiments of both
situations are presented in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 Identical Mean Adoption Rate
In this section, we consider systems with m identical shelters having capacity (the
maximum number of animals allowed to be in a shelter) of C. Each space or cage
for an animal is comparable to a server and each animal is considered as a customer
in the system. Animals arrive to a shelter with Poisson arrival rate, λ. The overall
service (or adoption) rate of the shelter, iµ, is proportional to the current number of
animals in shelter, i, since each animal’s service or adoption time is considered to be
exponentially distributed with mean of 1
µ
. We assume when there are more animals in
the shelter, the probability of people successfully finding the animal they would like
to adopt also increases. In this section, each shelter in the K system is comparable to
a M/M/C/C system, with exponential arrival and service rates, and with capacity of
C and no waiting spaces. Some of the assumptions will be relaxed for more general
cases (e.g., when shelters have different types of animals, capacities and mean arrival
rates, and when the overall service rate service is less than iµ) in Section 2.3.2 and
2.3.3.
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In a K system, there is no coordination between shelters; each shelter has an
independent arrival rate λ. Once a shelter is at full capacity, e.g., all cages are
occupied, then when another animal arrives, one is rejected and killed. Let m denote
the number of shelters in a system. The states and transition rates between states of
the K system when m = 2 are shown in Figure 1. We define the killing probability
as PKC , which is the total long-run rejecting probability of each independent shelter












Since each shelter has arrival rate λ, the long-run rejection rate is λPKC . Hence, for a
K system with m shelters, the total killing rate is mλPKC . The notation is summarized
in Table 1 for ease of reference.
Table 1: Notation for coordination policy
C Capacity of each shelter
λ Animal arrival rate to each shelter
µ Adoption rate of each animal in the shelter
m The number of shelters in each system
PKC Killing probability of the NK system consisting of m shelters with capacity C











Figure 1: The transition diagram for a K system with two shelters.
If there is coordination among shelters in the system, An arriving animal can be
transferred to another shelter when one of shelters is full. When there is no available
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shelter in the NK system, the arriving animals will be rejected. This is equivalent to
being left on the street or being sent to a pound, in which case the animals’ expected
life time is quite short. Thus, in this section where each shelter is considered to be an
M/M/C/C system, the NK can be called a partial coordinated M/M/C/C system
since the coordination occurs only when one of them is full. The killing probability of
the entire system is defined by PNKmC , which is the long-run probability of m shelters
being full and the arriving animals cannot enter the NK system. The total arrival
rate of an NK system with m shelters is mλ since the system’s inter-arrival time is
the minimum of m exponential distributions with rate λ. Therefore, the killing rate
of the entire NK system is mλPNKmC . States and transition rates of the NK system
with two shelters when C = 3 are shown in Figure 2. For m = 2, let (x, y) represent
the state of the entire system where x and y are the number of animals in the first
and the second shelters, respectively. From Figure 2, when one shelter is full, the
arrival rate to the other shelter is doubled. For instance, the arrival rate from state
(0,3) to state (1,3) is 2λ because the second shelter is already full, and arrivals to the
second shelter are diverted to the first shelter.
# of animals in shelter 2
# of animals
       in




































Figure 2: The transition diagram for an NK system with two shelters when C = 3
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Theorem 1. Given that the shelter capacity (C), arrival rate (λ) and the adoption
rate (µ) are the same for each shelter in a system, the total killing rate of the system
with m shelters under the NK policy is equal to the killing rate of an M/M/mC/mC
system with the total arrival rate mλ.
The proofs of all the results are included in the Appendix. Theorem 1 implies that
even though the nature of the NK and the M/M/mC/mC system is different (NK
only coordinates when necessary), both systems give an equal rejection probability in
the long run. This is interesting since the NK system can be more decentralized and
may be less expensive, if coordination is costly. We next compare the K system and
the NK system based on their killing rates in the long run.
Corollary 1. Given the shelter capacity (C), arrival rate (λ) and the adoption rate
(µ) are the same for each shelter in a system, the total killing rate of the system with
m shelters under the NK policy is less than that under the K policy.
Due to Corollary 1, for systems with identical shelters and no coordination cost,
the NK system is preferable. So far, we have discussed the situation when each shelter
has one type of animal with the same adoption rate, µ. Next, let us consider what
happens if there is more than one type of animal, which might be more realistic for
most animal shelters. We will show the results we have proved are still valid in this
setting.
Let animals arriving to the shelter belong to one of the two types, “good” or
“bad”, with Poisson arrival rates of λ1 and λ2, respectively. The inter-adoption
times, the time animals spend in the shelter, are associated with their types and are




(where µ2 = kµ1 and 0 < k < 1) for
good and bad type, respectively. We assume the bad-type animals, on average, take
a longer time to be adopted than the good-type ones. Note that the model can be
easily extended to consider more than two types of animals.
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Each shelter having two types of arrivals in the K system is comparable to an
M/G/C/C system (no waiting space) with resultant Poisson arrivals rate of λ1 +







. Hence the mean





. Note that the overall service
time of a shelter is not exponentially distributed unless the service times of the good
and bad type are equal (which is not true in this case). Let PKC,2−type be the long-run
killing probability of each shelter in the K system. Table 2 summarizes additional
notation of this section for ease of reference.
Table 2: Additional notation for coordination policy
λ1 Arrival rate of good-type animal to the shelter
λ2 Arrival rate of bad-type animal to the shelter
µ1 Adoption rate of each good-type animal in the shelter
µ2 Adoption rate of each bad-type animal in the shelter
k The ratio between the adoption rate of the bad-type animals and
the adoption rate of the good-type animals (µ2µ1 )
r The ratio between mean arrival rate and mean adoption rate of
the shelter
SDNKmC The successful diverting rate of a NK system consisting of
m shelters
LNKmC The long-run average number of animal in a NK system with
m shelters
LKmC The long-run average number of animal in a K system with
m shelters
PKC,2−type The killing probability of a K shelter with two types of animals
Since the M/G/C/C system’s steady-state probabilities are independent of the
service distribution ([60]), the rejecting probability of the M/G/C/C system is equiv-























The next two properties address how the killing rate changes with arrival rates
and adoption rates.
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Property 1. Under the K policy, the effect on the shelter’s killing probability from
reducing the arrival rate of bad-type animals is greater than the effect from reducing
the arrival rate of good-type animals.
Property 1 states that under the K policy, decreasing the arrival rate of bad-type
animals yields a greater effect in reducing the killing probability than changing that
of the good-type, independent of their proportion in the population. This is rational
since when we have fewer animals spending a long time in the shelter (as compared
to those with shorter time), it is likely that the shelter can service a higher number
of animals in the long run.
In practice, a greater number of bad-type animals may be brought to the shelter,
compared to good-type animals. Some shelters have a policy of not accepting animals
of certain breeds (e.g., pit bulls) because they are harder to get adopted. However,
this does not solve the cause of animals’ overpopulation problem. Instead, a more
effective method can be done by promoting regular public programs teaching the
benefits of spaying and neutering. With cooperation of all shelters, the results can
be substantial for successful reduction in shelters’ killing numbers.
Property 2. The killing probability of the animal shelter under the K policy decreases
as the ratio between the adoption rate of the bad-type animals and the adoption rate
of the good-type animals, k, increases (0 < k < 1).
Property 2 shows the chance of killing animals in the shelter can be reduced by
bringing the adoption rate of the bad-type animals closer to the adoption rate of the
good-type animal (k close to 1). This can be done in practice by training bad-type
animals in the shelters to be housebroken or obedient to increase their adoption rates.
As mentioned, it is shown in the literature ([124]) that the killing rate of a shelter
with one type of animal (considered as an M/M/C/C system) is equal to the killing
rate of a shelter with two types of animals (M/G/C/C). Thus, the K systems with
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one type or two types of animals in each shelter also have the same killing rate as long
as the mean adoption rates, the mean arrival rates, and the capacities of each shelter
are equivalent. In the NK system, there is a partial coordination that occurs only
when one of shelters is full. The NK system is, therefore, comparable to a partially
coordinated M/M/C/C system when there is one type of animal and comparable to
a partial coordinated M/G/C/C system when there are two types of animals arriving
to the system. The next theorem explores an important characterization of the NK
system.
Theorem 2. Given that the shelter capacity, mean arrival rate and mean adoption
rate are the same for each shelter in a system, the killing rate of the NK system with
one type of animal (the coordinated M/M/C/C) is equal to the killing rate of the NK
system with two types of animals (the coordinated M/G/C/C).
Theorem 2 shows the NK system also has the same killing rate whether it has
one or two types of animals. Hence, the results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are
also valid when we have two types of animals in each shelter. These results together
show that when all m shelters in the system are identical, an NK system gives a lower
killing rate than a K system does.
Next, we consider the following questions: 1) how can the average numbers of
animals in the NK and the K system be compared?, and 2) how does the NK system
perform in terms of its killing probability as we make more shelters available for
coordination in the NK system? The first question is related to the ability of efficiently
utilize the resources of each system, while the second question could occur when the
No-Kill network gets larger by being coordinated with a higher number of No-Kill
shelters. The next Lemma addresses these situations.
Lemma 1. Given the shelter capacity (C), arrival rate (λ1 + λ2) and the adoption
rate (ν) are the same for each shelter in a system,
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i) the long-run number of animals in the system with m shelters under the NK
policy is greater than that in the system under the K policy.
ii) the killing probability of the system with m shelters under the NK policy is
decreasing in m.
From Lemma 1 (i), when all parameters are the same, there is a higher number of
animals occupying the NK shelter’s capacity, compared to the K shelters. Intuitively,
it is because the NK system rejects fewer number of animals in the long-run. Although
the arrival rate of each shelter in the NK system is similar to that in the K system,
the NK shelters allow extra arrivals diverted from other NK shelters in the system
when possible. As a result, the NK system utilizes its resources more efficiently since
it serves more number of animals in the long run. It is also beneficial for adopters
since there are more animals available in the NK shelters to be chosen.
Lemma 1 (ii) implies the NK systems consisting of a different number of shelters
do not perform equally. As we increase the size of the system by adding more shelters
to coordinate, the killing rate is decreased. So, having more centralization of resources
decreases the killing probability. However, if we consider some costs of coordination, it
might not be beneficial to do so, depending on how much a system improves compared
to the coordination efforts. A further question is how the marginal benefit of adding
more shelters to the NK changes with the number of shelters. We generate insights
on this issue through computational experiments in Section 2.3.3.1.
We have seen that the NK system provides several advantages over the K system,
our next question is; what situations (e.g., with respect to model parameters) are
there for the NK system to be the most beneficial? We find that a possible way to
quantify the benefits of the NK system is to measure the improvements of the NK
system over the K system. This can also indicate when it is the most advantageous
to switch from the K policy to the NK policy. We define this performance measure
as the successful diverting rate, SDNKmC , i.e., the rate of animals successfully diverted
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to other available shelters in the system.
Observation 1. For the NK system with m shelters, the successful diverting rate is
given by:
SDNKmC = m(λ1 + λ2)(P
K


















Observation 11 follows the idea that SDNKmC is the difference between the killing
rate of the K system (m(λ1 + λ2)P
K
C ) and the NK system (m(λ1 + λ2)P
NK
mC ). It can
be useful to see how the successful diverting rate changes with several key parameters
to analyze the benefits of coordination, established in the next property.
Property 3.
i) SDNKmC → 0 as r → 0,
ii) SDNKmC → 0 as r →∞,
iii) SDNKmC is increasing in m,





− 1 + PKC ) > PNKmC (Cr − 1 + PNKmC ) and
decreasing in r, otherwise.
From Property 3, when each shelter has either very low (case i) or very high
(case ii) arrival rate compared to the adoption rate, the benefit from coordination
(operating as the NK instead of the K system) does not help much to reduce the
rejection rate. Methods other than coordination, such as increasing adoptions, might
be more effective solutions for those cases. From Observation 2 (case iii), as the NK
system gets larger (i.e., more shelters are coordinated) the successful diverting rate
also gets larger, which is quite intuitive; while case iv gives the condition how the
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successful adoption rate is affected by the ratio of arrival and adoption rate of each
NK shelter.
What we have discussed so far relates to the case where each shelter in the system
is identical. In practice, shelters might differ in size or be operated in different
environments; for instance, one may have a higher incoming rate due to a greater
animal population. However, as long as the total arrival rates and the total capacities
of the entire system are the same (but shelters in the same system are not necessarily
identical), the killing rate under the NK policy is less than the rate under the K policy.
The proof is very similar to the proofs of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, therefore we
omit it.
The advantage of the identical adoption rate assumption is that it allows us to
directly compare the K with the NK system when the animals in the shelter are not
identically adoptable, e.g., when there are more than one type of animal. We next
explore a more general situation where each shelter in the system may have different
mean adoption rates. This can happen if one shelter is located in a populated area
with more people visiting to adopt animals; while the other shelter is not. It is
interesting to see if the NK system still rejects (or kills) fewer animals compared to
the K system.
2.3.2 Different Mean Adoption Rates
In this section, we consider a more general case when the shelters’ mean adoption
rates are different (e.g., the adoption rates of the each type of animal are not equal).
We define the mean adoption rate of the good-type and the bad-type animals as µ1,1
and µ2,1 for the first shelter and µ1,2 and µ2,2 for the second shelter, respectively.
When there is coordination between shelters, the adoption rates of animals can be
adjusted. For example, if an animal from a shelter is diverted to a popular shelter
with higher number of adopters (e.g., in a bigger city), it may take less time for
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him/her to get adopted. On the other hand, when an animal is diverted to a less
popular shelter, it may take longer time until someone decides to adopt him/her. We
assume the adoption rate of an animal will change, depending to which the shelter it
is transferred.
The arrival rate for each type of animal is the same as the previous section, λ1 for
the good type and λ2 for the bad-type animals. Let ν1, and ν2 be the mean adoption
















Observation 2. Given that the mean adoption rate of each shelter in the system is
not identical, the total killing rate of the NK system can be different than the rate of
the M/G/mC/mC system.
We prove observation 13 through a counter example by showing that Theorem 1
cannot be applied when the shelters’ adoption rates are not equal. In fact, there is
no closed-form solution for the NK’s killing probability in this case. To get further
insights, we use computational experiments to show the performance of the K policy
versus the NK policy by comparing the long-run rejecting probability of both systems,
presented in the next section.
2.3.3 Numerical Examples and Insights
In this section, we use numerical examples to obtain some insights about the perfor-
mance of the shelter policies and their relationships with problem parameters such as
arrival rates, adoption rates and shelter capacities. Computational experiments also
allow us to examine some systems that do not have a closed-form solution; e.g., the
NK system with shelters having different mean adoption rates.
The numerical examples are divided into three parts. Section 2.3.3.1 is related
to Section 2.3.1, where the mean adoption rates of the shelters are equal. Section
24
2.3.3.2 corresponds to Section 2.3.2 where the mean adoption rates of the shelters
are different. If there is only one type of animal in the NK system (the coordinated
M/M/C/C), the killing probability can be obtained by solving the balance equations
for the system such as illustrated in Figure 2 where the adoption rates (µ) for shelter
1 and shelter 2 are different. If there are two types of animals in the NK system (the
coordinated M/G/C/C), we use simulation to find the long-run killing probability
in the numerical examples. It also allows us to obtain the rejecting probability of
systems with a combination of K and NK policies; i.e., some shelters in the system
use the K policy while others use the NK policy. Section 2.3.3.3 shows what happens
if we alternatively consider the shelter whose the mean adoption rate is nonlinear,
specifically an increasing concave function of the number of animals in the shelter.
Managerial insights on coordination policy analysis are provided in Section 2.3.3.4.
2.3.3.1 Systems of shelters with equal mean adoption rates
We perform computational experiments for the case where each shelter has the same
mean adoption rate in this section. In the first analysis, we consider how much
the killing probability of the NK system is lower than that of the K system. Next,
we explore if shelters cannot coordinate, how much the inter-adoption time of each
individual shelter needs to be reduced to achieve the same benefit as performing
coordination. Then, we examine the benefit gained of adding more shelters to the
NK system.
Let us consider the first analysis. We proved in Section 2.3.1 that the NK gives
a lower adoption rate than the K system does. However, it is interesting to quantify
the difference. Consider systems with two shelters in which the capacity of each
shelter is 40 and k = 0.5. The good-type and bad-type animals arrive with Poisson








. Figure 3 presents the killing probability of the described K and the
25
NK systems at different inter-adoption times ( 1
µ1
) of the good-type animals on the
x-axis.
As proven in Corollary 1, the NK’s killing probability graph is below the K sys-
tem’s. According to Observation 1 (i and ii), as the inter-adoption time becomes
very large (r →∞), or becomes very small (r → 0), the killing probabilities of both
system converge to each other. The explanation is; as r goes to infinity, the proba-
bility of both systems being full is very high. When animals arrive at a full shelter in
a NK system, there is a very small probability of other shelters not being full. The
rate of successful diverting, SDNK2C , is also very small. The NK system, therefore,
rejects animals almost as often as the K system does. On the other hand, as r goes
to zero, SDNK2C also converges to zero since each shelter is likely to be available at
all times and diverting is unnecessary. It implies the shelter does not benefit much
from coordinating as an NK system. Especially when the existing killing rates of shel-
ters are already high, shelter management should focus on decreasing the number of
abandoned animals or increasing adoptions rather than using a coordination policy.










Inter-adoption Time (Day) 
Figure 3: The killing probability of the NK and the K systems with two shelters
when C = 40
To explore how increasing adoptions can improve the shelter system compared to
using a coordination policy, we consider the following question: how much would the
inter-adoption time of each animal in a K system need to be, in order to reduce the
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killing probability to the same as an NK system? We would like to see if shelters
cannot (or do not want to) coordinate, how much their inter-adoption time need to
be reduced to achieve the same benefit as performing coordination. An additional
motivation for this question is: in practice, the inter-adoption time of the NK may
be higher than the K system since the less desirable animals may be left in the
NK shelters. Given all other parameters are the same, Table 3 presents the percent
animal’s adoption time (i.e., the time each animal spends in a shelter until being
adopted) required for K system to be lower than the NK system’s in order to achieve
the same level of killing probability.
Table 3: Percent of adoption time required for the K system to be lower than the
NK system in order for the K system to achieve the same level of killing probability
as the NK system (C = 40)
Killing probability 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45
% decrease in adoption time 9.57 6.80 4.76 4.17 3.84 3.57 1.96 1.84 1.32
From Table 3, when the acceptable killing probability is at most 0.3, the K system
will have the same killing probability as the NK system if the K system’s adoption
time is 3.57 percent lower than the that of the NK system. One possible way to
improve the adoption time is: instead of rejecting every animal who arrives when the
K shelters are full, one may replace the animal who has spent the longest time in the
shelter by the arriving one. Furthermore, if the adoption time of the uncoordinated
K system is reduced, as shown in Table 3, then its killing probability can be equal
to the coordinated NK system. If the adoption time can be decreased by a greater
percentage than the numbers shown, coordination might even be unnecessary.
From Lemma 1 (ii), the killing probability of the system with m shelters under the
NK policy is decreasing in m. It is of interest to learn how much benefit is obtained
by adding one more shelter to the NK system. This can also quantify whether a large
coordinating NK system is beneficial. Consider an NK shelter where the adoption
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times of the good-type and bad-type animals are 24 and 36 days respectively. The
good-type and bad-type animals arrive with Poisson arrival rate, 0.5 and 1 per day,
respectively. Figure 4 shows the killing probabilities of the NK system consisting of
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Number of shelters in the NK system (m)
Figure 4: The killing probability of the NK system consisting of different numbers
of shelters
Observation 3. The benefit gained from adding one more shelter into the NK system
decreases as the existing number of shelters in the system increases.
Not surprisingly, this example illustrates that as we add one more shelter to co-
ordinate in the NK system, the killing probability reduction is greater when the NK
is small than when the NK system is large. Thus, if there is a fixed cost of coordi-
nation for every shelter added, increasing the size of the NK system to be too large
might not be a good idea. We should, therefore, consider the trade-off between the
benefit gained and the increased cost to find the optimal number of shelters for each
NK system. For large systems, an alternative choice might be coordination among a
subset of No-Kill shelters, in which we will explore in the next analysis.
In big cities, all No-Kill shelter may not be close to each other. Some shelters
may be able to divert animals to others in their neighborhoods, but not to those
too far away. Specifically, we consider No-Kill systems with shelters that coordinate
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with only shelters located next to them (defined as a “NK-Neighbor” system). To
illustrate the structure of the described system, Figure 5 (left) depicts the coordination
of the “NK-Neighbor” systems when the number of shelters (m) equals 4, 5, or 6
respectively, reading from top to bottom. The number of connections needed for
the NK coordination (each shelter connects to all others) and the “NK-Neighbor”
coordination is shown in Figure 5 (up, right). Figure 5 (down, right) presents the
killing probabilities of the K system with no coordinations, the “NK-Neighbor”, and
the NK system, when there are 4 to 10 shelters in each system. In this example,
C=40, and the good-type and bad-type animals arrive with Poisson arrival rate of
0.5 and 1 per day, respectively. We consider two scenarios; 1) when the adoption times
of the good-type and bad-type animals are 24 and 36 days, and 2) when they are 20
and 30 days, respectively. Thus, the offered load (r) is equal to 0.5*24+1*36=48 in
the first case and 0.5*20+1*30=40 in the second case.
From Figure 5 (down, right), the killing probability of the K system is the highest
in both scenarios, as expected. An observation is that the killing probabilities of
the “NK-Neighbor” and the NK system are much lower than the K system in the
first case (r=40, with lower adoption time), compared to in the second case (r=48,
with higher adoption time). With high r, the NK is not that much better than the
K system, consistent with earlier insights. As the number of shelters increases from
4 to 10, the advantage of the NK increases over “the NK-neighbor”. However, the
marginal benefit of the NK over the “NK-neighbor” is much less than that of the
NK over the K system. Moreover, from Figure 5 (up, right), as m increases, the
NK system requires a much higher number of connections than the “NK-Neighbor”
does. Consequently, for a large No-kill system, it may not be necessary for shelters
to coordinate with all others. Systems similar to the “NK-Neighbor” coordination can
be an effective and practical option.
So far, we have shown computational experiments of the situation where the mean
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Figure 5: The “NK-Neighbor” systems when the numbers of shelters (m) are 4, 5
and 6 respectively (left); the number of connections required for the “NK-Neighbor”
and the NK coordinations (up, right); and the killing probabilities of the K, the
“NK-Neighbor” and the NK system (down, right)
adoption rate of each shelter is the same. Let us next consider what happens if this
assumption is relaxed.
2.3.3.2 Systems of shelters with different mean adoption rates
As mentioned in Observation 3, when the mean adoption rate of each shelter in the
system is not equal, the total killing rate of the NK system can be different than
the rate of the M/G/mC/mC system. In this section, we obtain some insights by
exploring a variety of examples.
Consider systems of two shelters (C=30), where arrival rates to each shelter are
2 and 4 per day for the good and the bad types, respectively. The first shelter in the
system has good-type adoption time, 6 days, and bad-type adoption time, 12 days.
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≈ 0.515. Figure 6 depicts the killing probability of the systems with
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Figure 6: The killing probability of the system operated with the K and the NK
policy when ν1 = 0.1 and C = 30
Observation 4.
i) The killing probability of a NK system is less than that of the K system when
each shelter in the system has different mean adoption rate.
ii) Given shelter 1’s mean adoption rate is fixed, the difference between the killing
probabilities of the K and the NK system is non-decreasing in the mean adoption
rate of shelter 2.
iii) As ν2 →∞, PNK → 0; while PK → P12 .
Observation 4 (i) and (ii) imply the NK system performs better than the K
system and the benefit gained from using the NK policy tends to increase as the
adoption rate of shelter 2 differs from shelter 1. From Observation 4 (iii), when
the adoption rate of shelter 2 is very large, the killing probabilities of the K and
the NK system converge to different values (PNK → 0; while PK → P1
2
). In the
NK system, animals can be diverted if one shelter is full, so all the diverted animals
31
arriving at the second shelter will not be rejected due to its large adoption rate. On
the other hand, there is no coordination in the K system. When the second shelter’s
adoption rate is very high, it does not help reduce the killing probability of the first





≈ 0.256. Thus, the killing rate of the NK system can be
effectively improved by enhancing the adoption rate of just one of the shelters in the
system (which may be cheaper than enhancing the adoption rate of both shelters, for
example).
Next, we consider some combinations of the K and NK policies since in practice
it might not be possible to coordinate all shelters as a large NK system due to the
distance between shelters (or the additional costs). We would like to explore coordi-
nation between different types of shelters for insights on which one performs better
than the others. First, consider a system consisting of four shelters (C=30). Two
shelters in the system are considered to be “Fast” shelters where the mean adoption
time is equal to 8 and 16 days for good and bad-type animals, respectively. The
other two shelters are “Slow” shelters with mean adoption time 12 for the good type
and 24 for the bad type. The first system in consideration is called “F-F and S-S”;
i.e., “Fast” shelter only coordinates with the “Fast” and the “Slow” only coordinates
with the other ”Slow” shelter. The second system is called “F-S and F-S” where the
“Fast” shelters coordinate with the “Slow” ones. The left diagram of Figure 7 depicts
the described systems, while the right diagram shows their killing probabilities at dif-
ferent arrival rates of the good-type (λ1) and the bad-type animals (λ2). The arrows
indicate the pair of shelters that coordinate; while no arrows mean no coordinations
between shelters.
Observation 5. The “F-S and F-S” systems give lower killing probabilities than the
“F-F and S-S” systems.













1 = 0.6, 2 = 1.2 
1 = 0.5, 2 = 1.0 
1 = 0.7, 2 = 1.4 
F-F and S-S 
F-S and F-S 
Figure 7: “F-F and S-S” and “F-S and F-S” systems (left) and their killing proba-
bilities (right)
“Fast” shelter does. If a “Slow” shelter is paired with a “Fast” shelter, when the
“Slow” shelter is full, animals are diverted to the faster shelter with higher adoption
rates. In contrast, when a ”Slow” shelter is diverting to another “Slow” shelter, they
both may be full. Also, if a set of shelters with different adoption rates are considering
coordination but full coordination is too costly, then matching complementary shelters
can be useful.
Next, let us consider a system with three shelters where the inter-adoption times
of the good-type animals are 10 days for “Fast”, 12 days for “Medium” and 15 days
for the “Slow” shelter, respectively. The inter-adoption times of the bad-type animals
are assumed to be twice that of the good-type ones. Figure 8 presents a variety of
policy combinations among the three shelters and their killing probabilities. Each
pair of arrows in the figure represents coordination between shelters, and the letters
beneath each picture denote the name of each system.
Observation 6.
i) For coordination between only one pair of shelters, the system that coordinates
between the “Fast” shelter and the “Slow” shelters gives the lowest killing prob-
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Figure 8: Two-way systems with “Fast”, “Medium” and “Slow” shelters and their
killing probabilities (λ1 = λ2 =0.5/day)
ii) For coordination between two pairs of shelters, the system that coordinates be-
tween the “Fast” and “Slow” as well as “Fast” and “Medium” gives the lowest
killing probability (i.e.,“F-M,F-S” performs better than “M-F,M-S” and “S-F,S-
M”).
From Observation 6, if we have a variety of shelters in consideration and would
like only one pair of coordination, selecting a pair with the fastest shelter and the
slowest shelter is the most beneficial. In this case, we pair the shelter that needs help
the most with the one that can help the most. For two pairs of coordinating shelters,
the system connecting the fastest shelter to both of the others is likely to perform
best. The reason is the “Fast” shelter is able to most effectively help reduce killing
rates of both “Medium” and “Slow” shelters.
What we have explored in this section are “two way” coordinations; i.e., animals
are diverted both forward and backward between shelters. In real life, some shelters
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may need to divert animals if they are full, but cannot receive animals from others
due to their insufficient resources. Next, we consider what happens if “one way”
coordinations are implemented. Figure 9 depicts systems with varieties of coordina-
tions, where arrows indicate the direction of animals diversion. Parameters of “Fast”,
“Medium” and “Slow” shelters, e.g., arrival rates and adoption rates, are similar to




















                           
                  















Figure 9: One-way systems with “Fast”, “Medium” and “Slow” shelters when using
“one-way” animal diversions
From Figure 9, “system 1” (both “Slow” and “Medium” shelters transfer animals
to the“Fast” shelter) has the highest killing probability. A possible reason is when
animals from all other shelters are diverted to the “Fast” shelter, they have to fight
for spaces due to the diversion overload. Consequently, it hurts the system in the
long run. The killing number can be much reduced by adding another diverting
option from “Slow” to “Medium” shelter (as described in “system 4”, which has the
lowest killing probability). However, if there are only two pairs of shelters where
the “one way” coordination is allowed, it is most effective to transfer animals from
the “Slow” to “Medium” shelter, and from the “Medium” to “Fast” shelter (“system
3” in Figure 9). Therefore, transferring animals from one shelter to the next faster
one, e.g., “Small” to “Medium” and “Medium” to “Fast”, can most help reducing
the killing rate of the overall system (the killing probability of “system 3” is less than
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those of “system 1” and “system 2”). The examples we have explored in this section
give insights on how to design an effective coordinating system in practice. If the best
element is chosen for coordination, it can leand to much improvement in performance.
2.3.3.3 Systems of shelters whose the adoption rates are concave and increasing
in the number of animals in the shelter
One of the assumptions we have used so far is that the shelter’s adoption rate is
proportional to the number of animals in the shelter, and we have found that NK
performs better than the K system. In this section, we consider what happens if the
shelter’s adoption rate is not linear, specifically an concave increasing function of the
number of animals in the shelter. In other words, the adoption rate still increases
with the number of animals (due to a greater selection for people visiting) but the
marginal benefit decreases. There are two questions of interest; 1) is the NK’s killing
rate still less than the K’s killing rate?, and 2) if so, how does the function between
the adoption rate and the number of animals affect the benefit of the NK policy over
the K policy?
Let i be the number of animals in a shelter and ν(i, a, µ) be the adoption rate when
there are i animals in the shelter (aε{1, 2, 3, ...}). Define ν(i, a, µ) as ν(i, a, µ) = i aa+1 µ,
where µ is the adoption rate when there is only one animal in the shelter and “a”
represents the sensitivity of the overall adoption rate over the number of animals.
Note that ν(i, a, µ) is increasing in a and is an increasing concave function of i.
Further, since the function approaches i as a increases, this choice of function allows
us to directly compare results to the case when the adoption rate is linear with the
number of animals (a →∞).
Figure 10 (left) shows the shelter’s adoption rate (ν(i, a, µ)) at different i, when
a equals 1,3,5,7,9 and ∞, respectively. When a →∞, the adoption rate is closest to
linear. Figure 10 (right) depicts the percentage decrease in the killing probability as
the system of two shelters is operated by the NK policy instead of the K policy (when
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the total arrival rates to each shelter are 3, 3.5 and 4 per day, correspondingly).
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Figure 10: Shelter’s adoption rate when µ equals 0.2 and a equals 1,3,5,7,9 and ∞
(left), and the percentage decreased in the killing rate as the two-shelter system is
operated by the NK policy instead of the K policy (right)
Observation 7.
i) When the shelter’s adoption rate is an increasing concave function of the number
of animals in the shelter, the NK system’s killing rate is less than the K system’s
killing rate.
ii) The percentage gained by using the NK policy in place of the K policy increases
with a, i.e., as the adoption rate is closer to linear in the number of animals.
From Observation 7, the NK still performs better than the K system does with
this non-linear assumption. As we discussed earlier, “a” is the indicator representing
the sensitivity of the overall adoption rate over the number of animals in the shelter.
When a is small, changing from K policy to NK policy may not offer as much ben-
efit compared to when a is large. This insight suggests the shelter management to
consider the sensitivity between the adoption rate and the number of animals when
determining how much the system can be improved by the coordination policy.
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2.3.3.4 Managerial Insights
In this section, we summarize managerial insights obtained from our computational
experiments for coordination policy. For systems with identical mean adoption rates,
we observe the shelter cannot much reduce its killing rate by performing coordination
when the existing killing rates are already high. So, it might not be beneficial to
focus on coordination in this case. We examine the percentage difference in adoption
rates that would make the K system and NK system equivalent in their killing rates.
For example, with a small acceptable killing probability, the adoption rate in the K
system would need to be almost 10% faster. Therefore, focusing on the adoption rate
(e.g., using aggressive adoption campaigns) in the K system could achieve the same
benefits as coordination.
In addition, our result shows that when we increase the size of the NK system,
the killing probability reduction is greater when the system is small than when the
system is already large. If there is a cost of adding more shelters to coordinate,
the shelter manager should consider the trade-off between how much the system can
improve and the cost of coordination (since having a very large NK system can be
costly). Instead of coordinating with all other shelters in the NK system, coordinating
only with shelters in neighborhoods, e.g., the “NK-neighbor” system, can also be an
interesting and practical option.
We found that the NK system consisting of shelters with much different adoption
rates can effectively reduce its killing rate by coordination policy. For instance, if
the manager can find a shelter with faster adoption rate to coordinate with a slower
adoption rate, it can much reduce the overall killing rate of the system since animals
diverted to the fast shelter have a higher chance finding adopters. In practice, when
there are more than two shelters (e.g., “Fast”, “Medium”, and “Slow”), the manager
may consider coordination among subsets of them. If only one pair of coordination is
allowed, for the highest improvement they should consider pairing the fastest shelter
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with the slowest one. For two pairs of coordination, the system connecting the fastest
shelter with others gives the lowest killing rates. Furthermore, we examine the impacts
of “one way” coordination, where the animal diversion is allowed in one direction. We
found diverting animals from one shelter to the next faster shelter can most reduce
the overall killing rate, compared to other options (i.e., “Slow” to “Medium” and
“Medium” to “Fast” is more effective than ‘‘Slow” to “Fast” and “Medium” to “Fast”,
or “Slow” to “Fast” and “Medium” to “Slow”.)
Next, we relax the assumption that the shelter’s adoption rate is proportional to
the number of animals and consider what happens if the adoption rate is increasing
concave with the number of animals in the shelter. The numerical experiments show
coordination can still reduce the killing rate. However, its benefit is small when the
adoption rate is less sensitive to the number of animals. So, if the shelter management
has observed that the total adoption is not much impacted by the number of animals
in the shelter, coordination may not be a good option to improve the system.
In this section we have explored effects of coordination among shelters. In the
next section, we study how No-Kill shelters can reduce the killing rate by adoption
and neutering campaigns.
2.4 Adoption and Neutering Policies
In addition to shelter coordination, No-Kill shelters can reduce their killing rates by
encouraging more adoptions and reducing animal arrivals. These two practices are
often implemented in No-Kill shelters [10]. We consider adoption campaigns and
neutering campaigns in Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2, respectively, and the comparison of
campaigns is presented in Section 2.4.3.
2.4.1 Adoption Campaign
An adoption campaign is often promoted to increase adoption rates. In this campaign,
the shelters use, for instance, temporary storefronts, mobile units, partnerships with
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retail operations via the internet and etc. [148]. The campaigns usually raise not
only the number of animals who are placed in new homes, but also the return-to-
owner rate for lost pets. In this section we investigate the impact of the number of
adoption campaigns on the shelters’ overall cost and benefit. An important decision
for shelters’ management is how many adoption campaigns should be used per year
[97]. To consider this, define µ1(na) and µ2(na) = kµ1(na), 0 < k < 1, as the adoption
rates of the good-type and the bad-type animals, respectively, where na is the number
of adoption campaigns that a No-Kill shelter attempts in one year.
Like the previous section, we consider λ1 and λ2 as the yearly arrival rates of
good-type and bad-type animals, accordingly. Let vk be the cost of killing an animal,
which can be interpreted as the disadvantageous impact of euthanizing each animal,
fa be a fixed cost and va be a variable cost of using adoption campaigns. The shelter’s
total cost when implementing an adoption policy with na campaigns can be defined
as
TCNKa (na) = vk(λ1 + λ2)PC(µ1(na)) + (fa + vana), (1)











and λ̃ = kλ1+λ2
k
.
Note that we consider only the costs directly impacted by adoption campaigns.
The first part of equation (1) is the killing cost, which can be reduced by increasing
adoptions, and the second part represents fixed and variable costs of implementing
the campaigns. The main notation we employ in this section is provided in Table 4.
Lemma 2. If the adoption rate, µ1(na), is concave in the number of adoption cam-
paign, na, then the shelter’s total cost, TC
NK
a (na), is a convex function with respect
to na.
Since there is a limitation on the number of households near each shelter, clearly
the impact of each adoption campaign on the adoption rate is non-increasing concave
with the number of campaigns a shelter has attempted (µ1(na) is concave in na). From
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Table 4: Notation for Section 2.4.1
na The number of adoption campaigns
µ1(na) Adoption rate of the good-type animals when the shelter promotes
na adoption campaigns
vk Cost or negative impact per an animal killed in the shelter
fa Fixed cost of implementing the adoption policy
va Variable cost of implementing each adoption campaign
TCNKa (na) Total cost of a No-Kill shelter implementing adoption campaign policy
na The maximum number of adoption campaigns due to the budget constraint
Lemma 2, the convexity of the shelter’s total cost function allows us to determine the
optimal number of adoption campaigns as discussed in the following Theorem, where
na is the maximum number of campaigns a shelter can use (e.g., due to budget
limitation).
Theorem 3. The optimal number of campaigns in the interval [0, na] for all na ∈
[0, na] is given by :

































Note that case (i) implies the shelter should not promote any adoption campaign
since the benefit gained from the reduced killing rate is always lower than the cost
of campaigning. However, this condition rarely holds for shelters in real-life situation
because the killing rate (without any adoption campaign) times killing cost is usually
higher than the cost of employing an adoption campaign [97]. In case (ii), the total
cost is still decreasing in na when na = na. The shelter can benefit more with an
41
additional number of campaigns but they already reach the maximum na. While in
case (iii) we have the total cost first decreases and then increases in the interval [0, na]
and n∗a is the solution of equation (2).
To illustrate impacts of adoption campaign on the total cost, consider the following
example of µ1(na) function:
µ1(na) = wa + za(1− e−lana), wa, za, la > 0.
It is important to note that when the shelter does not implement any adoption cam-
paign, the starting adoption rate of this function is µ1(0) = wa. Moreover, the
increased adoption rate does not exceed za ( lim
na→∞
µ1(na) → wa + za) no matter how






Let us consider the example of a shelter with capacity 80 where the adoption rate
is 15 without any campaigns and it cannot exceed 25 no matter how many campaigns
attempted (wa = 15, za = 15 and la = 0.2). Since the average cost of basic food,
supplies, medical care and training for a dog or cat is 400 to 700 dollars annually
[110], we approximate the killing cost to be 400 in this example. Let the campaign’s
fixed and variable cost be 2000 and 1000, respectively. Figure 11 shows the shelter’s
costs as a function of the number of adoption campaigns at different yearly arrival
rates of bad-type animals (the rate of good-type animals is assumed to be 70% of
the bad types’ in this example). The shelters with greater arrival rates have higher
minimum costs and need a larger number of campaigns to achieve them. As Figure
11 implies the arrival rate plays a role in how much the shelter can lower its cost, in
the next section we consider another No-Kill solution, namely neutering campaigns.
2.4.2 Neutering Campaign
Although adoption is important, it alone cannot effectively solve animal shelter’s
problems. The number of animals coming into the shelters needs to be reduced. In
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Figure 11: The total cost of shelters implementing adoption policy, at different
number of adoption campaigns, when λ2 = 800, 850, 900 and 950, respectively
typical service systems (e.g., call centers) reducing the arrival rates is not a common
practice since it means fewer customers (and usually less revenue). However, for non-
profit organizations like animal shelters, having higher arrival rates can cause higher
number of euthanized animals, so decreasing arrival rates is desirable.
Spaying or neutering is one of the most effective ways to solve pet overpopulation
and eventually reduce the shelters’ killing rate [132]. Unfortunately, the current
statistics shows that only 10% of the animals received by shelters have been spayed
or neutered [110]. Therefore, No-Kill shelters widely encourage pet owners to neuter
their animals via neutering campaigns, by offering reduced rates or free services for
people bringing animals to be neutered. Although there are benefits of future reduced
incoming animals to shelter when an animal is spayed, there exist costs of neutering
processes. For the shelter’s effective decision making, it is important to examine the
impact of the number of neutered animals on the shelter’s total cost. Let hλ(ns)
and λ(ns) be the yearly arrival rates of good-type and bad-type animals, respectively,
where 0 < h < 1 and ns is the number of animals spayed each year. It is logical
to assume the arrival rate of bad-type animals is greater than the good type since
they have a higher chance of being left in the shelters. Also, for neutering campaigns,
43
shelters usually neuter either types depending on which one is brought to them, so we
assume each animal neutered has impact on both types’ arrival rates. The shelter’s
cost when using a neutering (or spaying) campaign is defined as TCNKs (ns) and




















; fs and vs are the fixed and variable costs of
neutering policy, respectively (see Table 2.4.2 for summary of notation).
Table 5: Notation for Section 2.4.2
ns The number of spayed animals due to neutering campaigns
λ(ns) Arrival rate of the bad-type animals when ns animals neutered in total.
hλ(ns) Arrival rate of the good-type animals when ns animals neutered in total.
fs Fixed cost of implementing neutering campaigns
vs Variable cost of neutering each animal
TCNKs (ns) Total cost of a No-Kill shelter implementing neutering campaigns
Lemma 3. If the arrival rate, λ(ns), is non-increasing convex in the number of spayed
animals, ns, then the shelter cost, TC
NK
s (ns), is a convex function with respect to ns.
Lemma 3 gives a sufficient condition for the shelter cost to be convex in the
number of spayed animals. For some service systems, it is reasonable to consider
the reduced arrivals as a convex function. However, for the animal shelter system, it
may be necessary to consider population dynamics. For example, in practice λ(ns)
may not always be convex in ns. The motivation of this assumption comes from
the well-known population growth logistic function. In other words, it is likely that
when there are very few number of spayed animals at the beginning, the arrival rates
into the shelter will not be reduced very much. Once there are greater number of
spayed animals, the arrival rates can be decreased with an increasing rate until a
limit when there are too many neutered animals in which the arrival rate is already
low and cannot be much more reduced. For example, λ(ns) can be non-increasing
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first concave and then convex function of ns. In addition, animal experts state that
spaying and neutering as much as 70% of the animals in a pet overpopulation area
is necessary for significant results in reducing strays [132]. So a sufficient number
of animals must be neutered for an effective population reduction. In our work, we
focus on effects of the number of neutered animals rather than effects of time, which
is often seen in the analysis of a general growth function.
To determine the impact of ns on the shelter’s total cost, we consider the following





Although λ(ns) can take other forms, the arrival rate function in (4) is logical for
the following reasons. Firstly, when there are no animals neutered, the arrival rate
starts at ws (or λ(0) = ws). Secondly, when all animals are neutered, the arriving rate
approaches zero (i.e., lim
ns→∞
λ(ns) → 0). Thirdly, it is easy to see that λ(ns) is strictly
decreasing with ns (
∂λ(ns)
∂ns









. Parameters ws, zs and ls can be chosen to best reflect the effects of the
number of animals neutered on the arrival rates of each shelter. To analyze impacts
of neutering campaigns, we address key structures of the shelter’s cost function in the
next property.













such that the shelter cost, TCNKs (ns), is
first concave when ns < n
∗
s and then convex when ns ≥ n∗s.
Figure 12 shows the shelter’s cost as a function of the number of animals neutered
when µ1 = 20, 23, 26 and 29, accordingly
1. At small ns, the total costs are concave
1Parameters for Figure 12 are ws=1200, ls=0.01, zs=20, fs=300 and vs=60.
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decreasing and then change to be convex increasing as ns increases. Furthermore,
the total costs increase as ns goes to ∞. So when only very few animals are spayed,
the total cost cannot be reduced much, but the effect become more significant once
the number increases. However, when too many number of animals are spayed, the
neutering cost offsets the benefit gained in the reduced killing cost, so the total cost
increases as more animals are spayed. From Figure 12, the effect of the neutering
campaign is greater for shelters with a small adoption rate. Nevertheless, they need
to have a large number of spayed animals to reach the minimum cost.




















Figure 12: The cost of shelters with neutering policy as functions of the number of
animal neutered when µ1 = 20, 23, 26 and 29, respectively
2.4.3 Campaigns Comparison
One of the differences when comparing adoptions to neutering policy is: adoption
campaigns can reduce the shelter cost quite significantly with a small number of
campaigns (since the cost is convex in na), while often, neutering improves the cost
slowly for a small investment (since the cost might be concave with ns). However,
both policies are similar when high effort is used since the shelter cost increases with
the effort ( lim
na→∞
TCNKa (na) = lim
ns→∞
TCNKs (ns) → ∞). This is the case because the
benefit gained cannot be offset by the campaign cost at the extreme. Examining
the two policies raises another interesting question: if a No-Kill shelter has a fixed
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amount of budget, under which scenario is one policy more effective than the other?
Consider a shelter that has a fixed S dollars budget and wants to spend on either
neutering or adoption or both policies at the same time. Figure 13 displays the shelter
total cost for dollars spent on the following: (1) adoption only, (2) 67% adoption and



















































Figure 13: The shelter’s overall cost for dollars spent on: (1) adoption only, (2)
33%neutering and 67%adoption, (3) 67%neutering and 33%adoption, and (4) neuter-
ing only
From Figure 13, the first policy (adoption only) is able to more effectively reduce
the overall cost when the total budget is less than approximately 16,000 dollars (as
the total cost of policy (1) is the lowest line). When the budget is between 16,000
and 19,000 dollars, using both adoptions and neutering campaigns (policy (2) and
(3)) can bring shelter cost to be lower than using only one campaign (policy (1) and
(4)). However, if the shelter is able to spend more than 19,000 dollars, the overall
cost can be much reduced with a neutering policy (4). Note that the minimum cost
occurs when shelter spends approximately 29,000 dollars with policy (4), in which
2Parameters for Figure 13 are wa=15, za=10, la=0.2, fa=2000, va=1000, ws=1200, ls=0.01,
zs=20, fs=300 and vs=60.
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the shelter implements only the neutering campaigns. Although it is not shown, the
overall cost of all policies increases when the investment is high, since the benefit
gained cannot offset the campaign costs.
Our analysis has shown that one policy can be more beneficial than others under
different situations, e.g., depending on the shelters’ the offered load (r) and the bud-
get constraint. Figure 14 summarizes our observations on the policies that the shelter
management should emphasize, where the horizontal axis represents budget limita-
tion and the vertical axis represents the offered load (i.e., the ratio between arrival
and adoption rates). Although the killing rate is small at low r, neutering policy can
be useful because it prevents future animal overpopulation problems. Shelter coordi-
nations are beneficial for medium r, but not for small or high r, as shown in Property
3 that the successful diversion rate approaches zero in those two cases. For high r,
adoption and neutering policies are necessary to increase shelter’s turnover rates and
reduce incoming rates, respectively. As we have seen in Figure 13, adoption campaign
is favorable when the budget is low; while neutering policy can be a good option when
the budget is high enough to spay sufficiently large number of animals. Moreover,
combination of adoption and neutering campaigns is useful for a moderate campaign
budget. If the shelter management emphasizes on the right policy (depending on
their situations), the shelter’s problem can be most effectively solved.
2.5 Conclusions
Approximately five million cats and dogs were killed in animal shelters last year in the
United States. With such a large number, shelters are facing a challenging problem
of how to decrease the number of animals euthanized. Some shelters have moved to a
No-Kill policy, where their animals are not killed for space reasons. Instead, they try
to solve the problem by using several methods. This chapter explored different kinds
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Figure 14: Summary of beneficial policies under different scenarios
with the goal of providing insights on how each method helps reduce the killing rates
(or reduce the job rejection rate of other service systems).
For the coordination policy, if one shelter is full, animals can be diverted to the
other shelters in the NK system. We addressed the theoretical aspects of coordina-
tion and used numerical analysis to obtain managerial insights. We proved that the
coordinating NK system with m shelters having the same adoption rates is equiva-
lent to the M/M/mC/mC system. This directly allowed us to show the NK system
has a lower killing rate than the uncoordinated K system. The systems may have
two types of animals, where the animals may arrive or be adopted at different rates.
Analytically, we showed changing the arrival rates for the bad type had more impact
on the overall system than changing the arrival rate of the good type (independently
of their relative frequency of arrivals). We also showed that the killing rate of the
shelter decreased not only in individual adoption rates, but also in the ratio of the
adoption rate of the bad-type to the good-type.
When the adoption rates of each shelter are not identical, we found the NK system
was no longer equivalent to the M/M/mC/mC system. This makes theoretical results
more difficult to show, but we were able to use numerical analysis to generate further
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insights. We found that adding more coordinated shelters helps reduce the overall
killing probability but the marginal improvement is decreasing. Thus, if there is a
fixed coordination cost per shelter added, it might not be optimal to have a large NK
system. We provided several insights on how to design different kinds of coordinating
systems to achieve the highest improvement, including coordinating with neighbors
or between particular pairs of shelters.
Our results show that coordination cannot much help reduce the killing rate when
the existing rejecting probability is high. Adoption and neutering policies can be use-
ful in that case. We showed when a shelter uses adoption campaigns, if adoptions are
concave and increasing with the number of the campaigns, the shelter’s total cost is
a convex function with the number of campaigns and there exists an optimal number
to achieve the minimum cost. For the neutering campaign we found when animals
increase according to a type of growth function, the shelter’s total cost is first concave
and then convex in the number of neutered animals. Comparing these two policies,
computational experiments suggested that an adoption campaign could be more at-
tractive when the budget is limited, while neutering policy could be a good option
when the shelters have enough money to spay sufficiently large number of animals.
Since it may not be possible for shelters to apply all policies at once, we discussed the
situation when each policy is the most effective tool. Although this work is motivated
by the animal shelters’ policies, the context can be applied to other industries with
customers and servers, e.g., hospital operations, ambulances and internet servers. Fi-
nally, we hope our results will be helpful as we strongly believe that killing is not the
only option to solve the shelters’ problem.
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CHAPTER III
SCALING THE HOUSE : OPTIMAL SEATING ZONES
FOR ENTERTAINMENT VENUES WHEN LOCATION
OF SEATS AFFECTS DEMAND
3.1 Introduction
Revenue management (RM) has been a significant strategy to maximize revenue for
industries with limited resources. RM research was pioneered in the airline industry
and has been widely practiced in other industries such as hotels, cruise lines and rental
car agencies (e.g., [7], [25], [55], [82], [91], [94]). Sports and entertainment (S&E)
is another of industry with great potential for applying the revenue management
practices in business decisions. However, much remains to be done in developing new
methods and approaches to apply to the revenue management in the S&E industry
[147].
There are several important decisions that the S&E venue manager needs to make:
e.g., how to categorize seats into zones for different prices, what price they should
charge for each seating zone, and which performances and how many should be in-
cluded in a ticket bundle. In this chapter, we focus on developing methods to system-
atically “scale the house” as it is called in the industry, which is sectioning seats into
zones for different prices. Our work arose from discussions with a firm who provides
analysis of revenue management for many large performance venues. They point out
that “scaling the house” is one of most important decisions the venue managers need
to make. Although several studies in the literature indicate price differentiation can
increase performance venues’ revenue (e.g., [67], [89] and [120]), determination of the
seating categories has not been deeply explored [34].
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Tickets sold in the S&E industry differ from the standard spot market since tickets
of the same show or game are not homogeneous items. Each seat in the venue offers
a different experience as it is located in a different location, so customers perceive
them as products with different qualities. However, it is not practical to price each
individual seat with a unique price. General guides state that seats closest to the stage
are usually priced at a premium, and the price falls as they get closer to the back of
the venue [5]. While most of the previous studies related to demand estimation for
performing arts focus on finding the impact of related variables, such as price, on the
aggregated demand (e.g., [33], [43] and [47]), we incorporate impacts of seat locations
and then integrate those impacts to identify an optimal zoning decision for the venue.
In this study, we first examine transactional level data obtained from major arts
organizations to identify how ticket demand varies by location of seats. In addition
to price, we find that demand decreases with distance from the stage and distance
from the seating row’s center, where the highest demand occurs in the center-front
areas. Given the observed demand characteristics, we consider how the venue manager
should divide seats into zones to maximize the expected revenue. We focus on revenue
for this industry because the cost of selling additional tickets is very small compared
to the performance’s fixed set-up cost.
We consider a static scaling the house decision because most art organizations
publish their seating sections early in the selling horizon and prefer not to dynamically
change them. The reasons are as follow: 1) most advertising brochures contain the
seating charts indicating how seats are categorized, so changing seating zones after
they have been announced is not practical; 2) some venues may have the zone name
printed on the tickets or may use different ticket colors to differentiate zones. For
these reasons, finalizing the zoning decision at the beginning of the selling season is
preferred.
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We develop a “Scaling the House” model to segment the venue across two dimen-
sions (e.g., by row and column cuts), incorporating demand differences from front or
center. For venues whose ticket demand is not very sensitive to the distance from the
center, we present an alternative one-dimensional optimal zoning decision where sec-
tions are defined by seating row cuts, which provides an easy-to-implement optimal
decision. In both models, we analytically identify the optimal solutions and provide
comparative statics of results for managerial insights. We perform robustness anal-
ysis to examine how model results are sensitive to estimation errors under different
scenarios. We also conduct several computational experiments to identify the situa-
tions when it is the most beneficial to apply the two-dimensional model rather than
the one-dimensional zoning decisions. It is worthwhile to note that our models and
results also provide some implications to other industries whose demand is sensitive
to spacial locations such as airline seats, etc.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a review of
the related literature. In Section 3.3, we present empirical results on how seating
locations affect demand within venues. We describe the resulting demand function
based on location in the venue and present the two-dimensional zoning model where
zones are divided from the front to the back as well as from the center to the left/right
in Section 3.4.1. Then, in Section 3.4.2, we present an alternative zoning model
where zones are defined in only one dimension. Robustness analysis and comparisons
between the different zoning models are considered in Section 3.5 and 3.6, respectively.
We conclude by summarizing important results and providing managerial insights in
Section 4.6. The proofs of all results are provided in the Appendix.
3.2 Literature Review
A stream of literature, especially from economics, related to the sport and enter-
tainment (S&E) industries focuses on ticket demand estimation. In an early paper,
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Moore [106] developed an econometric model of performance theater attendance. He
focused on finding the effects of ticket price, income, and the number of shows on
ticket demands. Felton [47] estimated a demand function for opera tickets and used
a ”popularity rating” variable as a measure of quality. Ekelund and Ritenour [43]
incorporated an opportunity cost variable (mean hourly wage across cities) in their
model and found a significant negative impact on the aggregate symphony concert
demand. Corning and Levy [33] considered demand for performances in a group of
live theaters and characterized the seasonality of demand for each theater. Tseng
[140] empirically explored how consumers respond to event manager’s scheduling de-
cisions. He found that when performances are scheduled closely in distance or time
can sometimes have either positive or negative effects on ticket sales. Other empirical
works in ticket demand include [19], [58], [74], and [138]. All of the studies above used
aggregated (time series or cross-sectional) data to find the effects of relevant factors
(such as income and price) on the aggregate ticket demand. In contrast, our work
quantifies demand variation within the same venue based on locations, such as the
distance of seats from the stage and the distance from the center of each seating row.
We observe how customers perceive seats at different locations in the venue, which
cannot be obtained from the aggregated demand data.
In addition to ticket demand estimation, studies related to the S&E business
include ticket bundling and pricing of complementary goods. Regarding a ticket
bundling problem, Drake et al. [41] developed an optimal switching model from
selling ticket bundles to selling a single ticket, and identified the conditions when only
bundles, only individual tickets, or both should be offered. Duran and Swann [147]
extended the static model to a switching model that considered the optimal dynamic
time to switch based on inventory. Their computational experiments suggested that
the profit improvement could be 1 to 2 percent over the optimal static switching
and the dynamic switching could also reduce profit variability. Studies on pricing
54
complementary goods are presented in [100] and [134]. For example, Marburger
[100] found that when the performance price setter gains a share of revenues from
complementary goods, overall profits is maximized when the performance ticket prices
lie in the inelastic section of demand. None of the papers above considered variable
pricing of seats, while our work incorporates seating categorizations in the venue with
the goal to increase ticket revenue via effective “Scale the house” decisions.
Our work also relates to price discrimination literature. A body of evidence indi-
cates that price discrimination plays a significant role in the S&E industries. Hunting-
ton [67] examined a sample of thirty-three theaters to compare the revenue between a
single price policy and a multiple price policy. From regression results, he suggested
that theaters charging a uniform price could increase their revenue by approximately
24 percent by scaling the house. Leslie [88] analyzed the existence of price discrimina-
tion for a particular Broadway show. He found that there are, on average, 8.7 different
ticket categories sold for each show. In addition, Leslie [89] conducted various exper-
iments to examine the implication of different pricing mechanisms and showed price
discrimination can increase profitability by approximately 5 percent, compared to
uniform pricing across venue. The author assumed the ticket quantity of each price
section is fixed, so he did not consider the “Scaling the house” decision in his model.
Advantages of multiple seating categories are also pointed out in Courty [36], where
he empirically found that offering various prices could cause revenue to be about 5
percent higher than offering a uniform price. Other studies focused on the variations
on ticket price discrimination can be found in [42], [56] and [95]. Although many
papers have found significant advantages of ticket price segmentation, none of the
authors above considered methods to optimally segment seats into zones to maximize
revenue.
Although different seats in the S&E venue provide different views of the stage,
each seat is seldom priced as a distinct good. Instead, the venue manager usually
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groups seats in sections or categories and prices them equally within the same section
(“Scaling the house”). Rosen and Rosenfield [123] considered an economic model with
two seat categories and determined the number of tickets for each category . Unlike
our work, they did not include the impact of spatial characteristics (e.g., locations
of seats) when determining the number of tickets. Since we introduce an analytical
method of scaling seats into different sections, our work contributes to the current
literature in finding optimal seating zones based on their location in the venue.
In summary, unlike most previous empirical studies that employed aggregated
demand data, we explore the detailed transactional data to identify how demand
varies with location. We quantify the effect of the distance from the stage and the
distance from the center on ticket demand and develop a two-dimensional “Scaling
the House” model to find the optimal points to switch from a premium price to a
lower price (from front to back, and from center to the left/right of the venue). When
demand is not very sensitive to the distance from the center, we alternatively consider
a one-dimensional model focusing on seats sectioning only from front to back. We
characterize the optimal venue segmentation accounting for location effects nd analyze
insights for managements. Our results shed light on “scaling the house” strategies
that had not been spotlighted by the existing literature.
3.3 Effect of Seating Location on Ticket Demand
In this section, we examine how seating locations affect demand within a venue. We
use detailed transactions of classical concert ticket sales ranging from year 2004 to
2009, obtained from a major performance venue in the U.S. in this study and we have
318 shows across 5 seasons. The detailed transactional data that we study contains
information such as ticket seating locations, ticket prices and when the transactions
occurred. The venue capacity is 1,762 and the average percentage seat sold is 74.4
percent. In addition to this data set, we also examine ticket demand at two other
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large venues and find similar results. The seating chart of this venue is presented in
Figure 15.
 
Figure 15: Seating chart of the venue
To measure the average demand of seats by location, we use the average percent-
age sold of each seat across each season as the ticket demand indicator. Note that
although the analysis could also be done for shows in the season of a given type (e.g.,
symphony or dance) if desired. Zoning decisions in the S&E industry are usually
made before the performance (or game) season begins and seating sections do not
vary for each performance of the same type (i.e., classical, pop, etc.). Therefore, the
average percentage of seats sold during the whole season can represent the overall
popularity of each location in the venue. Since there are many artists or games that
were performed at the same venue each year, the average percentage sold represents
the seat popularity in general. In addition, since none of the performances in the data
are totally sold out, the percentage of seats sold generally represents ticket demand
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in this venue. Alternative measures of demand can be used for venues that sell out,
such as how quick each seat is sold.
As an example of the ticket demand, Figure 16 presents the percentage of tickets
sold in the two latest seasons for different seating rows. From Figure 16, “07-08” and
“08-09” indicate 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 seasons, respectively, where each season
starts in September and ends in June or July of the following year. Note that as the
number of rows (at the horizontal axis) increases, seats are further from the stage.
We can see in Figure 16 that the percentage sold significantly decreases with the













Figure 16: The percentage of seats sold, located at different rows in the entertainment
venue, where the front of the venue is near row 0
Figure 17 shows the percentage of tickets sold at different seating columns, from
the left to the right of the stage. We can observe the highest percentage sold occurs
in the middle part of the venue and demand is generally lower as seats are further
away from the middle or center of the seating rows. Moreover, compared to nearby
locations, the percentage sold is also higher for seats next to the aisle, which are the
very first and very last two columns.










Figure 17: The percentage of seats sold, located at different columns in the enter-
tainment venue, where the left of the stage is column 0)
the following estimation model,
Percentsold,l = θ + βpPl + βdDfront,l + βcDcenter,l + βaAislel +
5∑
k=2
γkSk,l + ε, (5)
where ε is an error term. The dependent variable Percentsold,l is defined as the
average percentage of seat l that is sold during each season. The independent variable
Pl denotes the average price that the customers actually paid for seat l, including
discounts that may have been received. Variables Dfront,l and Dcenter,l denote the
distance from the front and the distance from the center of seating rows of seat l,
respectively; and Aislel is the variable indicating if that seat is next to aisles. The
dummy variable, Sk,l, indicates which season the data is from (where the first season,
2004-2005, is used as the starting point), and k = 2, . . . , 5 represent 2005-2006,. . . ,
2008-2009 seasons, respectively) The parameters θ, βp, βd, βc, βa and γk(k = 2, . . . , 5)
are to be estimated. To summarize the data characteristics, we present the descriptive
statistics of each variable in Table 6.
The model fit is presented in Table 7 to describe effects of price, location of seats,
etc., where the R-squared of the estimation model is 0.615. We find that when the
price of seats increases by 4 dollars, the percentage sold decreases by approximately
one unit (e.g., from 80% to 79%). Both distance from the front and distance from the
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Percentsold,l 2209 74.41 22.78 6.35 99.25
Pl 2209 29.75 7.13 9.82 46.65
Dfront,l 2209 9.17 5.61 0.00 19.00
Dcenter,l 2209 10.78 6.61 0.00 22.00
Aislel 2209 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00
S2,l 2209 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
S3,l 2209 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
S4,l 2209 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
S5,l 2209 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
center have negative impacts on the percentage sold, but the impact of the distance
from the front is approximately twice as much as that of the distance from the middle
(-1.94 versus -0.96). The results imply that demand is relatively more sensitive to
the distance from the stage in this venue; i.e., paying the same price, customers may
prefer moving one seat from the middle section to moving further to the back of the
venue. In addition, we show that aisle seats have positive impacts on sales, although
the majority of seats are not by the aisles. The percentage sold is significantly higher
for the last three seasons (2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009) than the first two
seasons (2004-2005 and 2005-2006), where the highest sales occur in the last 2008-
2009 season. This analysis is relatively easy to repeat for the particular venues where
the type of event may drive more or less sensitivity.
Table 7: Estimation results
Variable coefficient Standard Error t value p-value
Pl -0.24 0.07 -3.38 0.000
Dfront,l -1.94 0.08 -22.12 0.000
Dcenter,l -0.96 0.06 -16.92 0.000
Aislel 5.76 1.27 4.55 0.000
S2,l -4.03 1.00 -4.04 0.000
S3,l 25.66 0.96 26.61 0.000
S4,l 26.75 1.00 26.73 0.000
S5,l 28.84 0.97 29.66 0.000
Constant Term 93.82 3.35 27.97 0.000
R-Squared 0.615
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To summarize impacts of seat locations, we found that although whether seats
are next to aisles plays some roles on demand, the effects of the distance from the
front (or from the stage) and the distance from the center are more important. Thus,
in the next section, we develop a two-dimensional “Scaling the House” model where
premium seats are located in the front-center area of the venue. Also, we have seen
from the empirical results that customers are more sensitive to the distance from the
front than the distance from the center, and it is more common for venue managers
to divide seats into zones from front to back. We also develop an alternative one-
dimensional model which focuses on the impact of the distance from the front for the
scaling decisions.
3.4 Models
From empirical results, we have explored how the demand of seats is affected by seat
location and prices. In this section, we integrate the effects of price, distance from
the front and distance from the center on the ticket demand, and develop models for
the optimal one- and two-dimensional “Scaling the house” decisions.
3.4.1 Two-Dimensional “Scaling the House” Model
In this section, we present the two-dimensional zoning model where zones are divided
in two directions: (1) from the front to the back, or “row cut” and (2) from the center
to the left/right, or “column cut”. We consider the following demand function:
λ(Pi, Pj,j 6=i, F, C) = α− βiPi +
∑
j 6=i
βjiPj − βF F − βCC + ε, (6)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i, and ε is the error term. The demand function λ(Pi, Pj,j 6=i, F, C)
is defined as the ticket demand of seat located at distance F from the front and at
distance C from the center, when it is priced at Pi, i ∈ {1, 2} (and Pj, j 6= i is the
other seating section’s price). This demand function is not only sensitive to its own
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price but can also be sensitive to the prices of other sections, if there is more than one
section available. Parameters βi and βji denote the price effect and cross section effect
of the price of zone j on the demand of zone i, respectively. We include substitution
effects since customers may consider switching from one seating section to another
when making a purchasing decision. In addition, as we have found in Section 3.3,
demand of seats is sensitive to the distance from the stage (F ), where βF represents
distance from the front sensitivity, and it is also sensitive to the distance from the
center (C), where βC represents distance from the center sensitivity.
We have observed that the ticket demand decreases with the distance from the
front and the distance from the center. In other words, if tickets are offered at the
same price, audiences prefer seats in the front/center, rather than the ones located
in the back/left or right of the venue. In this case, it is rational to have the premium
seating section in those popular locations. Thus, we consider the two-dimensional
optimal “Scaling the house” decision where the zoning sections is defined by the
row cut (from front to back) and column cut (from the center to the left/right).
Specifically, the decision variables are: 1) ρ1, the number of seating rows from the
front to be priced at high price P1 before switching to lower price P2 in the next row,
and 2) η1, the number of seats from seating rows’ center to be priced at high price
P1, before switching for lower price P2 in the left and right areas.
Define r as the total number of seating rows from the front to the back, and c as
the average number of seats from the center to the left (or to the right) of the stage,
that is one-half of the number of seats in each row. We use symmetric seating sections
since we have seen demand symmetrically decreases from the middle to the left/right
of the venue (Figure 17). However, our model can be applied to asymmetric sections
(if desired) by starting at the column whose demand is the most and calculate the
optimal column to switch from that point. The left diagram in Figure 18 illustrates
the two-dimensional seating sections in our model. The right diagram in Figure 18
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represents the right half of the venue, where the size of each section is determined via
the decision variables ρ1 ∈ [0, r] and η1 ∈ [0, c], respectively.
 
   
















   	 











   	  
Figure 18: An example of two-dimensional seating sections priced at P1 and P2,
where P1 > P2 (left diagram) and the right-half of the venue with decision variables,
ρ1 and η1 (right diagram)
The key model assumptions are as follows;
1. The entertainment venue manager has predetermined prices, P1 and P2, where
0 < P2 < P1.
2. The capacity is fixed and the number of seats is equal to 2× c× r (no inventory
replenishment).
3. Demand for each seating row is deterministic (as this is a planning decision based
on season average) and given by equation (6) with the following characteristic:
i) α > 0, βi > 0, βij > 0, βF > 0, βC > 0, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i
ii) βi > βij, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i
This means a unit increase (decrease) in the price causes a greater decrease
(increase) in its own seating section’s demand than an increase (decrease) in
63
another seating section’s demand. This assumption also ensures that the overall
market size of the ticket demand decreases in the prices of all seating sections.
iii) βi > βji, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i
This assumption ensures that the ticket demand generated by a seating zone is
affected more by a unit change in its own price than by a unit change in other
sections’ prices.
4. We assume non-negative demand function and the total demand of seats when
priced at either P1 or P2 is less than the total capacity. Otherwise, the problem
becomes trivial since all seats can be sold at price P1 or P2, and the action of
“scaling the house” is not necessary.
5. If α + β1P1 + β21P2 > 1, we assume all seats where F ≤ α−β1P1+β21P2−1βF and
C ≤ α−β1P1+β21P2−1
βC
can be sold at the high price P1.
This means if there is excess demand for price P1 in the popular area, i.e., the
front-center location, we assume the excess demand can be captured by the
nearby available seats. In other words, all seats in the front-center area with
F ≤ MF and C ≤ MC can be sold at price P1, where MF and MC satisfy the










. The parameters MF and MC in condition (1) represent the seating
rows and columns such that the total demand in that area is equal to the
seating capacity. Condition (2) states that we assume the excess demand can be
captured within the areas depending on how demand is sensitive to the distance
from the front and the distance from the center. For instance, if demand is more
sensitive to the distance from the front (high βF ), the excess demand will be
captured by the available seats with smaller MF , or closer to the front rather









In this model, we use continuous rows and columns for the zoning decisions, which
are made in advance before the season begins, and the same seating chart is applied
for all shows of the same performance type (e.g., classical, pop, etc.) during the entire
season. In addition, for many venues, pricing decisions are affected by other factors
such as economy, competition, etc. Thus, we primarily focus on zoning decisions
when the prices are exogenous parameters. We note that this analysis could be
repeated with different sets of prices. After determining the optimal “scaling the
house” decision for each choice of prices, the venue manager can select the most
preferable one.
Define Rev2Dn=2 as the revenue obtained from the two-dimensional zoning decisions.










































E[λ(P2, P1, F, C)]dFdC ≤ 2cr − 2ρ1η1. (9)
The demand, λ(Pi, Pj,j 6=i, F, C), where i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i, is as defined in equation
(6). The objective function (7) is twice the revenue obtained from the right-half of
the venue (presented in the right diagram of Figure 18), since we assume symmetry.
The revenue of the right diagram in Figure 18 is equal to price P1 times the number
of seats that can be sold at P1, plus price P2 times the number of seats that can be
sold at P2. The constraints (8) and (9) ensure that the number of tickets sold does
not exceed the capacity of each zone.
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Lemma 4. The two-dimensional zoning model presented in (7) is not jointly concave
in the decision variables ρ1 and η1.
We present the proof of this Lemma and other key results of this chapter in
the Appendix. Although the revenue function is not jointly concave in the decision
variables, we found it is concave in one decision variable given the other is fixed.
Consider the second derivatives of the objective function Rev2Dn=2(ρ1, η1) with respect
to ρ1 and η1, respectively:
∂2Rev2Dn=2(ρ1, η1)
∂ρ21
= −2η1βF (P1 − P2) < 0, (10)
∂2Rev2Dn=2(ρ1, η1)
∂η21
= −2ρ1βC(P1 − P2) < 0. (11)
Note that Rev2Dn=2(ρ1, η1) is concave in ρ1 for a given η1. Therefore, we can reduce the
problem to an optimization problem over a single variable η1 by first solving for the
optimal ρ1 as a function of η1, then substituting ρ
∗





Rev2Dn=2(η1). Likewise, since Rev
2D
n=2(ρ1, η1) is also concave in η1 for a given ρ1, we can







n=2(ρ1). Both sequential techniques give the same final
results and we present the first approach in this chapter.
Lemma 5. For a fixed η1, the optimal ρ1 (the number of seating rows to be price at
high price P1 before switching to price P2) can be determined uniquely as a function
of η1:
ρ∗1(η1) = min{max{0,MF ,
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1)− (P1 − P2)βC η12





Lemma 5 provides the optimal ρ1 as a function of η1. Then, substituting ρ
∗
1(η1)
into the revenue function (7), we have the maximization problem over the single
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variable η1. We next solve for the optimal η
∗
1 and substitute back to ρ
∗
1(η1), yielding
the value of ρ∗1. The optimal solutions are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Given prices P1 and P2, the optimal two-dimensional segmentation with
row (ρ1) and column (η1) decisions are given below.
1. Offer all seats with low price P2 (ρ
∗
1 = 0 and η
∗
1 = 0) when
α− β1P1 + β21P2 ≤ 1, and (12)
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) < 0. (13)
2. Offer all seats with high price P1 (ρ
∗
1 = r and η
∗
1 = c) when:
2.1) if βCc ≤ βF r,
P1(α−β1P1+β21P2−βF r−βC c
2
) > P2(α−β2P2+β12P1−βF r−βC c
2
). (14)
2.2) if βCc > βF r,
P1(α−β1P1+β21P2−βF r
2
−βCc) > P2(α−β2P2+β12P1−βF r
2
−βCc). (15)
3. Offer two seating sections with P1 and P2,
3a) ρ∗1 = MF and η
∗
1 = MC when
α− β1P1 + β21P2 > 1, and




βF (P1−P2) and η
∗
1 = c when
βCc ≤ βF r, and
(P1 − P2)βC 3c
2
< P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2) (17)









βCc > βF r, and
(P1 − P2)βF 3r
2
< P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2) (18)













Theorem 4 provides conditions when it is optimal to offer only one section with
price P2, two sections with price P1 and P2, or only one section with price P1, where
the optimal solutions indicate the size of each seating section. While conditions look
complicated, there is a reasonable interpretation. From Theorem 4, we can interpret
P1(α − β1P1 + β21P2) − P2(α − β2P2 + β12P1) as the higher revenue obtained from
the front-center seat (D = C = 0) when using price P1, instead of using price P2.
The conditions that are required for selling all seats with the low price P2 (case 1)
are given by (12) and (13). In other words, if there is no excess demand in the most
popular front-center seat for price P1 (condition (12)), and if it is more beneficial
(with higher revenue) to offer price P2, rather than P1 for that seat (condition (13)),
it will be optimal to use price P2 for all other less popular seats as well.
On the other hand, in case 2 the venue manager should offer all seats with high
price P1. Note that when βCc ≤ βF r (case 2.1), condition (14) implies: if it is more
beneficial to sell tickets in the last seating row with high price P1, then it is most
beneficial to use price P1 for all seats in the venue. When βCc > βF r (case 2.2),
condition (15) implies that if more revenue can be obtained on average from pricing
at P1 in the most left/right seating column, then it is optimal to use price P1 for all
seats in the venue.
Next, let us consider the cases outlining two-price sections. From Assumption 5,
when there is some excess demand in the most popular front-center seat for price P1
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(i.e., α− β1P1 + β21P2 > 1), we assume all seats in the front-center area at D ≤ MF
and C ≤ MC can be sold at price P1. Thus, it will not be optimal to switch to the
low price P2 immediately (so, ρ
∗
1 > 0 and η
∗
1 > 0). Condition (16) states that suppose
it is more beneficial to offer seats at distance MF and MC with price P2, rather than
P1, then it is optimal switch to price P2 at ρ
∗
1 = MF and η
∗
1 = MC (case 3a).
If βCc ≤ βF r; and condition (17) holds (i.e, case 3b) then it is optimal to charge
the same price for all seats in the same row and to “scale to house” only from front
to back (with a row cut). Rearranging the optimal decisions in case 3b, we have
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF ρ∗1 − βC c2) = P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF ρ∗1 − βC c2). It means
the optimal row to switch price is the one whose expected revenue when seats in that
row are priced at P1 is equal to the expected revenue when they are priced at P2.
If βCc > βF r and condition (18) holds (i.e, case 3c), then it is optimal to “scale
to house” only from center to left/right (with column cut). Similarly, the optimal
decisions in case 3d imply P1(α − β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r2 − βCη∗1) = P2(α − β2P2 +
β12P1−βF r2−βCη∗1); i.e., the optimal seating column to switch price is the one whose
expected revenue when seats in that seating column are priced at P1 is equal to the
expected revenue when they are priced at P2. Otherwise, it is optimal to perform
seating segmentations with the solution provided in case 3d.
To provide some visualizations, Figure 19 illustrates examples of the seating sec-
tions for each case presented in Theorem 4.
Observation 8. From Theorem 4:
i) if βCc ≤ βF r, the seating chart option E in Figure 19 will never be the optimal
solution,
ii) if βCc > βF r, the seating chart in option D in Figure 19 will never be the
optimal solution.
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Figure 19: The depictions of the optimal two-dimensional seating sections for each
case presented in Theorem 4
insights for venue segmentations. For instance, we found that if demand is very
sensitive to the distance from the front (high βF ) and there is a higher number of
seating rows than the number of seats from the center (r > c), then the venue manager
should not choose to have seating segmentations similar to option E in Figure 19.
When both βF and r are high, it is more beneficial to offer the low price in the back
rather than on the far sides.
On the other hand, if βCc > βF r, then the seating chart option D will never be
optimal for the venue since it is better to provide low prices in the left/right seats
than in the back seats in this case. In practice, demand is usually more sensitive to
the distance from the front than to the distance from the center. This can be why
seats in most venues are usually divided into zones from front to back (option D),
rather than from center to left/right (option E). Next, we examine the relative size
of the optimal solutions for option C of Figure 19 in the following observation.
Observation 9. If 0 < ρ1 < r and 0 < η1 < c, then the ratio of the optimal decisions,
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Figure 20: The optimal ρ∗1 at different distance from the front sensitivity, βF (left),
and the optimal η∗1 at different distance from the center sensitivity, βC (right)
ρ∗1
η∗1
, equals the ratio between the distance from the center sensitivity and the distance
from the front sensitivity, βC
βF
.
The proof of Observation 9 follows directly from the optimal decisions given in





. It suggests that the relationship between
the distance from the center sensitivity and the distance from the front sensitivity
can imply the relative size of the optimal premium section area. For instance, the




are relatively less sensitive to the distance from the center as compared to the distance
from the front (small βC
βF
), and vice versa.
Next, we observe how the distance sensitivity impacts each optimal decision in-
dividually. Figure 20 (left) depicts the optimal row cut ρ∗1 at different βF values. As
shown in the graph, for small βF , the optimal ρ
∗
1 reaches its limit at the last row of the
venue (r=60). This is rational since when demand does not significantly decreases
as the seats are further from the stage, it is unnecessary to offer the back seats with
a low price. As βF increases (customers may not want to pay a high price for back
seats), the optimal ρ∗1 decreases, suggesting a bigger area for the low-price section in
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the back. Similar observations hold about the impact of the distance from the center
(βC) on the optimal η
∗
1, as shown in Figure 20 (right).
Figure 21 summarizes the impact of both distance sensitivities simultaneously
on the optimal zoning decisions (with the same set of numerical parameters as in
Figure 20). In this example, α − β1P1 + β21P2 ≤ 1 and P2(α − β2P2 + β12P1) <
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2), so we know that case 1 and 2a in Theorem 4 are not optimal.
From Figure 21, when both βF and βC are low, the ticket demand is not sensitive
to the locations of seats and it is optimal to charge all seats with the high price P1
(case 3). When βF is low but βC is high, i.e., the distance from the center is more
important than the distance from the front, the optimal solution suggests reducing
price only in the left and right areas (case 2b). In contrast, for high βF and low βC ,
i.e., the impact of distance from the front is more important, we found it is optimal
to reduce price in the back seats instead of the left/right seats (case 2c). When both
βF and βC are high, the venue managers should consider offering low price tickets in
both areas in the back and the left/right (case 2d). Our results suggest that different
combinations of the distance from the front and distance from the center sensitivities
can imply different optimal seating segmentations.
If there are many types of performances (such as orchestra concert, pop concert
and comedian talk show) taking place in the same venue, each type may lead to
different distance sensitivities on demand. For instance, pop concerts’ demand may
be more sensitive to both distances from the front and from the center, since most
attendants may prefer to be close to the famous singer (as compared to the demand
of broadway shows which may utilize the full stage so the distance from the front
sensitivity may not be high). Orchestra’s audiences may also have different distance
sensitivity compared to comedian talk shows’ audiences since the number of perform-
ers and shows structures are not the same. Therefore, it can be beneficial to capture





Figure 21: The optimal seating zones described in Theorem 4 at different distance
from the front sensitivity, βF , and distance from the center sensitivity, βC
zoning sections for each category of show performed in the same venue.
We have found that when ticket demand is not very sensitive to the distance
from the center (βC is small), it may be unnecessary to offer low price P2 on the
side area of the venue. Similarly, for a narrow venue (i.e., small c), customers may
not have different perception for seats in the same row. We consider an alternative
one-dimensional zoning model in the next section.
3.4.2 One-Dimensional “Scaling the House” Model
From empirical results in Section 3.3, we found demand is more sensitive to the
distance from the front than to the distance from the center. Also, it is more common
to divide seats into zones from front to back, rather than from center to left/right.
In this section, we simplify the previous model to consider one-dimensional zoning
decisions defined by row cuts. We consider the following demand function:
Q(Pi, Pj,j 6=i, F ) = a− biPi +
∑
j 6=i
bjiPj − bF F + ε, (19)
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where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j 6= i, n is the number of seating sections (where n can
be greater than 2), and ε is the error term. The demand function Q(Pi, Pj,j 6=i, F )
is defined as the ticket demand of the seating row located at distance F from the
stage when it is priced at Pi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and seats in other sections are sold at
price Pj, j 6= i. Parameters bi and bji denote the price effect and the cross section
effect of zone j’s price on zone i’s demand, respectively. Demand of seats is also
sensitive to distance from the stage (F ), where bF represents distance sensitivity.
Note that the demand function in (19) is different than the previous section since
it represents demand of each seating row; while the demand function given in (6)
represents demand of each seat.
Given the demand function described, we next consider how the entertainment
venue managers should categorize seats into zones to maximize revenue. In the one-
dimensional zoning model, the decision variable is defined by the row cut. The deci-
sion variables ri (i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}) denote the last seating row to be sold at price
Pi before switching to a lower price Pi+1. We note that the decision could be column
instead of row, if desired, where the optimal solution will be the number of column
from the center of rows for a high price before switching to a lower price.
Denote rowc as the average row capacity and r as the total number of rows for
the zoning decision. The key model assumptions are as follow:
A. The predetermined price for each section i is Pi (i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) and prices are
ordered with subscript i (Pi+1 < Pi for i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}).
B. The number of seats in each row is fixed.
C. Demand for each seating row is a known function of parameters and given by
(19):













E[Q(Pi, Pj,j 6=i, F )]dF ≤ r × rowc, where i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j 6= i.
Note that the justifications of assumptions above are similar to those in Section 3.4.1.














E[Q(Pi, Pj,j 6=i, F )]dF ≤ (ri − ri−1)× rowc, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (21)
where r0 = 0, rn = r. The demand, Q(Pi, Pj,j 6=i, F ), is as defined in equation (19).
The objective function (20) is the total revenue obtained from each show, which is
the summation of the price of each section times the expected total number of seats
that can be sold in that section. The capacity constraint (21) ensures the number of
tickets sold does not exceed the capacity of each zone. We present the structure of
the described problem in the following Lemma.
Lemma 6. The revenue maximization problem given in (20) and (21), is jointly
concave in the zoning decision variables ri,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
The concavity result given by Lemma 6 guarantees a global maximum expected
revenue, achieved by the optimal zoning decisions across multiple sections. We can
find the solutions by setting the first order condition of each variable to zero and solv-
ing simultaneously. Thus, the one-dimensional model has a computational advantage
over the two-dimensional problem presented in section 3.4.1.
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To demonstrate further structure of model solutions, let us consider the case when
n = 2, where P1 and P2 denote the ticket prices of the first and the second zones,
respectively (P1 > P2). The decision variable, r1, represents the last row of seats to
be sold at price P1, before switching to price P2. The revenue maximization problem














(a− b1P1 + b21P2 − bF F )dF ≤ r1 × rowc, (23)
∫ r
r1
(a− b2P2 + b12P1 − bF F )dF ≤ (r − r1)× rowc. (24)
The optimal solution is identified in the following Theorem.
Theorem 5. The optimal row (r∗1) to be priced at the high price P1 before switching
to the lower price P2, is given by:
Case 1. if a− b1P1 + b21P2 ≤ rowc,
i) r∗1 = 0 when P2(a− b2P2 + b12P1) > P1(a− b1P1 + b21P2),
ii) r∗1 = r when P1(a− b1P1 + b21P2 − bF r) > P2(a− b2P2 + b12P1 − bF r),
iii) r∗1 =
a(P1−P2)−b1P 21 +b2P 22−P1P2(b12−b21)
bF (P1−P2) , otherwise.
Case 2. if a− b1P1 + b21P2 > rowc,
i) r∗1 = m =
2(a−b1P1+b21P2−rowc)
bF
, when P2(a− b2P2 + b12P1− bF m) > P1(a− b1P1 +
b21P2 − bF m),
ii) r∗1 = r when P1(a− b1P1 + b21P2 − bF r) > P2(a− b2P2 + b12P1 − bF r),
iii) r∗1 =
a(P1−P2)−b1P 21 +b2P 22−P1P2(b12−b21)
bF (P1−P2) , otherwise.
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Let us examine the parameter condition of each solution case for insights. The
only difference between case 1 and case 2 of Theorem 5 is that we expect demand
in the first row when charged at price P1 to exceed the row capacity rowc, i.e.,
a − b1P1 + b21P2 > rowc in case 2. Therefore, there is no incentive to switch to the
lower price P2 in the first row since all seats in that row can be sold at the higher
price P1, leading to a higher revenue. In case 1(i), a − b1P1 + b21P2 ≤ rowc and
P2(a− b2P2 + b12P1) > P1(a− b1P1 + b21P2), implying the first seating row’s revenue
when priced at the lower price P2 is greater than the revenue when priced at the
higher price P1. In this case, the revenue function is decreasing in r1 ∈ [0, r], so it
is optimal to switch to price P2 immediately at r
∗
1 = 0. This can occur when the
expected demand is very low and/or when the demand is very sensitive to the high
price P1. Thus, the higher revenue gained from charging a higher price cannot offset
the loss of revenue from the decreased demand.
On the other hand, in case 1(ii) and 2(ii), all seats should be priced at the high
price P1 if the last seating row’s revenue when priced at the higher price P1 is greater
than the revenue when priced at the low price P2 (i.e., P1(a− b1P1 + b21P2 − bF r) >
P2(a− b2P2 + b12P1 − bF r)). It means the revenue function is increasing in r1 ∈ [0, r]
and the optimal r∗1 = r. This can happen when the ticket demand is not very sensitive
to price, so it may be unnecessary to attract more demand with low price tickets.
Cases 1(iii) and 2(iii) are what we expect to happen more frequently in practice,
which is that the venue managers should offer both prices, P1 and P2. The optimal
zoning decision occurs at row r∗1, in which the expected revenue when seats in that
row are priced at P1 is equal to the expected revenue when they are priced at P2. This
row can be referred to as the “indifference” row, whose revenues are the same for
either price. The interpretations of each solution case from Theorem 5 provide easy
managerial insights on how the venue management should make the optimal “scaling
the house” decisions.
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In the following Lemmas, we establish some comparative statics for the optimal
zoning decision for two sections, given in Theorem 5 to explore the behavior of the
optimal r∗1 as marginal model parameters change.
Lemma 7. As the marginal price sensitivity, b1(b2), increases, the optimal row to
switch from zone 1 to zone 2, i.e., price P1 to P2, should be moved to be closer to
(further from) the front.
Lemma 7 implies that the more customers are sensitive to price P1(P2), the fewer
the number of rows that should be priced at P1(P2). For instance, if the venue
management has realized that demand will decrease more dramatically with high
prices (b1 is larger), then fewer rows should be priced at P1 so that they can encourage
higher revenue from a greater proportion of seats charged at the lower price, P2.
Lemma 8. As the marginal price substitution effect, b12(b21), increases, the optimal
row to switch from price P1 to price P2 should be closer to (further from) the front.
The cross section sensitivity captures how demand changes when prices of other
seating sections changes. When b12 is larger, it means customers of the back section
become more sensitive to the price of the front section; e.g., they are likely to switch
from the low-price zone if the premium-zone price P1 is decreased. In this case,
we found the venue managers should shift the low-price section closer to the stage
(decrease r∗1) for higher overall revenue.
On the other hand, when b21 becomes larger, customers of the front section (with
high price P1) become more sensitive to price P2 of the back section; e.g., customers
are likely to switch from the front to the back section for a lower price. Then, from
Lemma 8, we should shift the low-price section further from the stage and offer more
seating rows for the high price section. A reason is when customers are considering
to switch to pay a lower price, they will find those low-price seats are further from
the stage. Note that this Lemmas hold with more sections as well.
78
Lemma 9. The optimal decision, r∗1, decreases with the distance sensitivity, bF .
Lemma 9 states that As the marginal distance sensitivity of demand (bF ) increases,
i.e., the demand decreases more significantly with the distance from the stage, the
optimal row to switch from price P1 to price P2 should be moved closer to the front.
An explanation is that when demand significantly decreases with distance, people
may not want to pay a high price for seats located further in the back of the venue.
Thus, when bF is high, the venue managers should consider having bigger low-price
zones to induce more sales and maximize the overall revenue.
Lemma 10. The optimal zoning decision, r∗1, is non-monotonic with ticket prices P1
and P2. Specifically, it depends on the following conditions:
i) As the marginal price P1 increases, the optimal row to switch from price P1 to





2. Otherwise, it should be moved closer to the back.
ii) As the marginal price P2 increases, the optimal row to switch from price P1 to





2. Otherwise, it should be moved closer to the back.
From Lemma 10, unlike other model parameters such as b1, b2, b21, b12 and bF , we
found P1 and P2 can have different effects on the optimal solution. For example, if
the exogenous price parameters are higher, the optimal zoning decisions may suggest
to either increase or decrease size of the premium zone (depending on the conditions
given above). Table 8 summarizes the comparative statics of the optimal decision r∗1
and the optimal revenue Rev∗n=2 to the model parameters, when r
∗
1 ∈ (max{0,m}, r).
The cases where the behavior of the optimal zoning decision (and the revenue) changes
conditionally are indicated by a symbol “E”, stating it can go either way, depending
on the conditions of parameters.
79





a ↗ ↗ ↗
b1 ↗ ↘ ↘
b2 ↗ ↗ ↘
b12 ↗ ↘ ↗
b21 ↗ ↗ ↗
bF ↗ ↘ ↘
P1 ↗ E E
P2 ↗ E E
In real life, it is possible that some model parameters can be misestimated, leading
to a lower revenue than the true optimal. We discuss this issue in the next section.
3.5 Robustness of the Models
In this section, we consider the robustness of both two-dimensional and one-dimensional
models to estimation errors in the price sensitivity and the two distance sensitivity
values. The goal of this section is to examine an aspect of model performance by
quantifying the percentage profit loss due to misestimating model parameters. This
can generate insights on which parameter estimation’s accuracy is more critical in
achieving the highest possible revenue, for example.
In the analysis, we start by computing the optimal seating sections at each mises-
timated value of the parameter and the optimal seating sections with the true value.
Next, we calculate revenues from the untrue solutions, compared to the actual opti-
mal revenue (where the accurate estimate was used). For simplicity, we assume the
price sensitivities of each section are equal (β1 = β2 for the first and b1 = b2 for
the second model). Figure 22 shows the percent revenue loss of the two-dimensional
model caused by the estimation errors in (a) the price sensitivity, β1, (b) the distance
from the front sensitivity, βF and (c) the distance from the center sensitivity, βC ,
respectively. For the one-dimensional model, Figure 23 presents a similar analysis
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Figure 22: Percent revenue loss of the two-dimensional model caused by estimation
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Figure 23: Percent revenue loss of the one-dimensional model caused by the estima-
tion errors in (a) b1 and (b) bF
Observation 10. For both models:
i) Underestimation of the model parameters causes greater revenue losses than
overestimation;
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ii) Estimation errors in the price sensitivity lead to higher revenue losses than
errors in the distance sensitivity values.
When the price sensitivity is underestimated, both models choose to offer more
seats at the high price, leading to a significant drop in ticket demand and overall
revenue. On the other hand, when the venue managers underestimate the price
sensitivity, the optimal zone decisions will offer more seats with the low price. The
expected demand is higher than the optimal but the revenue is less. Likewise, the
same reasoning applies for the misestimation of the distance from the front sensitivity
and the distance from the center sensitivity. We found that overestimation errors lead
to higher revenue losses than underestimation for both price and distance sensitivities.
The results imply a risk-averse venue manager who tends to overestimate sensitivity
of demand may achieve higher revenue than a risk-taker manager who underestimates
them.
When we compare revenue losses, the estimation errors from the price sensitivity
are more costly than those from the distance sensitivities for both models. A possible
reason is that the gap between the zoning decisions and the actual optimal decisions is
greater when the price sensitivity is misestimated than when the distance sensitivities
are misestimated. This finding emphasizes the importance of correctly estimating price
sensitivity parameters to achieve the maximum revenue in this ticket industry.
3.6 Comparisons among Different “Scaling the House” Mod-
els
We have presented the two-dimensional and the one-dimensional scaling the house
models in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, respectively. In this section, we conduct vari-
ous computational experiments to answer the following questions; (1) for the one-
dimensional scaling the house, when is a venue suitable for sectioning from the front
to the back (row cut), rather than sectioning from the center to the left/right (column
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cut), and vice versa?; (2) when is it beneficial to perform two-dimensional scaling the
house (both row and column cuts) instead of a simple one-dimensional sectioning?
These insights can help venue managers make more effective decisions when it comes
to model selection.
Next, we explore what happens if the venue management divides seats into zones
from the front to the back (row cut), rather than from the center to the left/right
(column cut) when βF r > βCc. Figure 24 shows the percent benefit gained from
implementing the row cut instead of the column cut at different values of distance
from the front sensitivity (βF ) and the number of rows (r). We can see that as βF
increases, the percent revenue gained from using row cuts (in place of column cuts)
also increases. In addition, sectioning seats by row cut is more advantageous when
r is high, e.g., the percent increase in revenue is the most when r=55 for all values
of βF . The results imply that if only the one-dimensional cuts are considered, the
larger the number of rows and the higher the distance from the front sensitivity, the
more attractive it is to consider zoning from the front to the back, rather than from
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Figure 24: The percentage revenue increase from implementing the one-dimensional
row cut instead of the one-dimensional column cut at different values of βF and r
In contrast, from Theorem 4 in section 3.4.1, it is never be the optimal to perform
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row cuts when βF r < βCc. Figure 25 depicts the percent increase in revenue from
using the column cut in place of the row cut, at different values of the center sensitivity
(βC) and number of seats from the center to the left/right (c). Similarly, we can see
from Figure 25 that when βC and/or c increases, the percent revenue gained from
using the column cut (instead of the row cut) also increases. Therefore, by looking
at the distance sensitivity parameters and the structure of the venue (i.e., number of
rows and seats), it is possible to determine which type of one-dimensional sections is
more suitable. The higher values of βC and c (or, βF and r), the higher tendency that
the one-dimensional ”Scaling the House” from the center to the left/right (or, from






      !  "#$% & ' &(' )(*
Figure 25: The percentage revenue increase from implementing the one-dimensional
column cut instead of the one-dimensional row cut at different values of βC and c
(when βF r > βCc)
The next interesting question is; when is it beneficial to use the two-dimensional
cuts (both row and column as presented in section 3.4.1) instead of a simple one-
dimensional model as presented in section 3.4.2? For instance, how does the venue’s
size impact the benefit gained from performing both row and column cuts, as com-
pared to a simple row cut? Figure 26 shows the percentage increase in revenue when
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implementing the two-dimensional instead of the one-dimensional sections at differ-
ent venue’s sizes, r and c. We can notice that as the venue size increases (in both
directions), it is more beneficial to perform both row and column cuts. Moreover,
for venues with the same size, as the distance sensitivity values (both βF and βC)
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Figure 26: The percentage revenue increase from implementing the two-dimensional
row and column cuts instead of the one-dimensional row cut at different values of r
and c (when βF r < βCc)
In practice, the entertainment venues may differ in term of their shapes. For
instance, a venue may have more rows than the number of seats in each row (repre-
sented in the left diagram of Figure 27). In contrast, other venues may have more
seats in each row than the number of rows (the right diagram of Figure 27). In the
next analysis, we explore performances of different zoning models when venues have
different shapes (e.g., different r
c
). Let “2D”, “1Drow” and “1Dcol” represent the
two dimensional zones, the one-dimensional zones from the front to the back and the
one-dimensional zones from the center to the left/right, respectively.
The left diagram of Figure 28 shows the percentage revenue increased when
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implementing the ”2D” instead of: (1) the “1Drow” and (2) the “1Dcol”, where
βF = βC = 1%. It can be observed that as
r
c
increases, i.e., there is a higher number
of rows compared to the number of seats in each row (large r
c
), the revenue gain from
using the “2D” zone instead of the “1Drow” zone (“2D vs 1Drow”) decreases. It
implies that when r
c
is small, the “2D” seating zone performs much better than the
“1Drow” seating zone. However, as the number of rows are greater or the number
of seats in each row are fewer, it becomes less necessary to consider the “2D” model
because its benefits become similar to the “1Drow” model. On the other hand, when
r
c
is small, the benefit gained from choosing the “2D” zone instead of “1Dcol” zone
(“2D vs 1Dcol”) is also small. It implies the “2D” and the “1Dcol” zones are not
much different at small r
c
and the benefit gained becomes larger as r
c
increases.
                                                                                                                   
 
                                                                                                                     
                  
  
 












Figure 27: Venue shapes examples
The right diagram of Figure 28 also demonstrates the percentage revenue increased
when implementing the ”2D” instead of the “1Drow” and the “1Dcol”. While βF and




in this case. We can see similar trends for both “2D vs 1Drow” and “2D vs 1Dcol”
lines in the left and the right graphs. However, a difference is that dividing seats in
the “2D” zone is less worthwhile if (1) r
c
<< 1 and r
2c
>> 1 for the left diagram (where
βF = βC) and (2)
r
c
<< 2 and r
2c




since there exists a one-dimensional cut yielding quite similar performances. When r
c






Figure 28: The percentage revenue increase from implementing the two-dimensional
row and column cuts instead of: 1) the one-dimensional row cut (“2D vs 1Drow”)
and 2) the one-dimensional column cut (“2D vs 1Dcol”), for different venue shapes
to apply the “ 2D” zone since it gives higher revenue than both “1Drow” and “1Dcol”





. Note that if a venue has several seating areas (e.g., different floors), this
insight can motivate different zoning models for seating areas with different shapes
within same the venue as well.
3.7 Conclusions
Although sectioning seats into zones for different prices (“Scaling the house”) is one
of the most important decisions in the entertainment industry, systematic approaches
for this problem have not been developed so far. The goal of this chapter is, therefore,
to develop models for the optimal “Scaling the house” decisions. We obtained trans-
actional level data of over 300 shows from a major performance arts organization in
the United States. We empirically explored how seating locations drive ticket demand
within the venue and found that in addition to price, demand is significantly driven
1Parameter values for Figure 28 are α = 1.25, β1 = β2 = 1%, β12 = β21 = 0.5%, P1 = 60 and
P2 = 45.
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by the distance from the front and the distance from the center.
Given the characteristics of demand, we developed a two-dimensional “Scaling
the House” model and identified the optimal closed form solutions of the number of
seating rows (from the front) and the number of seats (from the center of rows) to
be charged at a premium price. We found that for the two dimensional zones, the
ratio of the optimal row cut and column cut equals the ratio between distance from
the center sensitivity and distance from the front sensitivity. When ticket demand
does not significantly decrease with the distance from the center, the optimal seating
zones will be defined only by row cuts, where seats in the same row have the same
price. In fact, from our empirical results, customers are more sensitive to the distance
from the front than the distance from the center. Thus, we developed an alternative
one-dimensional zoning model (with row cuts). We showed the optimal cutting point
occurs at the seating row whose expected revenue when charging the a high price is
equal to its expected revenue when charging the a low price.
To obtain managerial insights, we performed comparative statics of the two-price
zoning decisions. We showed that the optimal number of high-price seating rows
decreases with the customers’ price sensitivity. Thus, if customers are very sensitive
to high prices, the venue managers should provide a smaller premium section and
induce more revenue with more low-priced seats. In addition, the optimal number of
high-price seating rows decreases with the distance from the front sensitivity. When
demand decreases significantly with distance, people may not want to pay a high price
for seats further in the back, so the venue managers may consider having a bigger low-
price section to motivate more revenue. The result also implies that when different
types of performances (with different distance sensitivity on demand) are performed
in the same venue, the management should consider having different seating charts
for each show type to maximize revenue.
In robustness analysis, we found that underestimation of model parameters causes
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greater revenue losses as compared to overestimation (for both two dimensional and
one dimensional zoning models). Therefore, a risk-averse venue manager who tends
to overestimate sensitivity of demand may achieve higher revenue than a risk-taker
manager who underestimates them. We perform several computational experiments
to identify how different venue’s characteristics impact the suitable zoning model
choices. The results show that it is most worthwhile to use the two-dimensional





venue’s shape can imply different zoning models and our insights can help the venue
managers select appropriate seating sections, based on the structures of their venues.
It is worthwhile to note that our “Scaling the House” models and results also
provide some implications to other industries whose demand is sensitive to spacial
locations. For example, in the airline industry, customers may prefer some locations
of seats in the aircraft such as window/aisle and front/back areas. In fact, airlines
(e.g. US Airways, Northwest and Spirit) have started to charge premium prices
for some types of popular seats [139]. It would be interesting to identify the optimal
zoning solutions for this business. Another example is the online advertising industry,
where some locations on the web page are considered to be more valuable for ad
placements. For instance, the top-page space may be the most stand-out area for
customers’ notification, so web site managers can consider ”Scaling the Page” for
different advertisement fees to maximize their revenue as well. We hope our work in
this chapter also motivates the future works of spatial locations impacts on revenue
management applications in broader industries.
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CHAPTER IV
DYNAMIC PRICING WITH DEMAND LEARNING FOR
THE SPORT AND ENTERTAINMENT TICKET
INDUSTRY
4.1 Introduction
Revenue management (RM) has attracted much attention and been proven as one
of the most effective practices to increase profitability for many industries. RM first
emerged in the airline industry in the context of passenger booking problems ([7],
[94] and [125]). Then, it has played important roles in improving the performance
of many industries, selling fixed perishable capacity with high set-up costs such as
hotels ([12], [13] and [91]), cruise lines [82], passenger railways [31], and rental car
companies ([25] and [55]). Ultimately, RM is used to support decision making to
achieve the goal of selling the right amount of product at the right price to the right
customers at the right time [18].
Dynamic pricing is an RM tool that is widely used to manage and control demand
at different points of time. Sellers adjust prices to increase or decrease demand in the
short run so that it can be matched with their available resources. The main objective
of dynamic pricing is to find an optimal dynamic policy to balance utilization of the
available capacity so that the revenue can be maximized over the selling period. There
are extensive papers exploring a variety of dynamic pricing topics (e.g., [11], [28], [51],
[52] [73], [87], [90] and [98]). While dynamic pricing has been intensively studied in the
travel industries, the Sport and Entertainment (S&E) industry is another business
that has potential to be improved by the idea but still has not received as much
attention [41].
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There are approximately 1,953 sport stadiums and 236 performance venues in the
United States, with the total revenue of 44.2 billion reported in 2009 [119]. Similar
to the airline business, the number of the S&E tickets is fixed and the are “perish-
able” since they have no value after the event date. However, the S&E industry’s
characteristics differ from airlines or hotels in many ways. First, a much higher per-
centage of entertainment tickets are purchased on the day of the show than on the
day of a flight or on the day of a hotel stay [41]. Secondly, while important factors
of demand are date/time of a flight for airlines and day/month of a stay for hotels,
the S&E ticket demand is also very related to the sport teams or performance artists’
popularity. Moreover, consumer tastes and economic conditions change over time and
events vary from one year to another, so it is difficult to incorporate all uncertainties
to precisely predict S&E ticket sales. For these reasons, a different pricing model is
necessary for the S&E industry.
Although there are a number of studies that are related to ticket pricing (e.g., [35],
[38] and [123]) and the topic of price variation in the S&E business (e.g., [89] and
[120]), the previous research considered static pricing decisions where ticket prices
remain constant for the entire selling horizon. It is generally because in the past,
most event tickets were sold with a fixed price (independent of when the tickets
were sold) due to the limited inventory tracking devices or ticket changes were done
on an ad-hoc basis. However, in recent years, tools such as internet based selling
systems have become widely available, providing information for real-time demand
observations. From our discussions with a performing arts consulting firm, there
has been a significant interest from a number of performance arts organizations for
methods to apply dynamic discounts/premiums pricing to more effectively manage
demand and increase revenue.
For new products (without past sales information) and/or products whose de-
mand patterns may deviate significantly from past history, demand characterization
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is difficult [83]. Likewise, the S&E demand can be uncertain, especially for a new
show or a sports team with varying performance. So, the seller cannot totally rely
on past sales history when predicting demand. Early sales observations can be useful
for demand information updates. For example, after the selling time starts, the ticket
sellers will have a clearer picture whether the games (or shows) are likely to have
high or low sales. In this chapter, we consider stochastic S&E ticket demand and
incorporate demand learning with Bayesian updates. A stochastic setting is appro-
priate to capture real-life situations when the paths of demand over time is difficult
to be accurately predicted [18]; while demand learning allows the seller to update his
beliefs as uncertainty reveals itself.
In this chapter, we assume ticket demand in each period follows a Poisson distri-
bution, where its rate is affected by three components; (1) the artists/sport teams’
popularity, (2) the ticket price and (3) the remaining time until the show date. In-
cluding timing effects for the S&E ticket demand is motivated by the actual data.
Figure 29 depicts the average number of tickets sold for 108 shows performed in a ma-
jor performance venue in the U.S. during the 2007-2008 season, where the horizontal
axis represents the number of months prior to the show dates. The upper and lower
lines represent the average plus and minus one standard deviation, respectively. We
can see in Figure 29 that the average number of seats sold each month is dependent
on time prior to the show and it generally increases when the time is closer to the
event date.
In our demand model, the seller can characterize price effects and timing effects on
demand, but he has incomplete information about the event popularity (i.e., the base
demand rate). The seller forecasts the base demand rate’ s initial estimation, and then
uses the observed sales to update his belief about the upcoming period’s demand. We
develop dynamic pricing models in a discrete-finite-time selling horizon. In the first
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Figure 29: The average ticket sales of 108 shows performed in a major performance
venue in the U.S. during the 2007-2008 season, at different times prior to the show
the seller can offer discounts (decrease price) or charge premiums (increase price), with
respect to the decided base price. We consider two types of pricing mechanisms. The
first model is called “Dynamic discounts/premiums pricing model”, where the levels of
discounts/premiums can be adjusted in every period. In the case that changing prices
too often is difficult or costly, the number of price changes may be restricted. We
consider in the second model (called the “Dynamic timing model”), where the seller
decides the optimal time to change price and the optimal level of discounts/premiums
that will be applied for all remaining periods. These problems are motivated by our
discussions on actual practices and methods that are needed in the S&E industry.
We address the following research questions:
1. How can the observed sales be used in the demand learning process to improve
the forecast, and when is demand learning most beneficial?
2. How are the optimal discounts/premiums related to model parameters such as
price sensitivity and remaining inventory of unsold tickets?
3. When is it most worthwhile to adjust discounts/premiums every period and
when is it most practical to limit the frequency of price discounts/premiums
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changes?
4. If the seller decides to limit the price change to only one, when is it optimal to
offer discounts/premiums: early in the selling season, or close to the show date?
This chapter is organized as follows. We begin by presenting a summary of the
relevant literature in the next section. In Section 4.3, we discuss demand assumptions
and describe how the observed sales are used to update the belief about the upcoming
period’s demand in the learning process. We next study two dynamic pricing models
in the context of stochastic dynamic programs. In Section 4.4, we present the dynamic
discounts/premiums pricing model, where the price discounts/premiums adjustment
is allowed in every period, and discuss the value of applying demand learning to the
pricing model. In Section 4.5, we address an alternative model (i.e., the dynamic
timing model) where the number of price changes is limited to only one and present
computational experiments comparing the dynamic timing model to the dynamic
discounts/premiums pricing model. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes with a summary
of insights from the results this chapter.
4.2 Literature Review
This research draws on and contributes to three streams of literature: 1) Sport and
Entertainment tickets pricing and timing literature, 2) dynamic pricing for perishable
products with no inventory replenishment and 3) demand learning with Bayesian
updates. In this section, we review related papers in these three areas.
Most pricing studies in Sport and Entertainment industry are concentrated in
economics and marketing fields. An extensive review on pricing practices observed
in the entertainment ticket markets can be found in [35]. Rosen and Rosenfield [123]
developed an economic model with two seat categories and determined the number
of tickets and price for each category that maximizes revenue. Marburger [100] con-
sidered a pricing model for performance goods when there are other complementary
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products sold at the event. All the works above considered deterministic demand
with static pricing decisions, i.e., ticket prices remain constant for the entire selling
horizon. Jorgensen et al. [70] studied optimal pricing and advertising policies for en-
tertainment events, taking into account diffusion effects and the last-minute market.
In their model, the authors assumed if all tickets are not sold by a current period, the
remaining tickets will be sold at a reduced price in the last period. Unlike Jorgensen
et al. [70], we assume stochastic demand with uncertain arrival rates that can be
updated as more demand information is revealed. This topic of pricing with demand
learning has not been explored in the S&E ticket pricing literature.
There are a small number of recent papers exploring opportunities for revenue
management in the S&E business. Drake et al. [41] considered the optimal time to
switch from selling ticket bundles to selling a single ticket. The authors characterized
the conditions when only bundles, only individual tickets, or mixed bundling should
be offered. While Drake et al. considered a static timing decision that is determined
at the beginning of the selling horizon, Yakici et al. [147] extended the previous
model to a dynamic switching model. They showed that the optimal time to switch
(from selling ticket bundles to selling a single ticket) consists of a set of threshold
pairs defined by the remaining inventory and the time left in the horizon. From
computational results, they found the profit can be improved by 1 to 2 percent with
dynamic switching as compared to static switching. Unlike the papers above, we
consider dynamic pricing models for the S&E industry in this chapter.
Dynamic pricing has been proven to be an effective tool for revenue management
and has been extensively studied in the literature. Bitran and Caldentey [18], and
Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [44] provided important reviews on dynamic pricing
research. Kincaid and Darling [77] were the first who formally developed a single-
product dynamic pricing model as a continuous-time stochastic dynamic program,
and they identified important properties of the revenue function. Gallego and van
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Ryzin [51] considered a continuous time dynamic pricing problem of a firm selling a
fixed stock of items over a finite horizon. The authors derived important structural
properties of the optimal solution and developed a deterministic heuristic to solve the
problem. In practice, it can be to costly to change prices too often. Feng and Gallego
[48] studied pricing models when prices can be changed only once and the second price
can be chosen from a set of allowable prices. The authors showed that the optimal
time to change price is a function of the remaining time and the remaining inventory
level. Bitran and Mondschein [16] considered a dynamic pricing model for seasonal
products having stochastic customer arrivals. They found that uncertainty in the
demand for new products leads to higher prices, larger discounts, and more unsold
inventory. Other dynamic pricing models for limited inventory studies are presented
in [17] and [149]. In contrast to these dynamic pricing papers, our work considers
demand learning opportunities and explores how the seller should adjust prices as
past sales are observed.
In real life, demand learning is possible as selling process evolves and the current
inventory level can be observed. Pricing can be an important tool to control not
only demand but also the speed of how the seller learns about actual popularity
of the products. Bayesian updating is one of the most important and widely used
approaches for demand learning. Scarf [126] was the first to introduce a Bayesian
approach to inventory models. He formulated a stochastic dynamic program where
demand distributions had an unknown parameter but could be updated via Bayes’
method. His optimal policy was to order up to a level, where the level was shown
to be an increasing function of the cumulative demand in the past periods. Murray
and Silver [108] developed an inventory model with a prior purchase probability of
a Beta distribution with unknown parameters. After early sales are observed, the
distribution was updated to compute the optimal ordering quantity for the next
period. Chang and Fyfee [29] studied demand learning in which demand consists
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of two terms; a fraction of total demand and a noise term, and the distribution of
the first part was updated after actual sales were revealed in each period. Eppen
and Iyer [45] developed a different learning model for fashion products, where the
demand process is defined as a set of pure demand processes having discrete prior
distributions, that can be revised as past sales are known. In their model, the seller
decides the order quantity and the quantity to be diverted to outlet stores in each
period. Other demand learning research in operations management can be found in
[3], [21], [50], [61], [65], [84], [96] and [102]. All of these papers assumed price to be
exogenous and did not consider the flexibility of a pricing decision. Our model differs
from them in that it incorporates demand learning for optimal pricing, rather than
for inventory decisions.
There are papers considering both pricing and inventory decisions with the exis-
tence of demand learning. Petruzzi and Dada [116] considered optimal pricing and
inventory levels under various types of deterministic demand with an unknown func-
tion parameter that can be revised after demands in early periods are realized. If
the unknown parameter was revealed in any period, then the authors assumed the
unknown parameter became certain and did not require learning in any subsequent
period. Subrahmanyan and Shoemaker [135] developed a pricing and stocking model
when demand had a discrete prior distribution and could be learned using Bayes’
rule. Their model’s decisions are the optimal price and order quantity for each sell-
ing period. Sen and Zhang [127] studied pricing decisions with demand learning via
Bayesian updates for style goods industry and considered the value of flexibility of
replenishment within the season. In contrast to the papers above, there is no pos-
sible inventory replenishment for the S&E tickets during the selling season because
it means adding capacity to the venue or arena. So, our work focuses on dynamic
pricing decisions without inventory replenishment.
Balvers and Cosimano [4] considered dynamic price adjustment models for a firm
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selling limited inventory, where demand is a linear function of price with unknown
slope and intercept. They described how the continuing process of learning about
demand curve affects the pricing decision over time. Aviv and Pazgal [2] considered
a partially observable Markov modulated demand model in a discrete time setting
for fashion goods. Other dynamic pricing with learning papers that did not consider
inventory replenishment include [1], [14] and [92]. Unlike the studies above, timing
is important in the S&E industry since ticket demand significantly increases as it is
closer to the show date. Therefore, in this chapter we include timing effect on ticket
demand. Also we consider an alternative model where ticket price can be changed
only once and this change will be applied for all subsequent periods, where we focus
on the impacts of different demand pace and demand variation on the timing of price
adjustment.
4.3 Demand Learning Model
In this section, we describe our demand model and show how the observed sales are
used to update beliefs about demand in the upcoming periods.
We assume the ticket demand in each period t follows a Poisson process with
rate Θt(pt, Γt), which is affected by three components: (1) the ticket price, (2) the
artists/sport teams’ popularity and (3) the remaining time until the show date. Note
that pt denotes the ticket price in period t and Γt denotes the base demand rate,
which represents the expected popularity of the show. The overall demand rate is
defined as follows:
Θt(pt, Γt) = φ(pt)g(t)Γt,
where φ(pt) represents price effects (i.e., the probability of each arrival purchasing
a ticket) and it is decreasing with price pt. The demand timing effect, g(t), is a
decreasing function of t (where t = n at beginning of the selling time and t = 0 at the
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show/event time). This assumption is underlined from the data we observed (e.g.,
Figure 29) that ticket demand tends to increase closer to the show date.
We note that from statistical theory, the mean and variance of a Poisson distri-
bution are the same [124]. However, we observe that the variance of entertainment
tickets is much larger than the mean 1, showing a significant sign of overdispersion,
i.e., a greater variance than what is expected in a Poisson distribution. Similar obser-
vations are found in other sets of data we have observed. As a result, an assumption
that demand follows a general Poisson process with a certain rate is not practical and
thus we incorporate uncertainty in our demand function.
From our discussions with the performing arts consulting firm, the show’s popu-
larity in customers’ perspective is usually uncertain to the seller. Therefore, in our
model we assume there is incomplete information on the exact value of the base de-
mand rate, Γt. At the beginning of the selling time (t = n), we assume Γn follows
a Gamma distribution with a scale parameter of a and a shape parameter of b. In
addition to the show’s popularity, a and b may depend on the city in which the show is
performed, since we may expect a higher base demand rate for the show taking place
in a bigger city. A Gamma distribution allows the flexibility of the shape and position
to be changed extensively via parameters a and b, where empirically we found it a
good match to past data.
Let Mn be the random demand in period t = n. The distribution of Mn, con-
ditional on the base demand rate (Γn = γ) and ticket price (pn), follows a Poisson
distribution with rate φ(pn)g(n)γ.
Thus, for demand in the first period, we have:
f(Mn = m|Γn = γ, pn) = [φ(pn)g(n)γ]
m e−φ(pn)g(n)γ
m!
, ∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. (25)
Similarly, the distribution of demand in period t (denoted by Mt), conditional on the
1approximately 20-70 times higher than the mean
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base demand rate and ticket price, follows a Poisson distribution with rate φ(pt)g(t)γ,
i.e.,
f(Mt = m|Γt = γ, pt) = [φ(pt)g(t)γ]
m e−φ(pt)g(t)γ
m!
, ∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .},∀t ∈ {n−1, . . . , 1}.
(26)
Next, we identify the prior distribution of the ticket demand in the first selling
period (t = n). From Bayes’ rule, we have that the distribution of demand (when the
ticket price is pn), unconditional on Γn, is given by:
f(Mn = m|pn) =
∫ ∞
0























∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, (27)
where f(Mn = m|Γn = γ, pn) is given by (25) and f(γ) is the distribution function
of Γn (i.e., a Gamma distribution with parameters of a and b). From (27), we can




Denote mn as the actual sales in the first period t = n. After mn has been
observed, the base demand rate in the next period, Γn−1, is updated. Using Bayes’
rule, the posterior distribution of Γn−1 is as follows:
f(γ|pn,mn) = f(Mn = mn|pn, Γn−1 = γ)f(γ)∫∞
0
f(Mn = mn|pn, Γn−1 = γ)f(γ)dγ
=
e−γ(b+φ(pn)g(n))γa+mn−1[b + φ(pn)g(n)]a+mn
(a + mn − 1)! ,∀γ > 0. (28)
Thus, the posterior distribution of Γn−1 at the beginning of the next period (t = n−1)
follows a Gamma distribution with a scale parameter of a+mn and a shape parameter
of b + φ(pn)g(n).
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From Bayes’ rule, the distribution of demand in period t = n− 1 is given by:













(a + mn − 1)! )dγ
=
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b + φ(pn)g(n) + φ(pn−1)g(n− 1)
)a+mn
,∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .},
where f(Mn−1 = m|Γn−1 = γ, pn−1) is given by (26) for t = n − 1, and f(γ|mn, pn)
is the distribution function of Γn−1, given by (28). We can see that Mn−1 follows a
Negative Binomial distribution with parameters a + mn and
b+φ(pn)g(n)
b+φ(pn)g(n)+φ(pn−1)g(n−1) .
From the demand functions described above, we find that the base demand rate and
the unconditional ticket demand distributions in any period t can be summarized in
the following Theorem.
Theorem 6. In period t, where n < t ≤ 1, we have:








ii) the unconditional ticket demand, Mt, follows a Negative Binomial distribution











We present the proofs of Theorem 6 and other key results in the Appendix. The-
orem 6 (i) and (ii) address the distribution of the base demand rate, Γt, and the
unconditional ticket demand, Mt, respectively. From Theorem 6 (ii), the distribution
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of demand in period t is given by:
f(Mt = m|pt, pt+1, . . . , pn,mt+1, . . . , mn)
=















∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .},
where A(t) = b +
∑n
k=t+1 φ(pk)g(k) + φ(pt)g(t). Note that ticket demand takes non-
negative integer values. The posterior Negative Binomial distribution of demand is
advantageous since it provides the probability mass function for non-negative integers.
Moreover, the shape and position can be changed extensively via its two parameters
[135]. From ticket sales data of the 2007-2008 season obtained from a performance
venue in the U.S. (108 shows), Figure 30 depicts the probability density plots of sales
occurred at different times in the selling horizon; i.e., one, two, three and four months
prior to the show time, respectively. Using the Maximum-Likelihood method, the
actual data was fitted to the Negative Binomial distribution, where the fitted values
of mean and standard deviation were shown. From the Pearsons Chi-Square test
[117], we found that with a significant level of 5%, the hypothesis that demand (from
the venue’s data) follows a Negative Binomial distribution was accepted for all graphs
shown in Figure 30.
Given the observed sales data, the seller updates his belief about demand in
the next period. The following Proposition presents the relationships between the
expected demand and key relevant factors.
Theorem 7. The expected demand in period t is:
i) decreasing with the ticket price in period t;
ii) decreasing with selling prices offered in the past periods, t + 1, . . . , n;
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Figure 30: The probability density plots of ticket sales from a major performance
venue in the U.S. (during the 2007-2008 season)
From Observation 11, the expected demand in period t depends not only on pt
but also on the history of prices charged, pt+1, . . . , pn. The result is intuitive because
when the seller sold tickets at expensive prices in the past periods, it reduced past
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sales. This causes lower expected demand in the current period t since the observed
sales are used to update belief about the upcoming demand. In other words, the
lower (higher) the past sales, the lower (higher) the demand in the upcoming period
is expected to be.
So far we have described the demand learning process. Let us next present the
dynamic ticket pricing model.
4.4 Dynamic Discounts/Premiums Pricing
In this section we describe how the demand learning technique discussed in Section
4.3 can be embedded in the ticket seller’s dynamic pricing model. We begin with de-
scriptions of key assumptions and present the “Dynamic discounts/premiums pricing”
model, where price discounts/premiums adjustments are allowed in every period, in
the context of a stochastic dynamic program in Section 4.4.1. Computational analysis
is then presented in Section 4.4.2 to provide insights on the optimal pricing structures
and the benefit of demand learning for the described pricing model.
4.4.1 Model
We consider a discrete finite time setting, where there are n sub-periods from the
beginning of the selling horizon to the event/show time. The time periods are num-
bered in reverse chronological order so that the beginning of the selling horizon is
time t = n, and the show takes place at time t = 0. At the beginning of the selling
horizon (t = n), there are In number of tickets for sale. The number of tickets demand
and the actual sales in period t are denoted by dt and mt, respectively. If demand is
less than inventory at the beginning of period, It, the ticket sales in period t (mt) are
equal to dt. However, if demand exceeds inventory (dt > It), the ticket sales mt will
equal It.
In the first period of the selling horizon (t = n), the seller determines the ticket
base price, pn. Then, at time t = n − 1, . . . , 1, the seller observes past sales, and
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decides whether to offer any discounts (reduce price) or charge premiums (increase
price), and how much. Denote θt as the discount or premium for period t, and we
assume it is based on pn (i.e., customers pay θtpn for each ticket in period t). If θt < 1,
then θt is considered as a price discount; otherwise, it is a price premium. Define at





pn if t = n
θt if t = n− 1, . . . , 1.
Let Vt(ht) denote the maximum expected revenue obtained from time period t
until the time of the show/event (at t = 0), given the history at the beginning of
period t is ht = (ht+1, at+1,mt+1, It). Note that ht consists of the history of the
previous period t + 1 (i.e., the action and the number of ticket sold in the previous
period t+1), as well as the current inventory level (It). At the beginning of the selling
horizon (t = n), we have hn = In since there is no prior information. We assume the
seller is risk neutral, so the backwards recursion of the revenue maximization problem
can be written as:
Vt(ht) = max
at∈At
E[Rt(at)+Vt−1(ht−1)|mn, . . . , mt+1; φ(pn), . . . , φ(pt+1); g(n), . . . , g(t+1)],
(29)
where Rt(at) is defined as the immediate revenue received in period t when the seller’s





an min{In, dn(an)} = pn min{In, dn(pn)} if t = n;
atpn min{It, dt(at)} = θtpn min{It, dt(θtpn)} if t = n− 1, . . . , 1,
where It = max{0, It+1 − dt+1(at+1)}. The boundary conditions are as follow:
V0(h0) = 0,∀h0, (30)
Vt(ht = (ht+1, at+1,mt+1, 0)) = 0,∀t. (31)
Condition (30) means there is zero salvage value of any unsold tickets at the event
time (t = 0). Condition (31) states that when all tickets have already been sold,
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the revenue from any period t on is zero since there are no tickets left for sale. The
stochastic dynamic program can be solved by backwards induction starting at the
final period, t = 1, to period t = n. The following example is a special case where
the selling time is divided into two periods, n = 2.
Example: Special case when n=2
The first period of the selling season is at t = 2, where the ticket seller determines
the optimal base price p2. Then, after observing sales in period t = 2, m2, the seller
determines the price discount/premium for the next period t = 1. This problem can
be solved by backwards recursion, and the revenue maximization problem at t = 1
can be written as





E[θ1p2 min{I1, d1(θ1p2)}|m2, φ(p2), g(2)],
where I1 = max{0, I2−d2(p2)}. Given the inventory, price, and sale in the last period
are I2, p2,m2, respectively, the unconditional distribution of demand (d1(θ1p2)) in the
current period t = 1 when offering a price discount/premium (θ1) is Negative Binomial








E[R2(p2) + V1(I2, p2,m2, I1)]
= max
p2≥0









. Note that in
this period, the distribution of demand (d2(p2)) when offering the base ticket price, p2,
is Negative Binomial with parameters a and b
b+φ(p2)g(2)
, respectively. To observe the
characteristics of the optimal solution and the benefits from the learning process under
different scenarios, computational experiments are conducted in the next section.
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4.4.2 Computational Experiments
In this section, we perform computational experiments for the dynamic discounts/
premiums pricing model, with the goal of understanding the properties of the opti-
mal solutions and the model performance under different situations. Specifically, we
consider: (1) how the remaining inventory affects the expected base demand rate and
the optimal discounts/premiums pricing policy, and (2) how the performance of the
dynamic discounts/premiums pricing model with demand learning is compared to the
model without demand learning and when demand learning is most beneficial.
4.4.2.1 Effects of the Remaining Inventory of Unsold Tickets
In each period, the seller can observe how many unsold tickets remained in inventory.
This section explores how the seller’s expectation and optimal decisions are affected
by the inventory information. Let us consider the following example. A ticket seller
has 300 tickets for sale in a selling season with n = 2. Let the probability of each
arrival purchasing a ticket (the price effect function) be φ(pt) = e
−wpt , where w is a
known non-negative scalar. Note that with this form of price effect, the demand rate
equals g(t)Γt when pt equals 0 and the rate approaches 0 as pt is very large. This
form of exponential price effect function has been generally used in the marketing
literature since it was found to very well fit with the empirical data [1].
Let the timing effect be g(2) = 1 and g(1) = u, (where u > 1 since we assume
higher demand in the period closer to the show date). At the beginning of the selling
horizon (t = 2), the seller believes that ticket demand is Poisson, with the base rate
(Γ2) following a Gamma distribution with parameters a = 4 and b = 0.04
2.In this
period (t = 2), the seller determines the optimal base ticket price, p∗2, from a discrete
set P2={30, 35, . . . , 75, 80}. After he observes how many tickets have been sold, the
seller updates his belief with demand learning techniques presented in Section 4.3,
2This choice of a and b follows from an example of actual ticket demand data we observed.
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and determines the optimal price discount/premium, θ∗1, to charge in period t = 1
from a discrete set θ1={70%, 75%, . . . , 115%, 120%}.
Figure 31 presents the updated mean demand for period t = 1 at different values
of remaining inventory from the past period (where the price sensitivity parameters
(w) equal 0.018, 0.020, and 0.022, respectively3). As expected, at the same values
of remaining inventory, the graph for w = 0.018 is the highest and the graph for
w = 0.022 is the lowest in Figure 31, since a higher price sensitivity leads to lower
expected demand. Moreover, considering the trends, we can see that the higher
number of tickets left in inventory (i.e., the lower number of tickets already sold), the
lower mean demand the seller expects for the next period. This is consistent with
analytical results in Theorem 7 (iii) in Section 4.3 that the expected mean demand is
increasing with observed sales in the past periods (so it is decreasing with the leftover
inventory). The finding is rational because having a large number of tickets sold in
the past periods (or a few number of tickets left in the inventory) can be an indicator
of show popularity and it is likely that high demand will occur in the next period as
well.
We solve the described problem by the stochastic dynamic program described in
Section 4.4.1. The optimal base price at the beginning of the selling horizon (t = 2) is
95. After sales are realized, the seller’s optimal discount/premium pricing for period
t = 1 is shown in Figure 32, where the horizontal axis represents different values of
leftover inventory, I1. Note that different lines in Figure 32 (a) represent different
price sensitivity parameters, i.e., w equals 0.018, 0.020, and 0.022, respectively; while
different lines in Figure 32 (b) represent different timing effect parameters, i.e., u
equals 1.7, 2.0, 2.3, respectively.
Observation 11. The optimal ticket price discount/premium, θt, is non-increasing
3Parameter values for the price sensitivity parameters (w) in this experiment result in shifts of













   


















    !  
 

"   #$%$ $&'(')'
*'+','-''--'-.' ' (' -'' -(' .'' .(' /''01-2*01.2'01.2/&'(')'*'+'
,'-''--'-.'
' (' -'' -(' .'' .(' /''31'2'-+31'2'.'31'2'..
Figure 32: The optimal discounts/premiums pricing for the last period (t = 1) at
different values of leftover inventory, where: (a) w=0.018, 0.020, and 0.022; (b) u=1.7,
2.0 and 2.3
with the amount of leftover inventory observed at the beginning of the period.
Similar to other sets of experiment results we have explored, Observation 11 states
that the higher the inventory, the lower the percentage of the base price that should
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be charged in the last period (t = 1). This result is consistent with other studies
of dynamic pricing with no demand learning where the optimal price is found to be
non-increasing with the remaining inventory (see [30], [49] and [149]). In addition,
we can see in Figure 31 (a) that at the same level of inventory, the higher the price
sensitivity, the lower the optimal θ1. The timing effect parameter (u) also impacts
the optimal θ1. From Figure 31 (b), at the same inventory level, the line with u = 2.3
is the highest and the line with u = 1.7 is the lowest It implies when high demand is
expected in the last period, it is less necessary for the seller to offer a deep discount
(since there is a lower risk of having empty seats).
Next, we examine benefits of demand learning and identify which situations are
most worthwhile for applying the learning process.
4.4.2.2 Benefits of Demand Learning Process
In this section, we study how the performance of the dynamic discount/premium
pricing model with demand learning compares to the model without demand learning.
The insights will allow us to identify which situations are most worthwhile to apply
the learning process. The demand learning (DL) model incorporates observed sales
in updating the belief of the next period’s demand, while the no demand learning
(NoDL) model does not. Thus, when the seller applies the NoDL model, in every
period he uses the same estimated base demand rate as in the first period. We capture
the DL and the NoDL model performances by comparing revenues obtained from each
model to the revenue under perfect information. Note that under perfect information,
the seller knows the true base demand without uncertainty and he optimizes his prices
based on the true value. Define PFMDL as the performance of demand learning, i.e.,
PFMDL =
Revenue of demand learning model
Revenue of perfect information case
×100, and PFMNoDL as the performance of
the no demand learning model, i.e., PFMNoDL =
Revenue of no demand learning model
Revenue of perfect information case
×100.
The closer PFMDL and PFMNoDL are to 100, the better their performances are as
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compared to the perfect information case, although the latter may not be achievable.
Consider a ticket seller having 100 tickets for sale in a two-period selling horizon,
where the timing effects are g(2) = 1 and g(1) = u, u > 1. The price effect function
is φ(pt) = e
−0.02pt . At the beginning of the selling time (t = 2), the seller determines
the optimal base ticket price, p∗2, from a discrete set P2={50, 55, . . . , 95, 100}. Then
in the next period (t = 1), he determines the optimal price discount/premium (θ∗1)
from a discrete set Θ1={70%, 75%, . . . , 115%, 120%}.
Let us consider what happens if the ticket seller misestimates demand. For in-
stance, suppose the true base demand rate in the first period (t = 2) is γ, while the
seller believes the base demand rate follows Gamma distribution with parameters a
and b, respectively. Note that the expected value of the base demand rate in this case
equals a
b
and the variance equals a
b2
(for Gamma distribution). Thus, the demand is
overestimated if the seller believes that a
b
is greater than the true base demand rate,
γ, and the demand is underestimated otherwise.
In the following example, let the true base demand rate, γ, be 120. Figure 33 shows
the chosen prices for the first and the second periods when the seller’s estimates of
the mean base demand rate (a
b
) are 30, 60, . . . , 210, 240, respectively. The second
period (t = 1) price equals the first period (t = 2) price times the discount/premium
of the second period (p1 = p2 × θ1). In case 1, u=2.0, and the optimal prices under
perfect information are 75 and 56 for the first and the second period (in case 2 with
u=2.3, they are 80 and 60, respectively). We can see from Figure 33 that in the
first period, both DL and NoDL models choose similar prices for almost all values
of a
b
. However, when the base demand rate is underestimated, i.e., a
b
< 120, the DL
model’s prices for the second period are higher than the NoDL model’s. Due to the
ability of updating demand, the DL model uses the observed sales to adjust the true
base demand rate’s distribution for the next period. With the DL model, the seller
realizes in the second period that he has underestimated the rate and then decides
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to charge higher prices than he would have done without demand learning (NoDL).
Similar reason applies when the base demand rate is overestimated, where the second



















































































































































       
 
Figure 33: The optimal prices for the first and the second periods when using the
DL and the NoDL models
Considering the performance of each model, Figure 34 shows PFMDL and PFMNoDL,
where the horizontal axis represents different estimates of a
b
and the true value is in-
dicated.
Observation 12. We found that:
i) Demand learning (DL) is most beneficial, as compared to no demand learning
(NoDL) when the initial estimation is inaccurate (with up to 8-11% improve-
ment in revenue when the misestimates are high).
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Figure 34: Performances of the DL and the NoDL models at different estimates of
a
b
, when the timing effects, u, are 2.0 (the left diagram) or 2.3 (the right diagram)
a greater amount of demand arrives in the last period (approximately 5.4%
improvement in revenue on average for case 2, as compare to 3.9% for case 1).
iii) The underestimation of the base demand rate when using the DL model causes
fewer revenue loss as compared to overestimation.
As we can see in Figure 34, when the misestimates of the base demand rate are
fairly large, PFMDL is greater than PFMNoDL for both graphs. It implies demand
learning can help increase revenue, compared to no learning. The intuition is that
when there are estimation errors, observed sales are effectively used since the inaccu-
rate estimation can be corrected for an updated belief of demand in the next period.
For example, if there is high uncertainty about the show’s popularity (e.g., a new
show with no records of past sales), it can be difficult for the ticket seller to identify
a correct value of the show’s base demand rate. The seller can start with a rough
estimate of the base demand rate and then use the observed sales to update his belief.
Comparing case (1) and case (2) in Figure 33, we found the marginal improvement
of the DL model over the NoDL model is larger when a greater amount of demand
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arrives later in the last period (where the percentage improvements are 3.91% and
5.44% for case (1) and (2), respectively). An explanation is that when a large amount
of demand arrives in the last period, it can be more critical to optimally choose the
price for that period since wrong prices can lead to a greater loss of the potential
revenue. The demand learning model has a greater advantage over the No demand
learning model because it uses observed sales to update the belief about demand, and
thus it can be more effective in choosing an optimal price for the last period.
As we observe in Figure 33, when the base rate is overestimated, the seller chooses
to offer higher prices than the true optimal, leading to a drop in ticket demand and
the overall revenue. On the other hand, when the ticket seller underestimates the base
demand rate, the models suggest lower prices. The resulting demand is then higher
than the optimal while the revenue is less. From Figure 34, when the seller uses
observed sales to update his belief, underestimation of the base demand rate leads to
less revenue loss than overestimation (Observation 12 (iii)). It implies a risk-averse
ticket seller who tends to underestimate the demand rate may receive greater revenue
than a risk-taker seller who overestimates it. In other words, underestimation of
demand is fairly safer than overestimation. We note that these results are consistent
with other sets of experiments (with different model parameters) we have performed.
So far, we have considered the dynamic discount/premium pricing where the price
adjustment is allowed every period, prior to the show date. In the next section, we
consider an alternative practice in which the offering time of discounts/premiums is
also a decision variable and there is only one opportunity to adjust price in the selling
horizon.
4.5 Dynamic Timing for Price Discounts/Premiums
In practice, changing price too often may not be preferable for some performance
organizations who believe it may reduce customer satisfactions. From our discussions
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with the Sports and Entertainment ticket sellers, an interesting question they point
out is: if they will change ticket price only once in the selling period by reducing
or increasing 5% or 10% from the original price, when should they do so and by
how much (based on demand they have seen so far)? In this section, we consider an
alternative model that dynamically determines the optimal time and level for price
discounts/premiums during the selling season. After the seller has already offered a
discount or charged a price premium, the price will remain the same in all following
periods.
4.5.1 Model
We note that the notation of parameters and variables in this section is similar to
what we have defined in Section 4.4.1. When there is only one chance to adjust price,
the backwards recursion of the revenue maximization problem is given by:
Vn(In) = max
pn∈Pn
E[pn min{In, dn(pn)}+ Vn−1(hn−1)],









E[pn min{It, dt(pn)}+ Vt−1(ht−1)|Bt]
}
, ∀t = n− 1, . . . , 1,
where Bt = mn, . . . , mt+1; φ(pn), . . . , φ(pt+1); g(n), . . . , g(t + 1), and Θt is the set
of discrete allowable levels of discount/premium. A discrete list of prices is also
considered in the dynamic pricing with no demand learning literature (e.g., [30],
[49] and [48]) since it is easy to be implemented and controled. Note that It =
max{0, It+1−dt+1(θt+1pn)} if the seller has decided to offer a price discount/premium,
and It = max{0, It+1 − dt+1(pn)} otherwise.
In the first period (t = n), the seller chooses the base price pn from the set
Pn. Then, for each of the future periods, the seller evaluates the expected revenue
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from: 1) offering a price premium/discount, starting from this period, or 2) delay-
ing the price discount/premium decision to one of the future periods by continuing




min{Ii, di(θ∗t pn)}|Bt] since the final price is θ∗t pn for all the rest of the peri-
ods and there is no further decisions. For the second choice, the expected immediate
plus future revenue equals E[pn min{It, dt(pn)}+Vt−1(ht−1)|Bt] since the seller’s price
is still pn and the decision repeats in the next period.
The boundary conditions are similar to equations (30) and (31) in section 4.4.1,
where V0(h0) = 0,∀h0 and Vt(ht = (ht+1, at+1,mt+1, 0)) = 0,∀t. The stochastic
dynamic program above can be solved by backwards recursion from the final period,
t = 1, to period t = n. We present key computational results for managerial insights
in the next section.
4.5.2 Computational Experiments
In this section, computational experiments are performed to further analyze the so-
lutions of the dynamic timing for price discounts/premiums. The results can give in-
sights on when the seller should offer a discount/premium early in the selling horizon,
or close to the show date. We also compare the dynamic timing model’s performance
to the original dynamic discount/premium pricing model to identify the impact of
restricting the number of price adjustments.
4.5.2.1 Solutions of the Dynamic Timing Model
Consider a selling season with three periods, n = 3. In the first period, t = 3,
the seller determines the base price p3 from a discrete set P3={50, 55, . . . , 95, 100}.
After learning demand from the observed sales, in period t = 2 he decides if any
discounts/premiums (chosen from the set {70%, 75%, . . . , 115%, 120%}) should be
used from this period on, or he should continue with the base price and repeat this
decision again in a future period (at t = 1). Figure 35 presents the optimal price
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Figure 35: The optimal price discounts/premiums for period t = 2 at different values
of remaining inventory (I2), where the starting inventory, I3 = 80
Observation 13. The optimal decisions for period t = 2 are as follow.
i) Offer price discounts (θ∗2 < 1) when the remaining inventory is high. The
optimal percentage of the base price decrease (1− θ∗2) is non-decreasing with the
level of unsold inventory.
ii) Charge price premiums (θ∗2 > 1) when the remaining inventory is low. The
optimal percentage of the base price increase (θ∗2 − 1) is non-increasing with the
level of unsold inventory.
ii) Continue with the base price, p∗3, and delay the decision of price discount/premium
to the next period when the remaining inventory is moderate.
From Observation 13, it is not always optimal to delay the pricing decisions in an
effort to learn more about demand. We can see in Figure 35 that the seller should use
discounts/premiums in period t = 2 when either low or high demand was observed
in the previous period (equivalently, either high or low remaining inventory). The
explanation is that when the observed sales are low (i.e., there are a large number of
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unsold tickets), the future demand is also expected to be low. It is optimal to use price
discounts to induce more revenue in this period, rather than delaying the decision.
Similarly, when the observed sales are high (or higher than the seller’s expectation),
it can imply the seller’s belief of the base demand rate should be increased and/or the
decided base price is too low. Thus, the model suggests increasing price with price
premiums, starting from this period. However, for a moderate level of remaining
inventory, it can imply the base price is already appropriate and it is unnecessary to
use discounts/premiums in this period. Moreover, it can mean that more information
is necessary for price changing decisions. So, for those moderate levels of inventory,
the seller should continue with the current price and delay the decision to the future
period. These observations are consistent with other sets of numerical experiments
we have performed, using different model parameters.
As we have described, if the seller decides to use a discount or premium in period
t = 2, the selected discount/premium will be applied in the last period (t = 1),
and thus the net ticket price remains the same until the show date. Let us next
consider the optimal price discount/premium in the last period, t = 1, given that
a discount/premium has not been used previously. Figure 36 depicts the optimal
last-period discounts/premiums at different levels of remaining inventory, I1, where
the inventory in the previous period equals I2. We observe that for all values of I2,
the optimal ticket price discount/premium for the last period (θ1) is non-increasing
with the amount of remaining inventory observed at the beginning of this period, I1.
This result is consistent with what we have seen in Observation 11 of the original
discounts/premiums pricing model in Section 4.4.
When the number of price changes is limited to be at most only once, we have seen
that different levels of remaining inventory can lead to different decisions, i.e., either
offering discounts/premiums immediately or delaying decisions to the next period. It


































Figure 36: The optimal discounts/premiums for the last period (t = 1) at different
levels of remaining inventory (I1), given that the inventory at time t = 2 equals I2
original dynamic discounts/premiums pricing model. We generate some insights on
this research question in the following analysis.
4.5.2.2 Comparisons between the Dynamic Timing Model and the Original Dy-
namic Discounts/Premiums Pricing Model
In this section, we examine the performance of the dynamic timing model, as com-
pared to the original discounts/premiums pricing model. In some situations, it
may be unnecessary to offer different discounts/premiums every period, while in
other cases it can be useful to do so. Our goal is to obtain insights on how the
seller should effectively select models, studied in Section 4.4.1 and 4.5.1, for dif-
ferent circumstances. Denote PFMDT as the performance of the dynamic tim-
ing model (compared to the dynamic discounts/premiums pricing model), where
PFMDT =
Dynamic timing model’s revenue
Dynamic discounts/premiums pricing model’s revenue
× 100. When PFMDT is close
to 100, the timing model’s performance approaches the dynamic discounts/premiums
pricing model’s.
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Consider a seller having 300 tickets to sell in a horizon with four periods, n = 4,
where the base price (p4) is selected from a discrete set {50, 55, . . . , 95, 100} and the
discounts/premiums are chosen from the set {70%, 75%, . . . , 115%, 120%}. We exam-
ine the impact of demand variation by measuring PFMDT when the base demand
rate (Γ) follows a Gamma distribution with mean a
b
= 100, 130 or 160. For each value
of the mean base demand rate, we consider different parameters a and b for different




), presented in the table in Figure 37. Note that
the graph in the bottom of Figure 37 shows the dynamic timing model’s performance
(compared with the original discounts/premium pricing model), PFMDT , at different
values of base demand rate’s standard deviation4.
Observation 14. It is less (more) necessary for the ticket seller to vary price dis-
counts/premiums every period when the base demand rate’s standard deviation is low
(high).
From Figure 37 , we observe that as the standard deviation of the base demand rate
(Γ) increases, PFMDT decreases, implying the dynamic timing model’s performance
is further from the original discounts/premiums pricing model’s. In other words, if
the seller expects high variation of the base demand rate, it can be useful to often
adjust the discounts/premiums to effectively capture the change of demand. This
is because when the the standard deviation of the initial estimate is high, the seller
cannot rely much on the initial estimate since there is a high probability that it takes
on other values. The seller may need to frequently adjust the discounts/premiums as
there is a variety of base demand rates in each period. On the other hand, limiting a
price change to only once is suitable for low demand variation. In this case, the same
price can be appropriate for many consecutive periods since the demand rate is less
likely to be much higher or lower than what is expected. This observation addresses
4The price effect and the timing effect functions for Figure 37 are φ(pt) when t = 4, φ(θtp4) =
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Figure 37: Performance of the dynamic timing model, PFMDT , at different values of
the base demand rate’s standard deviation, where a
b
=100, 130 and 160, respectively
that the seller should consider the base demand rate’s variation when deciding how
often the ticket price should be adjusted.
In addition to demand variation, we consider the impact of the timing effects
on the dynamic timing model’s performance. Depending on the show’s popularity,
venue locations, etc., the pace of demand in each selling period can be different. For
instance, much of the popular performance’s ticket demand may arrive early in the
selling season since people expect those tickets to be sold out soon, while most demand
of the less popular shows may arrive later or closer to the show date. In the next
analysis, we explore whether the seller should limit the frequency of price changes
by using the dynamic timing model, or whether he should adjust price every period
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by using the original discounts/premiums pricing model, for shows having different
demand paces.
We consider the following timing-effect functions for a selling horizon with 4 pe-
riods;
A) g(4)=1, g(3)=3, g(2)=5, g(1)=7,
B) g(4)=1, g(3)=2.6, g(2)=4.6, g(1)=7.8,
C) g(4)=1, g(3)=2.2, g(2)=4.2, g(1)=8.6,
D) g(4)=1, g(3)=1.8, g(2)=3.8, g(1)=9.4,
E) g(4)=1, g(3)=1.4, g(2)=3.4, g(1)=10.2,
F) g(4)=1, g(3)=1, g(2)=3, g(1)=11,
where the timing-effect trend for each case is presented in Figure 38. Note that the
average of the timing effects for all cases (
4∑
i=1
g(t)/4) is equal to 4, to be consistent
in average demand. In case A, demand is expected to increase linearly as it is closer
to the show date; while the ticket demand in case F does not increase much at the





















    
	

                          

                          

                         




















Figure 38: The timing effects for cases A, B, . . . , F, respectively
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To capture how the dynamic timing model performs as compared to the original
dynamic discounts/premiums pricing model, PFMDT of each case is measured. In
addition, we consider two conditions: (1) demand learning is allowed, and (2) demand
learning is not allowed, because it is interesting to see if demand learning affects the
model’s performances. Figure 39 shows PFMDT for cases A, B, . . . , F, respectively,
under (1) demand learning and (2) no demand learning 5.
 
Figure 39: The performance of the dynamic timing model for each case (as compared
to the discounts/premiums pricing model), when there are (1) demand learning, and
(2) no demand learning
From Figure 39, PFMDT is lowest in case A, implying that the performance of
limiting the number of price changes (as compared to allowing price adjustment every
periods) is lowest when the timing effect increases linearly. As a larger amount of
demand arrives closer to the end of the selling horizon (from case B to case F),
PFMDT increases, showing the dynamic timing model’s performance is closer to the
original discounts/premiums pricing model’s revenue.
In addition to the demand pace, we observe that demand learning affects the per-
formance difference between the two models. Specifically, the dynamic timing model’s
5Parameter values are a = 100, b = 0.77, I4 = 300, and the price effect function, φ(pt) =
φ(θtp4) = e−0.025θtp4 .
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performance is closer to the dynamic discounts/premiums pricing model’s when de-
mand learning is not allowed (as PFMDT is closer to 100 in this case). It indicates
limiting the frequency of price changes is less disadvantageous, compared to allowing
price changes every period, when the seller does not use observed sales to update his
belief of demand. An explanation is when the seller allows demand learning, new
information is received every period. So, it can be more beneficial to change price
often, according to the updated demand. Adjusting price regularly as in the dynamic
disconts/premiums pricing model can lead to higher revenue, especially with an in-
tegration of demand learning implementation. This observation is consistent with
results across the set of computational experiments we performed, using different
demand parameters.
We conclude this section by exploring the benefit gained from dynamic pricing as
compared to static pricing. Figure 40 shows the average percentage revenue increase
from implementing the dynamic discounts/premiums pricing model and the dynamic
timing model, with demand leaning and without demand learning, respectively. We
observe that dynamic pricing (without demand learning) can help increase revenue
by approximately 3.26-4.33%, compared to static pricing. When demand learning
is incorporated with one price change (dynamic timing model), the average revenue
increase is approximately 5.19%. Moreover, we found that the benefits from having
flexibility of price changes (dynamic discounts/premiums pricing model) and demand
learning can complement each other to achieve as much as 8.15% revenue increase.
4.6 Conclusions
While revenue management (RM) has been intensively studied in the travel indus-
tries, Sport and Entertainment (S&E) also has a great potential to be improved by
this idea but still has not obtained much attention in the literature. In addition,
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Figure 40: The average percentage revenue increase (from static pricing policy) under
different scenarios
contexts. In this chapter, we developed pricing and timing models for stochastic S&E
ticket demand in the existence of demand learning with Bayesian updates to reduce
uncertainty and improve forecast. We also allow flexibility of ticket demand being
affected by time since in the S&E industry, we observed significantly higher sales
when it is closer to the end of the selling horizon.
We considered two types of models. The first model allows ticket price to be
adjusted every period, where the adjustment is in terms of either the percentage
increase (price premiums) or the percentage decrease (price discounts) with respect
to the base price that has been determined at the beginning of the season. We
found that the optimal ticket price discount/premium for the upcoming period is
non-increasing with the amount of remaining inventory observed at the beginning of
the period. To identify the benefit of demand learning, we compared the described
model to a similar model without learning. We observed that demand learning is most
beneficial when the initial demand estimation is inaccurate since the seller can correct
his belief after observing the actual sales (with up to 8-11% improvement in revenue
when the misestimation is high). In addition, our results showed: when incorporating
demand learning, the underestimation of the base demand rate causes less revenue
loss as compared to overestimation. This implies a risk-averse ticket seller who tends
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to underestimate the demand rate may obtain higher revenue than a risk-taker seller
who overestimates it.
Instead of allowing price changes every period, our second pricing model limits
the frequency of discounts/premiums to only once since customer satisfaction can be
important for some sellers. After the seller decides to use a discount or premium,
it will be applied in all remaining periods. So, the seller’s decisions are the optimal
timing to offer a premium/discount and how much. This model is suitable when
changing price too often is not preferred, e.g., when frequent price change may re-
duce customer satisfaction or cause managerial complicatedness. We found that it
is not always optimal to delay the discounts/premiums pricing decisions in order to
learn more about demand. Our model’s optimal decision is significantly related to
the remaining inventory; i.e., the seller should offer discounts (premiums) when he
observes the inventory is lower (higher) than a particular level. For moderate levels
of inventory, the seller should delay his decision by continuing with the base price
and reconsidering this decision in the next period.
We compared the performance of the second model (dynamic timing) with the first
model (dynamic discounts/premiums pricing) and observed that when the standard
deviation of the base demand rate distribution is small, the dynamic timing model
can achieve a comparable revenue to that of the dynamic discounts/premiums pricing
model. The models’ performances were also found to be related to the timing effects
on demand. When a larger amount of demand arrives closer to the end of the selling
horizon, our results showed that it is less necessary to frequently change price. More-
over, we found that the benefits from having flexibility of price changes and demand
learning can complement each other to achieve as much as 8.15% revenue increase on
average, as compared to static pricing. We believe our model can encourage future
revenue management model development for the Sport and Entertainment industry,
and provide the basis for further research in dynamic pricing policies with demand
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learning since the context can be applied to other industries, selling perishable prod-
ucts with no inventory replenishment.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this thesis, we presented innovative demand management techniques for service
systems with limited resources. Our objective is to develop mathematical models to
enhance the overall understanding of such systems and improve decisions, ultimately
resulting in higher profit and better customer service. The first part of the disserta-
tion (Chapter 2) explored different kinds of No-Kill operational policies in managing
demand (coordination with other shelters, adoption and neutering) with the goal of
providing insights on how each method helps reduce the killing rates (or reduce the
job rejection rate of other service systems). For the coordination policy, if one shelter
is full, animals can be diverted to the other shelters in the NK system. When each
shelter has the same adoption rate, we proved that the coordinating NK system has a
lower killing rate than the uncoordinated K system. For large NK systems, we found
that adding more coordinated shelters helps reduce the overall killing probability but
the marginal improvement is decreasing. We provided several insights on how to
design different kinds of coordinating systems to achieve the highest improvement,
including coordinating with neighbors or between particular pairs of shelters.
If the existing killing rates of all shelters are high, we found it is worthwhile
to explore other alternatives such as neutering campaigns to reduce arrivals, and
adoption campaigns to increase turnovers. When animals increase according to a type
of growth function, and when a shelter promotes neutering, we showed the shelter’s
total cost is first concave and then convex with the number of animals neutered. For
the adoption policy, if adoptions are concave and increasing with the number of the
campaigns, we found the shelter’s total cost is convex in the number of campaigns
128
used and there is an optimal number of campaigns for the minimum cost. Our
results showed that an adoption campaign can be more attractive for a low campaign
budget, while a neutering policy is more effective for a higher budget when there
are enough resources to neuter a sufficiently large number of animals. Although this
work is motivated by the animal shelters’ policies, the context can be applied to
other industries with customers and servers, e.g., hospital operations, ambulances
and internet servers. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to quantitatively
analyze operational policies of animal shelters or study them as a stochastic system.
For Chapter 2’s future extensions, it would be interesting to consider other types
of coordination for service systems. For example, instead of coordination based on the
service rates of systems as considered in this chapter, it would be of interest to study
other priority schemes such as coordination based on the cost of services and/or the
cost of transferring customers. Empirical works on coordination in this area could be
useful although it is difficult here as non-profit organizations rarely keep or provide
detailed records. Systems can also change dramatically in a short time period (e.g.,
after promoting adoptions), one could explore how the rejection rates right after the
policy implementation are compared to the rates after a certain time period, and how
to effectively extend the reduced rejection rate effects.
In the second part of the thesis (Chapter 3), we considered a topic of demand
management via “Scaling the house” decisions for the performance ticket industry,
i.e., how to divide seats into zones for different prices to maximize revenue. We
obtained transactional level data of over 300 shows from a major performance arts
organization in the United States. We found that in addition to price, demand is
significantly driven by the distance from the front and the distance from the center.
We developed a two-dimensional “Scaling the House” model and identified the optimal
closed form solutions of the number of seating rows (from the front) and the number
of seats (from the center of rows) to be charged at a premium price that maximize
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the overall revenue. We developed an alternative one-dimensional zoning model,
where the optimal seating zones are defined only by row cuts, for venues whose ticket
demand does not significantly decrease with the distance from the center. We showed
the optimal cutting point occurs at the seating row whose expected revenue when
charging at a high price is equal to its expected revenue when charging at a low price.
We performed comparative statics of the two-price zoning decisions and showed
that the optimal number of high-price seating rows decreases with customer price
sensitivity. Thus, if customers are very sensitive to high prices, the venue managers
should provide a smaller premium section and induce more revenue with more low-
priced seats. Substitution effects can also impact the optimal zoning decision. We
found that if customers are likely to switch from the front section (with high price) to
the back section for a lower price, the it can be useful to move the low-price section
further from the stage. For location sensitivity, when demand decreases significantly
with distance from the front, it can be beneficial to move the low-price section closer
to the stage. Our results also imply that when different types of performances are
performed in the same venue, the management should consider having different seat-
ing charts for each show type. Further, we found that different venue’s shape can
imply different optimal zoning models and we provided insights on how to select ap-
propriate seating sections, based on the venues’ size and shape. Our work sheds light
on “scaling the house” strategies that to date have largely been performed visually
or based on ad-hoc basis.
Several directions are possible for future work related to Chapter 3. With the
advancement of real-time sales information, some venues may consider dynamic zon-
ing decisions, such as offering sub-sections during the selling season for some seating
areas having low to-date sales, although this could be achieved through pricing pro-
motions. Also, one could extend the model for dynamic decisions, e.g., when to
change the seating chart, how and which seating section to re-scale.
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In the third part of the dissertation (Chapter 4), we developed pricing and timing
models for stochastic Sports and Entertainment (S&E) ticket demand in the existence
of demand learning. Ultimately the goal is to improve price decisions and increase
revenue. Unlike the existing works in demand learning area, our model assumes
ticket demand is also affected by time because in the S&E industry, we observed a
significantly higher sales when it is closer to the end of the selling horizon. Since the
show’s popularity is usually uncertain to the seller, we propose a method to learn the
overall popularity via Bayesian updates as early sales are revealed.
We considered two situations: (1) the seller can adjust ticket prices every period,
or (2) the seller dynamically determines the optimal timing and amount of a single
price change in the selling horizon. Our results showed that demand learning is most
beneficial when the initial estimates are incorrect (with up to 8-11% improvement
in revenue when the misestimation is high). Our model’s optimal decision is signifi-
cantly related to the remaining inventory; i.e., in experiments, the seller should offer
discounts (premiums) when he observed the inventory is lower (higher) than a par-
ticular level. For moderate levels of inventory, the seller should delay his decision by
continuing with the base price and reconsidering this decision in the next period. We
found it is less necessary for the seller to vary price every period if demand variation
is low and/or a large amount of demand arrives close to the show dates. Moreover,
our results showed that changing price every period is less necessary when demand
learning is not allowed, while the benefit of frequent price changing increases if the
seller updates his belief via the proposed demand learning procedure. Specifically, we
found that the benefits from having flexibility of price changes and demand learning
can complement each other to achieve as much as 8.15% revenue increase on average,
as compared to static pricing.
There are several possible extensions of Chapter 4. First, our model assumes
demand uncertainty comes from the base demand rate, while the price and the timing
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effects are unchanging. One could extend the model to allow imperfect information
on price and/or timing sensitivities to explore the form of the resulting posterior
distribution. We expect the distribution will be more complex in those cases, but
it could be interesting to examine if the benefit can offset the higher complexity. A
second promising extension is a pricing model with demand learning for substitutable
products, e.g., substitutable seating sections or shows. If the ticket seller would like to
allow different discounts/premiums for different types of seats or different days of the
same performance, it can be useful to study how he can employ the observed sales to
predict future demand for a variety of substitutable products (although there may not
exist a closed form posterior distribution for each of them). Since dynamic pricing is
fairly new for the S&E business, an empirical work exploring the short-term and long-
term effects of this revenue management idea could be useful. Considering strategic
customers for the S&E industry could also be a possible extension. Obviously, there
is still room for revenue management improvement for the Sports and Entertainment
ticket industry and we hope our study will encourage future research in this area.
Overall, we considered innovation policies to manage demand towards increasing
profit or improving customer service in service systems, which are key components
in our societies. We explored a variety of decision levels from planning to real-time,
and we considered policies including partial coordination, segmentation, and decision
making incorporating demand learning. In all cases, we focused on problems spe-




APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. We refer to Figure 2 for the following proof. For m = 2, let p(x, y) be the
long-run probability of being in state (x, y). From the balance equation of state (0,0),
2λp(0, 0) = µ[p(0, 1) + p(1, 0)],
⇒ p(0, 1) + p(1, 0) = 2λ
µ
p(0, 0).
For states (0,1) and (1,0), the balance equations are:
(2λ + µ)p(0, 1) = λp(0, 0) + µp(1, 1) + 2µp(0, 2)
(2λ + µ)p(1, 0) = λp(0, 0) + µp(1, 1) + 2µp(2, 0).
From the three equations above, we have
p(0, 2) + p(1, 1) + p(2, 0) =
λ
µ





Considering states (0,2),(1,1) and (2,0), the balance equations are given by
(2λ + 2µ)p(0, 2) = λp(0, 1) + µp(1, 2) + 3µp(0, 3),
(2λ + 2µ)p(1, 1) = λ[p(0, 1) + p(1, 0)] + 2µp(1, 2) + 2µp(2, 1),
(2λ + 2µ)p(2, 0) = λp(1, 0) + µp(2, 1) + 3µp(3, 0).
Summing up three equations above, we have
p(0, 3) + p(1, 2) + p(2, 1) + p(3, 0) =
2λ
3µ



















Therefore, it is easy to see that the probability of having n animals in the entire NK
system is p(n) =
∑





p(0, 0). This is the same as
the probability of having n animals in an M/M/2C/2C queue with the total arrival











Let us next consider the situation when there are m shelters in the system.
For m ≥ 2, the proof is similar to the argument above where the dimension of











which is equal to the killing (rejecting) probability of an M/M/mC/mC system.
With the total equal arrival rate, mλ, the overall killing rates of the NK with m
shelters and the M/M/mC/mC system are also the same. ¥
Proof for Theorem 1 (in a general case where shelters have different arrival
rates and capacities)
Proof. Consider an NK system with two shelters (presented by Figure 41), where
the arrival rates of the first and the second shelters are λ1 and λ2, respectively, and
their capacities are C1 and C2, correspondingly.
From the balance equations of state (0,0),we have:
2(λ1 + λ2)p(0, 0) = µ[p(0, 1) + p(1, 0)],
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Figure 41: An NK system of two shelters with different arrival rates and capacities
Considering the balance equations of states (0,1) and (1,0), respectively, we have:
(2(λ1 + λ2) + µ)p(0, 1) = λ2p(0, 0) + µp(1, 1) + 2µp(0, 2) (33)
(2(λ1 + λ2) + µ)p(1, 0) = λ1p(0, 0) + µp(1, 1) + 2µp(2, 0). (34)
From the equations (32), (33) and (34), it follows that:
p(0, 2) + p(1, 1) + p(2, 0) =
(λ1 + λ2)
2µ






Considering the balance equations of states (0,2),(1,1) and (2,0), respectively, we
have:
((λ1 + λ2) + 2µ)p(0, 2) = λ2p(0, 1) + µp(1, 2) + 3µp(0, 3),
((λ1 + λ2) + 2µ)p(1, 1) = λ1p(0, 1) + λ2p(1, 0) + 2µp(1, 2) + 2µp(2, 1),
((λ1 + λ2) + 2µ)p(2, 0) = λ1p(1, 0) + µp(2, 1) + 3µp(3, 0).
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Summing up three equations above,
p(0, 3) + p(1, 2) + p(2, 1) + p(3, 0) =
(λ1 + λ2)
3µ







p(C1 − 2, C2) + p(C2 − 1, C2 − 1) + p(C1, C2 − 2) = [(λ1 + λ2)]
C1+C2−2
(C1 + C2 − 2)!µC1+C2−2p(0, 0)
p(C1 − 1, C2) + p(C1, C2 − 1) = [(λ1 + λ2)]
C1+C2−1






Thus, the probability of having n animals in an NK system with two shelters,
where the first (second) shelter’s arrival rate and capacity are λ1 and C1 (λ2 and
C2), is p(n) =
∑






p(0, 0). This is the same as the
probability of having n animals in an M/M/(C1 +C2)/(C1 +C2) queue with the total















We note that the proof for m ≥ 2 (where each shelter j’s arrival rate and capacity





























system. With the total equal arrival rate,
∑m
j=1 λj, the overall killing rates of the NK




j=1 Cj) system also equal. ¥
Proof for Corollary 1
Proof. Let PM/M/mC/mC be the killing probability of the M/M/mC/mC system









and (1 + xmλ
µ
)mC is strictly increasing in m, we have that the rejecting probability of
M/M/mC/mC, PM/M/mC/mC , is strictly decreasing in m (see [68], and [131] for the
proofs). Thus, PNKmC = P
M/M/mC/mC < PM/M/C/C = PKC . Since both NK system and
K systems with m shelters have total arrival rates mλ, it follows that the killing rate
of the NK system is less than the rate of the K system. ¥



































since 0 < k < 1 and
∂P KC,2−type
∂r
≥ 0 (see [64] for the proof of these inequalities).



















Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. Consider an NK system consisting of m identical shelters with two types
of animals (i.e., the coordinated m M/G/C/C systems). If there are n total animals
in the entire NK system, define the state T = (t1, t2, ..., tn), t1 ≤ t2 ≤ ... ≤ tn, when
the most recent animal has arrived t1 time units ago, the next most recent animal
has arrived t2 time units ago, and so on. We shall use the reverse process to find the
limiting probability density p(t1, t2, ..., tn), 1 ≤ n ≤ mC, t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn. Let p(∅)
be the probability that there are no animals in the NK system. As defined, the NK
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system with m shelters has total arrival rate m(λ1+λ2). Since the mean adoption time
of each shelter is identical, the overall inter-adoption time has general distribution G.






g(t)dt. In other words, a(t) is the instantaneous probability intensity that
a t-unit-old animals in any shelters is adopted.
The goal is to prove the conjecture that the reverse process is also a coordination
of m M/G/C/C systems where arrivals follow a Poisson process with rate m(λ1 +
λ2). The state at anytime represents the ordered residual adoption times of animals
currently in the NK system.
We will prove the above conjecture and also obtain the limiting distribution. For
any state T = (t1, ..., ti, ..., tn), let ei(T ) = (t1, ..., ti−1, ti+1, ..., tn). The probability
density in the forward process of moving from state T = (t1, t2, ..., tn), 1 ≤ n ≤ mC
to state ei(T ) is equal to a(ti) since the animal that has spent ti time units old must
be suddenly adopted. If we consider the reversed process, the joint probability density
of moving from state ei(T ) to T is equal to m(λ1 + λ2)g(ti), since we need to have
an animal with inter-adoption time ti to suddenly enter the NK system. Thus, for a
process to be reversible, we need to have that
p(T )a(ti) = p(ei(T ))m(λ1 + λ2)g(ti)
p(T ) = p(ei(T ))m(λ1 + λ2)G(ti),
which is true since a(t) = g(t)
G(ti)
.
Let i=1. We have,
p(T ) = m(λ1 + λ2)G(t1)p(e1(T ))





m(λ1 + λ2)G(ti)p(∅). (35)
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To find p(n animals in the NK), integrate over all T :







G(ti)dt1dt2 · · · dtn









G(ti)dt1dt2 · · · dtn
= p(∅)(m(λ1 + λ2)E[S])
n
n!
, n = 1, 2, ...mC,
where E[S] =
∫
G(t)dt, which is the mean inter-adoption time. Thus, we have






, n = 0, 1, ...,mC. (36)










The conditional distribution of the ordered ages given that there are n animals in the
NK system is
p(T | n animals in the NK) = p(T )









is the density of the equilibrium distribution of G, Ge. To have the above
conjecture valid, we can see from (2) that the limiting distribution of the number in
the system only depends the mean adoption time, and if there are n animals in the
NK system, their ages are independent and identically distributed as the equilibrium
distribution Ge of G.
In addition, we need to consider the forward process moving from T to (0, t1, ..., tn)
when n < k. The probability intensity in that case is m(λ1 +λ2). On the other hand,
in the reverse process, moving from (0, t1, ..., tn) to T occurs with probability 1. Thus,
for a process to be reversible, we need that
p(T )m(λ1 + λ2) = p(0, t1, ..., tn),
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which is true since it follows from (3) and Ḡ(0) = 1. Therefore, we have that the
reverse process of the NK system consisting of m shelters (coordinated m M/G/C/C
systems) also has the inter-adoption distribution G, and arrival process is also a
Poisson process with rate m(λ1 + λ2). Moreover, the state at any time represents
the ordered residual inter-adoption times of animals in the NK system. The limiting
distribution of the number of animals depends on G only through its mean, and their
(unordered) ages are i.i.d. due to the equilibrium distribution Ge of G. Thus, the
rejecting probability of the NK system with two type of animals (the coordinated
m M/G/C/C) is equal to that of the M/G/mC/mC system (which is equal to the
rejecting probability of the M/M/mC/mC). Thus, the NK system with two types
gives the same killing probability as the NK system with one type of animal. ¥
Proof for Lemma 1
Proof.
i) From Little’s Law ([93]), L = λeffW , where L, λeff and W are the long run
number of customers, the effective arrival rates, and the average time each
customer spending in the system, respectively. Since we assume there is no
waiting space in the shelter, W = 1
ν
. Thus, in the NK system with m shelters,
we have
LNKmC = m(λ1 + λ2)(1− PNKmC ) 1ν .
In the K system with m shelters,
LKmC = m(λ1 + λ2)(1− PKC ) 1ν .
From Corollary 1, PNKmC < P
K





ii) From Theorem 1, the killing rates of the NK and M/G/mC/mC are equal.
Also, from the proof in Smith and Whitt (1980), the rejecting probability of the
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M/G/mC/mC system is decreasing in m. Therefore, it follows that the killing
probability of the system with m shelters under the NK policy is decreasing in
m.






















































− 1 + PNKmC ). For
detailed derivations, see Whitt (2002) ¥
Proof for Observation 13
Proof. Consider the following example when m=2. The M/G/2C/2C system














































Let µ1,1 = φ, µ2,1 = kφ, µ1,2 =
1
φ
, and µ2,2 =
k
φ
, where 0 < k < 1; then, as φ → 0,
we have d →∞ and PM/G/2C/2C → 1 .
On the other hand, consider an NK system consisting of the two shelters as de-
scribed. As φ → 0, we have µ1,2 → ∞, and µ2,2 → ∞. The rejected animals from
shelter 1 can always be diverted to shelter 2 and get adopted there and we have
PNK2C → 0 for this case. Thus, if the mean adoption rate of each shelter in the system
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is different, the total killing rate of the NK system can be different than the rate of
the M/G/mC/mC system. ¥
Proof for Lemma 2
Proof. To prove this lemma, we show that if ∂
2µ1(na)
∂n2a
≤ 0, then ∂2TCNKa (na)
∂n2a
≥ 0.
Considering the total cost,
∂TCNKa (na)
∂µ1(na)




From the chain rule ([144]), the second derivative of a shelter’s cost with respect to

















< 0 and ∂
2PC(µ1(na))
∂µ1(na)2







> 0. Since (∂µ1(na)
∂na
)2 ≥ 0, we have ∂2TCNKa (na)
∂n2a
≥ 0 if ∂2µ1(na)
∂n2a
≤ 0. ¥
Proof for Theorem 3
Proof. The convexity shown in Lemma 2 allows us to determine the optimal value
of na by setting
∂TCNKa (na)
∂na
equal to 0. From equation (1),
∂TCNKa (na)
∂na






= −vk(λ1 + λ2)PC(µ1(na))(Cµ1(na)
λ̃







= −PC(µ1(na))(Cµ1(na)λ̃ − 1 + PC(µ1(na))) λ̃µ1(na)2 < 0 (see [64]).
In case i) when vk(λ1 + λ2)PC(µ1(0))(
Cµ1(0)
λ̃




have that TCNKa (na) is increasing in [0, na] and n
∗









a (na) is decreasing
in [0, na] and n
∗
a = na. Otherwise, n
∗
a is the solution of (2). ¥
Proof for Lemma 3
Proof. To prove this lemma, we show that if ∂
2λ1(ns)
∂n2s




Let AC = TC
NK
s (ns)− (fs + vsns) = vk(hλ(ns) + λ(ns))PC(λ(ns)).


































for C=0. Thus, we have that A
′
0 ≤ 0 since λ(ns) is non-increasing in ns (λ′(ns) ≤ 0).
Next, we prove by induction that the above equation, A
′
C ≤ 0, holds for all C ≥ 0.




AC(C + QAC−1) = Qvk(h + 1)λ(ns)AC−1,
and taking the derivative of both sides with respect to ns yields
(C + QAC−1)A
′




C−1[vk(h + 1)λ(ns)− AC ]
= Qvk(h + 1)λ
′
(ns)AC−1 + Q(1− PC(λ(ns)))vk(h + 1)λ(ns)A′C−1.
Therefore, using the induction hypothesis, we have A
′
C ≤ 0 for all C ≥ 0.







(ns)− A′C ] + QA
′′
C−1[vk(h + 1)λ(ns)− AC ]







(ns)− A′C ] + QA
′′
C−1(1− PC(λ(ns)))vk(h + 1)λ(ns)































≥ λ′(ns)vk(h + 1),
since ∂g
∂r
≤ 1 and λ′(ns) ≤ 0. Thus, 2QA′C−1[vk(h + 1)λ
′
(ns)− A′C ] ≥ 0.
If λ
′′
(ns) ≥ 0, then A′′0 ≥ 0. If we assume as the induction hypothesis, A′′C−1 ≥ 0, we
then have that A
′′






Thus, if λ(ns) is convex in ns, then the shelter cost (TC
NK
s (ns)) is a convex
function with respect to the number of neutered animals, ns. ¥
Proof for Property 4
Proof.
i) The proof follows directly from Lemma 3 and the property that λ(ns) is convex





ii) Taking the second derivative of equation (3), we obtain
∂2TCNKs (ns)
∂n2s











































The first term of (40) is greater than or equal to zero since (∂λ(ns)
∂ns






≥ 0 (from [80], the rejection rate is increasing




since PC(λ(ns)) + λ(ns)
∂PC(λ(ns)
∂λ(ns)
≥ 0. Since ∂2λ(ns)
∂n2s
changes sign from
negative to positive only once, setting (40) equals to zero, we have that there is
at most one sign change for (40). So, there is at most one positive root for (40)









, from (i), ∂
2TCNKs (ns)
∂n2s
≥ 0) such that the shelter
cost is concave when ns < n
∗
s and convex when ns ≥ n∗s. ¥
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APPENDIX B
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Proof for Lemma 4
































+ P2[r(c− η1)(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r
2
− βC c + η1
2
)













r(c− η1)(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r
2
− βC c + η1
2
)




) ≤ rc− ρ1η1. (44)
From Assumption 4, the total demand of seats when priced at P2 are assumed to
be less than the total capacity, so constraint (44) always holds with inequality. The
Lagrangean is given by:
L(ρ1, η1) = 2
(





+ P2[r(c− η1)(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r
2
− βC c + η1
2
)












where the first-order condition with respect to ρ1 is given by:
∂L(ρ1, η1)
∂ρ1
= 2η1[P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF ρ1 − βC η1
2
)






The second derivative of L(ρ1, η1) with respect to ρ1 is
∂2L(ρ1,η1)
∂ρ21
= −2η1βF (P1−P2) <
0. Similarly, the first derivative of L(ρ1, η1) with respect to η1 is
L(ρ1, η1)
∂η1
= 2ρ1[P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF ρ1
2
− βCη1)
− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF ρ1
2
− βCη1)] + µβC
2
.

















β21P2 − βF ρ1 − βCη1)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF ρ1 − βCη1)].











) is not always
positive. Thus, determinants of the hessian of L(ρ1, η1) do not alternate in sign and
this revenue maximizing problem is not jointly concave in the decision variables ρ1
and η1. ¥
Proof for Lemma 5
Proof. We start by first solving for the optimal ρ1 as a function of η1. Consider
the revenue maximization problem given in (42), the constraint (43) can be written as
ρ1 ≥ α−β1P1+β21P2−1βF and η1 ≥
α−β1P1+β21P2−1
βC













r(c− η1)(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r
2
− βC c + η1
2
)




















= −2η1βF (P1 − P2) < 0.
The concavity of Rev2Dn=2 with respect to ρ1 allows us to find the optimal value of ρ1




ρ∗1(η1) = max{min{0,MF ,
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1)− (P1 − P2)βC η12
βF (P1 − P2) }, r}.
The following cases provide conditions for each optimal solution of ρ∗1(η1).
Case A.
i) If α−β1P1 +β21P2 ≤ 1, we have MF ≤ 0. When P1(α−β1P1 +β21P2−βC η12 ) <
P2(α − β2P2 + β12)P1 − βC η12 ), then Rev2Dn=2 is decreasing in the interval [0, r],
so ρ∗1(η1) = 0.




) < P2(α − β2P2 + β12)P1 − βF MF − βC η12 ), then Rev2Dn=2 is decreasing in
the interval [MF , r], so ρ
∗
1(η1) = MF .
Case B. When P1(α−β1P1+β21P2−βF r−βC η12 ) > P2(α−β2P2+β12)P1−βF r−βC η12 ),
then Rev2Dn=2 is increasing in the interval [max{0,MF}, r], so ρ∗1(η1) = r.
Case C.
i) If α− β1P1 + β21P2 ≤ 1:
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P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βC η12 ) ≥ P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βC η12 ), and
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r − βC η12 ) ≤ P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r − βC η12 ),
and we have that Rev2Dn=2 is increasing and then decreasing in the interval [0, r].
ii) If α− β1P1 + β21P2 > 1:
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2− βF MF − βC η12 ) ≥ P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1− βF MF − βC η12 );
and P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r− βC η12 ) ≤ P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r− βC η12 ),
and we have that Rev2Dn=2 is increasing and then decreasing in the interval
[MF , r].
In both cases (i) and (ii), ρ∗1(η1) =




Thus from case A, B and C,







βF (P1−P2) }, r}.
¥
Proof for Theorem 4
Proof. After solving for the optimal ρ∗1(η1) as a function of η1 (given in Lemma 5),
we substitute ρ∗1(η1) into the revenue function Rev
2D
n=2 to next solve for the optimal η
∗
1.
The following cases identify the shape of Rev2Dn=2(ρ
∗
1(η1), η1) for each optimal ρ
∗
1(η1)
when α− β1P1 + β21P2 ≤ 1.




1(η1), η1) = 2P2cr(α−β2P2+β12P1−βF r2−βC c2),
and it is independent with η1.
Case II) When ρ∗1(η1) = r, we have
Rev2Dn=2(ρ
∗
1(η1), η1) = 2
[





+ P2r(c− η1)(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r
2






Taking the second derivative of Rev2Dn=2(ρ
∗






−2rβC(P1 − P2) < 0. Thus, Rev2Dn=2(ρ∗1(η1), η1) is concave in η1.
Case III) When ρ∗1(η1) =
α(P1−P2)−β1P 21 +β2P 22−(β12−β21)P1P2−(P1−P2)βC
η1
2


















[P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βC 3
4
η1)
− P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βC 3
4
η1)].





can be either positive or negative, depending on




























changes from negative to positive. So, the revenue function
Rev2Dn=2(ρ
∗
1(η1), η1) is first concave and then convex in η1.
From Lemma 5, when α− β1P1 + β21P2 ≤ 1, we have
ρ∗1(η1) =
(
min{P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1)− (P1 − P2)βC
η1
2
βF (P1 − P2) , r}
)+
.
Next, we identify the optimal η∗1 when ρ
∗
1(η1) equals either 0, r or
α(P1−P2)−β1P 21 +β2P 22−(β12−β21)P1P2−(P1−P2)βC
η1
2
βF (P1−P2) in the following case A, B and C, respec-
tively.
Case A.
From Lemma 5 (case A), we have ρ∗1(η1) = 0 when
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βC η12 )− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βC η12 ) ≤ 0,
or equivalently, η1 ≥ 2[P1(α−β1P1+β21P2)−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1)]βC(P1−P2) . From Case I, the objective
function is independent with η1 when ρ
∗
1(η1) = 0. Without loss of generality, when
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) < 0, we have ρ∗1(η1) = 0 and η∗1 = 0.
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Case B. From Lemma 5 (case B), when ρ∗1(η1) = r, it means
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r − βC η1
2




η1 ≤ 2[P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r)]
βC(P1 − P2) . (46)




1(η1), η1) is concave in η1. So,










= 2r[P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r
2
− βCη1)









P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r2)
βC(P1 − P2) .
From the condition (45), since η1 ∈ [0, c], we have that P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2−βF r2)−
P2(α − β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r2) ≥ 0 and P1(α − β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r) − P2(α − β2P2 +
β12P1− βF r) ≥ 0. Considering the upper bound on η1, the optimal η∗1 can be written
as
η∗1 = min{
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r2)
βC(P1 − P2) ,
2[P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r)]
βC(P1 − P2) , c}. (47)
The following cases identify values of η∗1 and ρ
∗
1 under different conditions.
Case B.1) If
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≥ (P1 − P2)(βF r
2
+ βCc), and
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≥ (P1 − P2)(βF r + βC c
2
),







≤ P1(α−β1P1+β21P2)−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1) ≤ (P1−P2)(βF r
2
−βCc),
we have η∗1 =





(P1 − P2)βF r ≤ P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≤ (P1 − P2)βF 3r
2
, and
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≤ (P1 − P2)(βF r + βC c
2
)






From Lemma 5 (case C), ρ∗1(η1) =




P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βC η12 ) ≥ P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βC η12 ) and
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r − βC η12 ) ≤ P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r − βC η12 )
Rearranging the above inequalities, it means
2[P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r)]
βC(P1 − P2) ≤ η1,
and
η1 ≤ 2[P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1)]
βC(P1 − P2) .
From the proof of Case III, we have that Rev2Dn=2(ρ
∗
1(η1), η1) is first concave and
then convex in η∗1. Thus, the optimal η1 can be obtained by setting the FOC of
Rev2Dn=2(ρ
∗







η∗1 = {2[P1(α−β1P1+β21P2)−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1)]3βC(P1−P2) ,
2[P1(α−β1P1+β21P2)−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1)]
βC(P1−P2) }, we have
that the local maximum is 2[P1(α−β1P1+β21P2)−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1)]
3βC(P1−P2) .
Therefore, the local optimal η∗1 can be written as,
η∗1 = min{max{
2[P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r)]
βC(P1 − P2) ,
2[P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1)]
3βC(P1 − P2) }, c}.
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The following cases identify local optimal values of η∗1 and ρ
∗
1(η1) under different
conditions. Case C.1) If
(P1−P2)βC 3c
2
≤ P1(α−β1P1+β21P2)−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1) ≤ (P1−P2)(βC 3c
2
+βF r),








≤ P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)−P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≤ (P1−P2)βC 3c
2
, and
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≤ (P1 − P2)βF 3r
2
,









≤ P1(α−β1P1+β21P2)−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1) ≤ (P1−P2)(βC c
2
+βF r),
we have η∗1 =
2[P1(α−β1P1+β21P2−βF r)−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1−βF r)]
βC(P1−P2) and thus ρ
∗
1 = r.
The solutions identified in each case above represent the local maximum for each
feasible region. In some cases, we have multiple local maxima in the same region. In
all cases, we found the revenue function is continuous and also continuously differ-
entiable in each region. Next, let us compare the local maximum to determine the
global maximum for each of the following cases;
Case 1: βCc ≤ βF r and α− β1P1 + β21P2 ≤ 1
when βCc ≤ βF r and α−β1P1 +β21P2 ≤ 1, we have the following feasible regions:
Feasible region 1.i) P1(α−β1P1 +β21P2−βF r)−P2(α−β2P2 +β12P1−βF r) ≤
0 =⇒ case A applies, where ρ∗1 = 0 and η∗1 = 0.
Feasible region 1.ii) 0 ≤ P1(α−β1P1+β21P2−βF r)−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1−βF r) ≤





Feasible region 1.iii) (P1 − P2)βF r ≤ P1(α − β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r) − P2(α −





1) of case C.2 is greater than that of case B.3 in this feasible region, the







Feasible region 1.iv) (P1 − P2)βC 3c2 ≤ P1(α − β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r) − P2(α −





1) of case C.1 is greater than that of case B.3 in this feasible region,




Feasible region 1.v) (P1 − P2)(βF r + βC c2) ≤ P1(α − β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r) −
P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r) =⇒ case B.1 applies and thus the optimal solutions are
η∗1 = c and ρ
∗
1 = r.
Thus, for Case 1, where βCc ≤ βF r, and α − β1P1 + β21P2 ≤ 1, the optimal ρ∗1
and η∗1 can be summarized as:
1.1) ρ∗1 = 0 and η
∗
1 = 0 when
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) < 0.
1.2) ρ∗1 = r and η
∗
1 = c when




















βF (P1−P2) and η
∗
1 = c when
(P1 − P2)βC 3c
2
< P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1)
≤ (P1 − P2)(βF r + βC c
2
).
Case 2: βCc ≥ βF r and α− β1P1 + β21P2 ≤ 1
When βCc ≥ βF r and α−β1P1 +β21P2 ≤ 1, we have the following feasible regions:
Feasible Region 2.i) P1(α−β1P1 +β21P2−βF r)−P2(α−β2P2 +β12P1−βF r) ≤
0 =⇒ case A applies, where ρ∗1 = 0 and η∗1 = 0.
Feasible region 2.ii) 0 ≤ P1(α−β1P1+β21P2−βF r)−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1−βF r) ≤




Feasible region 2.iii) (P1 − P2)βF r ≤ P1(α − β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r) − P2(α −





1) of case C.2 is greater than that of case B.3 in this feasible region, the







Feasible region 2.iv) (P1−P2)βC 3r2 ≤ P1(α−β1P1+β21P2−βF r)−P2(α−β2P2+





1) of case B.2 is greater than that of case B.3 in this feasible region, the op-
timal solutions are from case B.2, where η∗1 =
P1(α−β1P1+β21P2−βF r2 )−P2(α−β2P2+β12P1−βF r2 )
βC(P1−P2)
and ρ∗1 = r.
Feasible region 2.v) (P1 − P2)(βF r + βC c2) ≤ P1(α − β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r) −
P2(α − β2P2 + β12P1 − βF r) ≤ (P1 − P2)(βF r2 + βCc) =⇒ case B.2 applies and thus
the optimal solutions are η∗1 =




Feasible region 2.vi) (P1 − P2)(βF r2 + βCc) ≤ P1(α − β1P1 + β21P2 − βF r) −
P2(α−β2P2 +β12P1−βF r) =⇒ B.1 applies and thus the optimal solutions are η∗1 = c
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and ρ∗1 = r.
Thus, for Case 2., where βCc ≤ βF r, and α − β1P1 + β21P2 ≤ 1, the optimal ρ∗1
and η∗1 can be summarized as:
2.1) ρ∗1 = 0 and η
∗
1 = 0 when
P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) > P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2).
2.2) ρ∗1 = r and η
∗
1 = c














0 ≤ P1(α− β1P1 + β21)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≤ (P1 − P2)βF 3r
2
.





(P1 − P2)βF 3r
2
< P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)
− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≤ (P1 − P2)(βF r
2
+ βCc).
In the case where α−β1P1+β21P2 > 1, there is more demand (at price P1) than the




− βC η12 ≤ 1, which is equivalent to βF ρ1 + βCη1 ≥ 2(α− β1P1 + β21P2 − 1) > 0.




. The proof of this case is similar to the proofs above (where
α−β1P1+β21P2 ≤ 1). The only difference is that now we are solving the optimization
problem over the interval [MF , r] for the decision variable ρ1 and [MC , c] for the
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decision variable η1. The optimal solutions when α − β1P1 + β21P2 > 1 can be
summarized as followed;
Case 3: α− β1P1 + β21P2 > 1 and βCc ≤ βF r
when α − β1P1 + β21P2 > 1 and βCc ≤ βF r, the optimal decisions for two-
dimensional seating sections are given by;
3.1) Offer all seats with high price P1 (ρ
∗
1 = r and η
∗
1 = c) when
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) > (P1 − P2)(βF r + βC c2).
3.2) Offer two seating sections with P1 and P2 where:
i) ρ∗1 = MF and η
∗
1 = MC when













(P1 − P2)(βF MF + βCMC) ≤ P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)





βF (P1−P2) and η
∗
1 = c when
(P1 − P2)βC 3c
2
< P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)
− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≤ (P1 − P2)(βF r + βC c
2
).
Case 4: α− β1P1 + β21P2 > 1 and βCc > βF r
When α − β1P1 + β21P2 > 1 and βCc > βF r, the optimal decisions for two-
dimensional seating sections are given by:
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4.1) Offer all seats with high price P1 (ρ
∗
1 = r and η
∗
1 = c) when
P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) > (P1 − P2)(βF r2 + βCc).
4.2) Offer two seating sections with P1 and P2 where:
i) ρ∗1 = MF and η
∗
1 = MC when













(P1 − P2)(βF MF + βCMC) < P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≤
(P1 − P2)βF 3r2 .





(P1 − P2)βF 3r
2
< P1(α− β1P1 + β21P2)
− P2(α− β2P2 + β12P1) ≤ (P1 − P2)(βF r
2
+ βCc).
We summarize the optimal zoning decisions for all cases (1, 2, 3 and 4) as written
in Theorem 4. ¥
Proof for Lemma 6







Pi(ri − ri−1)(a− biPi +
∑
j 6=i







bjiPj − bF ri + ri−1
2
≤ rowc, i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
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where r0 = 0 and rn = r. Because
∂2Rev1D
∂r2i
= −bF (Pi − Pi+1), i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1},
∂2Rev1D
∂ri∂rj
= 0, j 6= i,




−bF (P1 − P2) 0 · · · 0









whose leading coefficient is negative and the determinants alternate in sign. Thus, the
hessian is negative definite and the objective function is jointly concave in r1, . . . , rn−1.
¥
Proof for Theorem 5
Proof. After rearranging terms, we can write the revenue maximization problem










2(a− b1P1 + b21P2 − rowc)
bF
≤ r1, (49)
2(a− b2P2 + b12P1 − rowc)
bF
− r ≤ r1. (50)
Note that from the assumption A3 (iv), E[
∫ r
0
(a − b2P2 + b12P1 − bF D)dD] ≤
r×rowc. So, we have 2(a−b2P2+b12P1−rowc)bF −r ≤ 0 and the constraint (50) is redundant.
As defined earlier, m = 2(a−b1P1+b21P2−rowc)
bF













= bF (P2 − P1) < 0). Therefore, it allows us to determine the optimal




In case 1, m ≤ 0, then max{m, 0} = 0. When P2(a−b2P2+b12P1) > P1(a−b1P1+
b21P2) in case 1 (i), we have that Rev
1D
n=2 is decreasing in the interval [0, r] and r
∗
1 = 0.
In case 2, m > 0, then max{m, 0} = m. When P2(a− b2P2 + b12P1 − bF m) > P1(a−
b1P1+b21P2−bF m) in case 2 (i), Rev1Dn=2 is decreasing in the interval [m, r] and r∗1 = m.
In case (ii) when P1(a−b1P1 +b21P2−bF r) > P2(a−b2P2 +b12P1−bF r), we have that
Rev1Dn=2 is increasing in the interval [max{m, 0}, r] and r∗1 = r. Otherwise, the revenue






which is equivalent to P1(a− b1P1 + b21P2 − bF r∗1) = P2(a− b2P2 + b12P1 − bF r∗1). ¥
Proof for Lemma 7
Proof. Suppose 0 < r∗1 < 0, then r
∗
1 =
a(P1−P2)−b1P 21 +b2P 22−P1P2(b12−b21)




= − P 21
bF (P1−P2) < 0. From Theorem 5 case 1(i), 2(i) where r
∗
1 = 0 and
r∗1 = m, the conditions for 0 and m to be optimal are easier to satisfy as b1 increases.
For case 1(ii) and 2(ii), the condition is more difficult to satisfy to have r∗1 = r. Thus,
as b1 increases, the optimal zoning decision is moving away from r and toward 0 and
m; that is the optimal row, r∗1, should be moved to be closer to the stage.






0. From Theorem 5, we can see that condition for r∗1 = r to be optimal is easier to
satisfy as b2 increases; so the optimal zoning decision is moving toward r and away
from 0 and m. Therefore, the optimal row, r∗1, should be moved to be further from
the stage as b2 increases. ¥
Proof for Lemma 8
















bF (P1−P2) > 0.
Thus, r∗1 is decreasing in b12 and increasing in b21. In the conditions for r
∗
1 to equal
0, m, or r, we can see that as b12 increases (and as b21 decreases), the optimal zoning
decision is moving away from r and toward 0 and m, resulting 0 and m to be easier to
satisfy. Thus, as the marginal price substitution effect b12 (b21) increases, the optimal
row should be moved to be closer to (further from) the stage. ¥
Proof for Lemma 9





bF (P1−P2) .. Taking the
partial derivative of the optimal solution with respect to bF , we have
∂r∗1
∂bF
= −a(P1−P2)−b1P 21 +b2P 22−P1P2(b12−b21)




Note that the condition for r∗1 = 0 (from Theorem 5 case 1 (i)) is not sensitive
to bF . The condition for r
∗
1 = m from case 2(i) is P2(a − b2P2 + b12P1 − bF m) >
P1(a−b1P1+b21P2−bF m) or P2(a−b2P2+b12P1) > P1(a−b1P1+b21P2)−(P1−P2)bF m.
We can see that as bF increases, this condition is easier to to satisfy. Likewise, as bF
increases, the condition for r∗1 = r is more difficult to satisfy. So, the optimal zoning
decision is moving away from r; i.e., the optimal row, r∗1, should be moved to be closer
to the stage as bF increases. ¥
Comparative statics of the optimal zoning decisions and optimal revenue
shown in Table 8




















Taking the derivatives of the optimal decision and the optimal revenue with respect
to each model parameter, we summarize the results in Table 9 below.
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bF (P1−P2) ≤ 0 −r∗1(P1)2 ≤ 0
∂b2
P 22
bF (P1−P2) ≥ 0 (P2)2(r∗1 − r) ≤ 0
∂b12
P1P2
bF (P1−P2) ≤ 0 P1P2(r − r∗1) ≥ 0
∂b21
P1P2
















Proof for Lemma 10
Proof.





bF (P1−P2) . Considering how
r∗1 changes as P1 changes, we take the partial derivative of the optimal solution
with respect to P1:
∂r∗1
∂P1
= −(b2 + b21 − b12)(P2)
2 − 2b1P1P2 + b1(P1)2
bF (P1 − P2) .
Rearranging the equation above, we have
∂r∗1
∂P1









ii) Similarly for P2, we have
∂r∗1
∂P2
= −(b1 + b12 − b21)(P1)
2 − 2b2P1P2 + b2(P2)2
bF (P1 − P2) .
Rearranging the equation above, we have
∂r∗1
∂P2








> 0, otherwise. ¥
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
Proof for Theorem 6
Proof. The results in this Proposition can be proved by induction on t. Consider
following two induction hypotheses:













k=t+1 mk−1)! ,∀γ > 0.
That is the distribution function of the base demand rate in period t, Γt, which

















)m ( b+∑nk=t+1 φ(pk)g(k)
A(t)
)a+∑nk=t+1 mk
, ∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .},
where A(t) = b +
∑n
k=t+1 φ(pk)g(k) + φ(pt)g(t).
That is the distribution function of the unconditional ticket demand in period t,












If t = n, the hypothesis (i) holds by the model definition that Γt=n, follows a Gamma
distribution with a scale parameter of a and a shape parameter of b. In addition, the
hypothesis (ii) also holds when t = n since from equation (27), we have that f(Mt =
m|pt) follows a Negative Binomial distribution with parameters a and bb+φ(pt)g(t) .
Assume that the induction hypotheses (i) and (ii) are true for t = j + 1, and
consider the case when t = j. If (i) and (ii) hold for t = j + 1, we have:
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k=j+2 mk−1)! ,∀γ > 0;













∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .},
where A(j + 1) = b +
∑n
k=j+2 φ(pk)g(k) + φ(pj+1)g(j + 1).
Then, consider the case where t = j;
A.2) Using Bayes’ rule, we have that the posterior distribution of Γj is equal to:
f(Γj = γ|pj, pj+1, . . . , pn,mj+1, . . . , mn)
=
f(Mj+1 = m|pj+1, pj+2, . . . , pn,mj+2, . . . , mn)f(γ)∫∞
0














k=j+1 mk − 1)!
, ∀γ > 0,
where f(Mj+1 = m|pj+1, pj+2, . . . , pn,mj+2, . . . ,mn) is given by (B.1).
B.2) The distribution of demand in period t = j, unconditional on Γj, is given by:












)f(γ|pj, . . . , pn,mj+1, . . . , mn)dγ
=
(
m + a +
∑n









∀m ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .},
where A(j) = b+
n∑
k=j+1
φ(pk)g(k)+φ(pj)g(j), and f(γ|pt, pj+1, . . . , pn, mj+1, . . . , mn)
is given by (A.2).
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From (A.2) and (B.2), it follows that the induction hypothesis (i) and (ii) are true for
t = j, given they are true for t = j + 1. Thus, the results in this Proposition follow
by induction.
Proof for Theorem 7
Proof. Let meandt denote the expected mean of demand in period t. Since

















. The proofs of results given in Proposition 7 are as fol-
low;





















> 0 and ∂φ(pt)
∂pt
< 0, we have ∂meandt
∂pt
< 0. Therefore, the
expected demand in period t is decreasing with the ticket price in period t.
ii) Taking the first derivative of meandt with respect to prices used in the past




















2 > 0 and
∂φ(pi)
∂pi
g(i) < 0, ∀i = t+1, . . . , n, it follows that
∂meandt
∂pi
> 0,∀i = t + 1, . . . , n. In other words, the expected demand in period t
is decreasing with the selling prices offered in the past periods t + 1, . . . , n.
iii) The derivative of meandt with respect to the observed sales in the past periods








> 0, ∀i = t + 1, . . . , n.
Thus, the expected demand in period t is increasing with sales in the past
periods, mi, where i = t + 1, . . . , n.
165
REFERENCES
[1] Aviv, Y. and Pazgal, A., “Pricing of short life-cycle products through active
learning.” Working Paper, Washington University, St. Louis, 2002.
[2] Aviv, Y. and Pazgal, A., “A partially observed Markov decision process for
dynamic pricing,” Management Science, vol. 51, p. 14001416, 2005.
[3] Azoury, K., “Bayes solution to dynamic inventory models under unknown
demand distribution,” Management Science, vol. 12, pp. 1150–1160, 1985.
[4] Balvers, R. and Cosimano, T., “Actively learning about demand and the
dynamics of price adjustment,” The Economic Journal, vol. 100, pp. 882–898,
1990.
[5] Baskerville, D., Music business handbook and career guide. California: Sage
Publications, 2001.
[6] Bassamboo, A., Harrison, J., and Zeevi, A., “Design and control of a
large call center: Asymptotic analysis of an LP-based method.,” Operations
Research, vol. 54, no. 3, pp. 419–435, 2006.
[7] Belobaba, P., “Airline yield management: An overview of seat inventory
control,” Transportation Science, vol. 21, pp. 63–73, 1987.
[8] Benjaafar, S., “Performance bounds for the effectiveness of pooling in
multi-processing systems,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 87,
pp. 375–388, 1995.
[9] Benjaafar, S., Cooper, W., and Kim, J., “On the benefits of pooling
in production-inventory systems,” Management Science, vol. 51, pp. 548–565,
2005.
[10] Best Friends, 2008. Official Website of Best Friends Animal Society,
http://www.bestfriends.org, last accessed on January 28, 2008.
[11] Biller, S., Chan, L., Simchi-Levi, D., and Swann, J., “Dynamic pric-
ing and the direct-to-customer model in the automotive industry,” Electronic
Commerce Research, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 309–334, 2005.
[12] Bitran, G. and Gilbert, S., “Managing hotel reservations with uncertain
arrivals,” Operations Research, vol. 44, pp. 15–49, 1996.
[13] Bitran, G. and Mondschein, S., “An application of yield management to
the hotel industry considering multiple stays,” Operations Research, vol. 43,
pp. 427–443, 1995.
166
[14] Bitran, G. and Wadhwa, H., “A methodology for demand learning with an
application to the optimal pricing of seasonal products.” Working Paper, M.I.T.
Sloan School of Management, 1996.
[15] Bitran, G., Haas, E., and Matsuo, H., “Production planning of style goods
with high setup costs and forecast revisions,” Operations Research, vol. 34,
pp. 226–236, 1986.
[16] Bitran, G. and Mondschein, S., “Periodic pricing of seasonal products in
retailing,” Management Science, vol. 43, pp. 64–79, 1997.
[17] Bitran, G. Caldentey, R. and Mondschein, S., “Coordinating clearance
markdown sales of seasonal products in retail chains,” Operations Research,
vol. 46, pp. 609–624, 1998.
[18] Bitran, R. and Caldentey, R., “Pricing models for revenue management.,”
Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 203–229,
2003.
[19] Borland, J. and MacDonald, R., “Demand for sport,” Oxford Review of
Economic Policy, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 478–502, 2003.
[20] Borst, S., Mandelbaum, A., and Reiman, M., “Dimensioning large call
centers,” Operations Research, vol. 52, pp. 17–34, 2004.
[21] Bradford, J. and Sugrue, P., “A Bayesian approach to the two-period style
goods inventory problem with single replenishment and heterogeneous Poisson
demands,” Journal of the Operational Research Society, vol. 41, pp. 211–218,
1990.
[22] Brockmeyer, E., Halstrom, H., and Jensen, A., “The life and works of
A. K. Erlang,” Danish Academy of Technical Sciences, Copenhagen, 1948.
[23] Buzacott, J., “Commonalities in reengineered business process: Models and
issues,” Management Science, vol. 42, pp. 768–782, 1996.
[24] Caro, F. and Simchi-Levi, D., “Static pricing for a network service
provider.” Working Paper, University of California, Los Angeles, Anderson
School of Management, 2006.
[25] Carol, W. and Grimes, R., “Evolutionary change in product management:
Experiences in the car rental industry,” Interfaces, vol. 25, pp. 84–104, 1995.
[26] Carrier, E., “Modeling airline passenger choice: Passenger preference for
schedule in the Passenger Oriented-Destination Simulator (PODS),” Master
Thesis. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003.
[27] Centonze, L. and Levy, J., “Characteristics of free-roaming cats and their
caretakers,” Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association, vol. 220,
no. 11, pp. 1627–1633, 2002.
167
[28] Chan, L., Shen, Z., Simchi-Levi, D., and Swann, J., “Coordination of
pricing and inventory decisions: A survey and classification. in: D Simchi-Levi
et al. (Eds), Handbook of quantitative supply chain analysis: Modeling in the
E-Business Era.,” Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 335–392, 2004.
[29] Chang, S. and Fyfee, D., “Estimation of forecast errors for seasonal style
goods sales,” Management Science, vol. 18, pp. 89–96, 1971.
[30] Chatwin, R., “Optimal dynamic pricing of perishable products with stochastic
demand and a finite set of prices,” European Journal of Operational Research,
vol. 125, pp. 149–174, 2000.
[31] Ciancimino, A., Inzerillo, G., Lucidi, S., and Palagi, L., “A mathemat-
ical programming approach for the solution of the railway yield management
problem,” Transportation Science, vol. 33, pp. 168–181, 1999.
[32] Cooper, R., Introduction to Queueing Theory, second edition. North Holland,
New York, 1981.
[33] Corning, J. and Levy, A., “Demand for live theater with market segmen-
tation and seasonality,” Journal of Cultural Economics, vol. 26, pp. 217–235,
2002.
[34] Courty, P., “An economic guide to ticket pricing in the entertainment indus-
try,” Louvain Economic Review, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 167–192, 2000.
[35] Courty, P., “Ticket pricing under demand uncertainty,” Journal of Law and
Economics, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 627–652, 2003.
[36] Courty, P., “The impact of price discrimination of revenue: Evidence from
the concert industry.” Working paper, 2009.
[37] DeGraba, P., “Buying frenzies and seller-induced excess demand,” RAND
Journal of Economics., vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 331–342, 1995.
[38] DeSerpa, A., “To err is rational : A theory of excess demand for tickets,”
Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 511–518, 1994.
[39] Dewan, S. and Mendelson, H., “User delay costs and internal pricing for a
service facility,” Management Science, vol. 36, pp. 1502–1517, 1990.
[40] Diesel, G., Smith, H., and Pfeiffer, D., “Factors affecting time to adop-
tion of dogs re-homed by a charity in the UK,” Animal Welfare, vol. 16, no. 3,
pp. 353–360, 2007.
[41] Drake, M. J., Duran, S., Griffin, P., and Swann, J., “Optimal timing
of switches between product sales for sports and entertainment tickets,” Naval
Research Logistics, vol. 55, no. 1, pp. 59–75, 2008.
168
[42] Einav, L. and Orbach, B., “Uniform prices for differentiated goods: The case
of the movie theater industry,” International Review of Law and Economics,
vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 129–153, 2007.
[43] Ekelund, R. J. and Ritenour, S., “An exploration of the Beckerian Theory
of Time Costs: Symphony concert demand,” The American Journal of Eco-
nomics and Sociology, vol. 58, pp. 887–889, 1999.
[44] Elmaghraby, W. and Keskinocak, P., “Dynamic pricing in the presence
of inventory considerations: Research overview, current practices, and future
directions,” Management Science., vol. 49, pp. 1287–1309, 2003.
[45] Eppen, G. and Iyer, A., “Improved fashion buying with Bayesian updates,”
Operations Research, vol. 45, pp. 805–819, 1997.
[46] Erlang, A., “On the rational determination of the number of circuits, the
life and works of A. K. Erlang, H. L. Halstrom and A. Jensen (eds.),” Danish
Academy of Technical Sciences, 1948, pp. 216–221, 1924.
[47] Felton, M. V., “Major influences on the demand for opera tickets,” Journal
of Cultural Economics, vol. 13, pp. 53–64, 1989.
[48] Feng, Y. and Gallego, G., “Optimal starting times for end-of-season sales
and optimal stopping times for promotional fares,” Management Science, no. 41.
[49] Feng, Y. and Xiao, B., “Maximizing revenues of perishable assets with a risk
factor,” Operations Research, vol. 47, pp. 337–341, 1999.
[50] Fisher, M. and Raman, A., “Reducing the cost of demand uncertainty
through accurate response to early sales,” Operations Research, vol. 44, pp. 87–
99, 1996.
[51] Gallego, G. and Van Ryzin, G., “Optimal dynamic pricing of inventories
with stochastic demand over finite horizons,” Management Science, vol. 40,
no. 8, pp. 999–1020, 1994.
[52] Gallego, G. and VanRyzin, G., “A multi-product dynamic pricing prob-
lem and its applications to network yield management,” Operations Research,
vol. 45, pp. 24–41, 1997.
[53] Gans, N. and Zhou, Y., “A call-routing problem with service-level con-
straints,” Operations Research, vol. 51, no. 2, pp. 255–271, 2003.
[54] Garnett, O., Mandelbaum, A., and Reiman, M., “Designing a call cen-
ter with impatient customers,” Manufacturing and Service Operations Manage-
ment, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 208–227, 2002.
[55] Geraghty, M. K. and Johnson, E., “Revenue management saves National
car rental,” Interfaces, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 107–127, 1997.
169
[56] Gil, R. and Hartmann, W. R., “Empirical analysis of metering price dis-
crimination: Evidence from concession sales at movie theaters,” Working paper,
2008.
[57] Grabiner, D., “Descartes’ rule of signs: Another construction,” American
Mathematical Monthly, vol. 106, pp. 854–855, 1999.
[58] Greckel, F. and Felton, M. V., “Price and income elasticities of demand:
A case study of Louisville,” Economic Efficiency and the Performing Arts,
pp. 62–73, 1987.
[59] Green, L., Kolesar, P., and Whitt, W., “Coping with time-varying de-
mand when setting staffing requirements for a service system,” Production and
Operations Management, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 13–39, 2007.
[60] Gross, D. and Harris, C., Fundamentals of queueing theory. John Wliey
and Sons, 1985.
[61] Gurnani, H. and Tang, C., “Optimal ordering decisions with uncertain cost
and demand forecast updating,” Management Science, vol. 45, pp. 1456–1462,
1999.
[62] Gurumurthi, S. and Benjaafar, S., “Modeling and analysis of flexible
queueing systems,” Naval Research Logistics, vol. 51, pp. 755–782, 2004.
[63] Ha, A., “Optimal pricing that coordinates queues with customer-chosen service
requirements,” Management Science, vol. 47, pp. 915–930, 2001.
[64] Harel, A., “Convexity properties of the Erlang loss formula.,” Operations
Research, vol. 38, pp. 499–505, 1990.
[65] Harpaz, G., Lee, W., and Winkler, R., “Learning, experimentation, and
the optimal output decisions of a competitive firm,” Management Science,
vol. 28, pp. 589–603, 1982.
[66] Harrison, J. and Lopez, M., “Heavy traffic resource pooling in parallel-
server systems,” Queueing Systems, vol. 33, pp. 339–368, 1999.
[67] Huntington, P., “Pricing policy and box office revenue.,” Journal of Cultural
Economics, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 71–87, 1993.
[68] Jagerman, D., “Some properties of the Erlang loss function,” Bell System
Technical Journal, vol. 53, pp. 525–551, 1974.
[69] Jordan, W., Inman, R., and Blumenfeld, D., “Chained cross-training of
workers for robust performance,” IIE Transactions, vol. 36, pp. 953–967, 2004.
[70] Jorgensen, S., Kort, P., and Zaccour, G., “Optimal pricing and adver-
tising policies for an entertainment event,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, vol. 33, pp. 583–596, 2009.
170
[71] Jouini, O. and Dallery, Y., “Estimating and announcing waiting times in
multiple customer class call centers,” Proceedings of INCOM, vol. 2, pp. 371–
376, 2006.
[72] Jouini, O., Dallery, Y., and Nait-Abdallah, R., “Analysis of the impact
of team-based organizations in call center management,” Management Science,
vol. 54, pp. 400–414, 2008.
[73] Kannan, P. and Kopalle, P., “To err is rational : Dynamic pricing on the
internet: Importance and implications for consumer behaviour.,” International
Journal of Electronic Commerce, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 63–83, 2001.
[74] Kelejian, H. H. and Lawrence, W. J., “Estimating the demand for Broad-
way theater: A preliminary inquiry,” Economic Policy for the Arts, pp. 333–346,
1980.
[75] Kessler, M. and Turner, D., “Effects of density and cage size on stress
in domestic cats (felis silvestris catus) housed in animal shelters and boarding
catteries,” Animal Welfare, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 259–267, 1999.
[76] Ketchum, P., “Adopt-a-cat not an animal shelter,” Canadian Family Physi-
cian, vol. 49, pp. 936–936, 2003.
[77] Kincaid, W. M., D. D., “An inventory pricing problem,” Journal of Mathe-
matical Analysis and Applications, vol. 7, pp. 183–208, 1963.
[78] Kochel, P., “Finite queueing systems structural investigations and optimal
design,” International Journal of Production Economics, vol. 88, pp. 157–171,
2004.
[79] Koole, G. and Pot, A., “An overview of routing and staffing algorithms in
multi-skill customer contact centers: Technical report,” Department of Mathe-
matics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2006.
[80] Krishnan, K., “The convexity of loss rate in an Erlang loss system and sojourn
in an Erlang delay system with respect to arrival rate and service rate,” IEEE
Transactions on Communications, vol. 38, no. 9, pp. 1314–1316, 1990.
[81] LA Animal Services, 2010. Official Website of Los Angeles Animal Services
Department,
http://www.laanimalservices.com, last accessed on January 21, 2010.
[82] Ladany, S. and Arbel, A., “Optimal cruise-liner passenger cabin pricing
policy,” European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 55, pp. 136–147, 1991.
[83] Lan, Y., Gao, H., Ball, M., and Karaesmen, I., “Revenue management
with limited demand information,” Management Science, vol. 54, pp. 1594–
1609.
171
[84] Lariviere, M. and Porteus, E., “Stalking information: Bayesian inventory
management with unobserved lost sales,” Management Science, vol. 45, pp. 346–
363, 1999.
[85] Larsen, C., “Investigating sensitivity and the impact of information on pricing
decisions in an M/M/1/∞ queueing model,” International Journal of Produc-
tion Economics, vol. 56-57, pp. 365–377, 1998.
[86] Lazear, E., “Retail pricing and clearance sales,” American Economic Review,
vol. 76, pp. 14–32, 1986.
[87] Leloup, B. and Deveaux, L., “Dynamic pricing on the internet: Theory and
simulations,” Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 265–
276, 2001.
[88] Leslie, P., “A structural econometric analysis of price discrimination in Broad-
way theater,” Mimeo, Yale University., 1998.
[89] Leslie, P., “Price discrimination in Broadway theater,” RAND Journal of
Economics, vol. 35, pp. 520–541, 2004.
[90] Levin, Y., McGill, J., and Nediak, M., “Dynamic pricing in the presence
of strategic consumers and oligopolistic competition,” Management Science,
vol. 55, pp. 32–46, 2009.
[91] Lieberman, W., “Implementing yield management,” ORSA/TIMS National
Meeting, (San Francisco, California), 1992.
[92] Lin, K., “Dynamic pricing with real-time demand learning,” European Journal
of Operations Research, vol. 174, pp. 522–538, 2006.
[93] Little, J., “A proof of the theorem L = λ W,” Operations Research, vol. 9,
pp. 383–387, 1961.
[94] Littlewood, K., “Forecasting and control of passenger bookings.” AGIFORS
Symposium Proceedings 95-117, 1972.
[95] Lott, J. and Russell, R., “A guide to the pitfalls of identifying price dis-
crimination,” Economic Inquiry, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 14–23, 1991.
[96] Lovejoy, W., “Myopic policies for some inventory models with uncertain
demand distributions,” Management Science, vol. 36, pp. 724–738, 1990.
[97] Maddiesfund Org., 2009. Official Website of Maddiesfund Organization,
http://www.maddiesfund.org, last access on June 10, 2009.
[98] Maglaras, C. and Meissner, J., “Dynamic pricing strategies for multi-
product revenue management problems,” Manufacturing and Service Opera-
tions Management, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 136–148, 2006.
172
[99] Mandelbaum, A. and Reiman, M., “On pooling in queueing networks,”
Management Science, vol. 44, pp. 971–981, 1998.
[100] Marburger, D., “Optimal ticket pricing for performance goods,” Managerial
and Decision Economics, vol. 18, pp. 375–381, 1997.
[101] Massey, W. and Wallace, R., “An optimal design of the M/M/C/K queue
for call centers,” Queueing Systems, vol. forthcoming, 2006.
[102] Matsuo, H., “A stochastic sequencing problem for style goods with forecast
revisions and hierarchical structure,” Management Science, vol. 36, pp. 332–
247, 1990.
[103] McKenna, K., 2007. http://mckatie.wordpress.com, last accessed on January
12, 2010.
[104] Mendelson, H., “Pricing computer services: queueing effects,” Communica-
tions of the ACM, vol. 28, pp. 312–321, 1985.
[105] Messerli, E., “Proof of a convexity property of the Erlang B formula,” Bell
system Technical Journal, vol. 51, pp. 951–953, 1971.
[106] Moore, T. G., “The demand for Broadway theater tickets,” Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, vol. 48, pp. 79–87, 1966.
[107] Moore, T. G., “Economics of American theater,” Durham, N.C.: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 1968.
[108] Murray, G. and Silver, E., “A Bayesian analysis of the style goods inventory
problem,” Management Science, vol. 12, pp. 785–797, 1966.
[109] NAICS, 2009. Official Website of North American Industry Classification Sys-
tem (NAICS),
http://www.census.gov/naics, last access on October 11, 2009.
[110] NCPPSP, 2009. National Council on Pet Population Study and Policy
(NCPPSP),
http://www.petfinder.com/for-shelters/facts-about-animal-sheltering.html,
last access on June 29, 2009.
[111] Ng, I., The Pricing and Revenue Management of Services: A Strategic Ap-
proach. Published By Routledge, An Imprint Of Taylor And Francis, under the
Advances in Business and Management Studies, 2007.
[112] No Kill Advocacy Center, 2009. Official Website of No Kill Advocacy
Center,
http://www.nokilladvocacycenter.org, last access on March 3, 2009.
173
[113] Normando, S., Stefanini, C., Meers, L., Adamelli, S., Coultis, D.,
and Bono, G., “Some factors influencing adoption of sheltered dogs,” Anthro-
zoos, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 211–224, 2006.
[114] Ormeci, E., “Dynamic admission control in a call center with one shared
and two dedicated service facilities,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 49, no. 7, pp. 1157–1161, 2004.
[115] Palaka, K., Erlebacher, S., and D.H., K., “Lead-time setting, capac-
ity utilization and pricing decisions under lead-time dependent demand,” IIE
Transactions, vol. 30, pp. 151–163, 1998.
[116] Petruzzi, N. and Dada, M., “Dynamic pricing and inventory control with
learning,” Naval Research Logistics, vol. 49, pp. 303–325, 2002.
[117] Plackett, R., “Karl Pearson and the Chi-Squared Test,” International Sta-
tistical Review, vol. 51, pp. 59–72, 1983.
[118] Posage, J. M., Bartlett, P., and Thomas, D., “Determining factors for
successful adoption of dogs from an animal shelter,” Journal of the American
Veterinary Medical Association, vol. 213, no. 4, pp. 478–482, 1998.
[119] PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2010. Official Website of PricewaterhouseCoop-
ers,
http://http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/index.jhtml?ld=no, last accessed on October
4, 2010.
[120] Rascher, D., “A test of the optimal positive production network externality
in major league baseball. in J. Fizel, E. Gustafson, and L. Hadley (Eds.) in
Sports economics: Current research (pp. 27–45),” Westport, CT: Greenwood,
1999.
[121] Ray, S. and Jewkes, E., “Customer lead time management when both de-
mand and price are lead time sensitive,” European Journal of Operational Re-
search, vol. 153, pp. 769–781, 2004.
[122] Reyniers, D., “A high-low search algorithm for a newsboy problem with de-
layed information feedback,” Operations Research, vol. 38, pp. 838–846, 1990.
[123] Rosen, S. and Rosenfield, A., “Ticket pricing,” Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 351–376, 1997.
[124] Ross, S., Stochastic processes. John Wliey and Sons, 1996.
[125] Rothstein, M., “An airline overbooking model,” Transportation Science,
vol. 5, pp. 180–192, 1971.
[126] Scarf, H., “Bayes solutions to the statistical inventory problem,” Annals of
Mathematical Statistics, vol. 30, p. 1959, 490-508.
174
[127] Sen, A. and Zhang, A., “Style goods pricing with demand learning,” Euro-
pean Journal of Operation Research, vol. 196, pp. 1058–1075, 2009.
[128] Sharma, P. and Singh, K., “Effect of shelter system on environmental vari-
ables,” Indian Journal of Animal Sciences, vol. 72, no. 9, pp. 806–809, 2002.
[129] Sheikhzadeh, M., Benjaafar, S., and Gupta, D., “Machine sharing in
manufacturing systems: Flexibility versus chaining,” International Journal of
Flexible Manufacturing Systems, vol. 10, pp. 351–378, 1998.
[130] Shumsky, R., “Approximation and analysis of a call center with flexible and
specialized servers,” OR Spectrum, vol. 26, pp. 307–330, 2004.
[131] Smith, D. and Whitt, W., “Resource sharing for efficiency in traffic systems,”
Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 60, pp. 39–55, 1981.
[132] SNKC Org., 2009. Spay Neuter Kansas City Organization (SNKC),
http://www.snkc.net/petoverpopulation.html, last access on June 15, 2009.
[133] So, K. and Song, J., “Price, delivery time guarantees and capacity selection,”
European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 111, pp. 28–49, 1998.
[134] Steiner, F., “Optimal pricing of museum admission,” Journal of Cultural
Economics, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 307–333, 1997.
[135] Subrahmanyan, S. and Shoemaker, R., “Developing optimal pricing and
inventory policies of retailers who face uncertain demand,” Journal of Retailing,
vol. 72, pp. 7–30, 1996.
[136] Syski, R., Introduction to Congestion Theory in Telephone Systems. New
York: North-Holland, 1986.
[137] Tadj, L. and Choudhury, G., “Optimal design and control of queues,” Span-
ish Statistical and Operations Research Society, vol. 13, pp. 359–414, 2005.
[138] Toma, M. and Meads, H., “Recent evidence on the determinants of con-
cert attendance for mid-size symphonies,” Journal of Economics and Finance,
vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 412–421, 2007.
[139] Travel and Leisure, 2010. Travel and Leisure Website,
http://www.travelandleisure.com/articles/domestic-airlines-the-cost-of-pre-
assigned-coach-seats/1, last accessed on September 20, 2010.
[140] Tseng, P., Effects of Performance Schedules on Event Ticket Sales. PhD
thesis, University of Maryland, 2009.
[141] Wells, D., Graham, L., and Hepper, P., “The influence of length of time
in a rescue shelter on the behaviour of kennelled dogs,” Animal Welfare, vol. 11,
no. 3, pp. 317–325, 2002.
175
[142] Wells, D. and Hepper, P., “The influence of environmental change on the
behaviour of sheltered dogs,” Applied Animal Behaviour Science, vol. 68, no. 2,
pp. 151–162, 2000.
[143] Whitt, W., “Improving service by informing customers about anticipated
delays,” Management Science, vol. 45, pp. 192–207, 1999.
[144] Widder, D., Advanced Calculus. Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1989.
[145] Williams, A., “Do anti-ticket scalping laws make a difference?,” Managerial
and Decision Economics, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 503–509, 1994.
[146] Wolff, R. and Wang, C., “On the convexity of loss probabilities,” Applied
Probability, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 402–406, 2002.
[147] Yakici, E., Duran, S., and Swann, J., “Dynamic switching times from
season to single tickets with early switch to low demand tickets in sports and
entertainment industry.” Working Paper, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009.
[148] Zawistowski, S.L., 2009. Petfinder Website,
http://www.petfinder.com/for-shelters/euthanasia-statistics.html, last access on
October 22, 2009.
[149] Zhao, W. and Zheng, Y., “Optimal dynamic pricing for perishable assets
with nonhomogeneous demand,” Management Science, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 375–
388, 2000.
[150] Ziya, S., Ayhan, H., and Foley, R., “Optimal prices for finite capacity
queueing systems,” Operations Research Letters, vol. 34, pp. 214–218, 2006.
176
VITA
Naragain Phumchusri was born in Bangkok, Thailand on January 1, 1983. She
received her B.S. degree in Industrial Engineering from Chulalongkorn University,
Bangkok, Thailand in 2004. After her graduation, she joined Procter & Gamble
Manufacturing (Thailand) Ltd., where she worked as a production engineer with the
responsibility of analyzing and reducing work-in-process inventory. She then pursued
her graduate study and earned M.S. degree in Industrial and Systems Engineering at
Georgia Institute of Technology in 2006. After that, she continued her doctoral study
in the same department. In 2008, she worked as an intern at Predictix, a consulting
company specializing on demand forecasting and promotion planning, where her de-
liverable was a statistical analysis identifying customers strategic behaviors affected
by past promotions. Upon her Ph.D. graduation, she will be joining the Faculty of
Engineering at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand.
177
